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Abstract
Abstract
Smartphones have advanced from simple communication devices to multipurpose devices
that capture almost every single moment in our daily lives and thus contain sensitive data
like photos or contact information. In order to protect this data, users can choose from a
variety of authentication schemes. However, what happens if one of these schemes fails, for
example, when users are not able to provide the correct password within a limited number
of attempts? So far, situations like this have been neglected by the usable security and
privacy community that mainly focuses on primary authentication schemes. But fallback
authentication is comparably important to enable users to regain access to their devices (and
data) in case of lockouts. In theory, any scheme for primary authentication on smartphones
could also be used as fallback solution. In practice, fallback authentication happens less
frequently and imposes different requirements and challenges on its design.
The aim of this work is to understand and address these challenges. We investigate the oc-
currences of fallback authentication on smartphones in real life in order to grasp the charac-
teristics that fallback authentication conveys. We also get deeper insights into the difficulties
that users have to cope with during lockout situations. In combination with the knowledge
from previous research, these insights are valuable to provide a detailed definition of fall-
back authentication that has been missing so far. The definition covers usability and security
characteristics and depicts the differences to primary authentication.
Furthermore, we explore the potential of autobiographical memory, a part of the human
memory that relates to personal experiences of the past, for the design of alternative fall-
back schemes to overcome the well-known memorability issues of current solutions. We
present the design and evaluation of two static approaches that are based on the memory of
locations and special drawings. We also cover three dynamic approaches that relate to re-
cent smartphone activities, icon arrangements and installed apps. This series of work allows
us to analyze the suitability of different types of memories for fallback authentication. It
also helps us to extend the definition of fallback authentication by identifying factors that
influence the quality of fallback schemes.
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: First, it gives essen-
tial insights into the relevance, frequency and problems of fallback authentication on smart-
phones in real life. Second, it provides a clear definition of fallback authentication to classify
authentication schemes based on usability and security properties. Third, it shows example
implementations and evaluations of static and dynamic fallback schemes that are based on
different autobiographical memories. Finally, it discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of these memories and gives recommendations for their design, evaluation and analysis in
the context of fallback authentication.
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Zusammenfassung
Zusammenfassung
Aus vormals einfachen Kommunikationsgeräten haben sich Smartphones inzwischen zu
Multifunktionsgeräten weiterentwickelt, die fast jeden einzelnen Moment in unserem Alltag
verfolgen und aufzeichnen. So ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass diese Geräte auch viele sen-
sible Daten beinhalten, wie zum Beispiel Fotos oder Kontaktinformationen. Um diese Daten
zu schützen, können Smartphone-Nutzer aus einer Vielzahl von Authentifizierungsverfahren
auswählen. Doch was passiert, wenn eines dieser Verfahren versagt, zum Beispiel wenn Nut-
zer nicht in der Lage sind ihr korrektes Passwort innerhalb einer begrenzten Anzahl von Ver-
suchen einzugeben? Derartige Fragen wurden bislang von der Usable Security und Privacy
Gemeinschaft vernachlässigt, deren Augenmerk vielmehr auf dem Forschungsfeld der pri-
mären Authentifizierung gerichtet war. Jedoch ist das Gebiet der Fallback-Authentifizierung
von vergleichbarer Bedeutung, um Nutzern die Möglichkeit zu bieten, wieder Zugang zu ih-
ren Daten und Geräten zu erlangen, wenn sie sich aussperren. Im Prinzip kann jedes primäre
Authentifizierungsverfahren auch für die Fallback-Authentifizierung eingesetzt werden. Da
letzteres in der Praxis jedoch viel seltener passiert, bringt der Entwurf neuer Verfahren für
die Fallback-Authentifizierung neue Anforderungen und Herausforderungen mit sich.
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, diese Herausforderungen zu verstehen und herauszuarbeiten. Da-
zu haben wir untersucht, wie häufig sich Smartphone-Nutzer im Alltag aussperren, um
darauf basierend die Hauptanforderungen für den Entwurf von Verfahren zur Fallback-
Authentifizierung herzuleiten. Zudem konnten wir durch die Untersuchung ein tieferes Ver-
ständnis für die Probleme der Nutzer in solchen Situationen entwickeln. Zusammen mit den
Erkenntnissen aus verwandten Arbeiten ermöglichten die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung ei-
ne detaillierte Definition für den Begriff der Fallback-Authentifizierung bereitzustellen und
unter Berücksichtigung von Faktoren der Nutzerfreundlichkeit und Sicherheit deren Unter-
schiede zur primären Authentifizierung hervorzuheben.
Zudem haben wir die Möglichkeiten des autobiographischen Gedächtnisses für den Ent-
wurf alternativer Verfahren zu Fallback-Authentifizierung exploriert. Das autobiographische
Gedächtnis ist ein Teil des menschlichen Gehirns und besteht aus persönlichen Erinne-
rungen der Vergangenheit. Durch den persönlichen Bezug erscheinen diese Erinnerungen
vielversprechend, um die Probleme bekannter Verfahren zu überwinden. Im Rahmen die-
ser Arbeit stellen wir deshalb zwei statische und drei dynamische Verfahren zur Fallback-
Authentifizierung vor, die sich auf autobiographischen Erinnerungen stützen. Während sich
die statischen Verfahren auf ortsbezogene Erinnerungen und das Anfertigen spezieller Zeich-
nungen konzentrieren, basieren die dynamischen Verfahren auf Erinnerungen der nahen Ver-
gangenheit (z. B. Aktivitäten auf dem Smartphone, Anordnung von Anwendungen oder de-
ren Installation). Die vorgestellten Konzepte erlauben nicht nur das Potential verschiedener
autobiographischer Erinnerungen zu analysieren, sondern ermöglichen es auch Faktoren zu
identifizieren, die einen Einfluss auf die Qualität der vorgestellten Konzepte haben und somit
nützlich sind, um die Definition der Fallback-Authentifizierung zu erweitern.
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Der wissenschaftliche Beitrag dieser Arbeit lässt sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: (1) Die Ar-
beit gibt einen wichtigen Einblick in die Relevanz, Häufigkeit und Probleme der Fallback-
Authentifizierung im Alltag der Nutzer. (2) Sie stellt eine klare Definition für den Begriff
der Fallback-Authentifizierung bereit, um Authentifizierungssysteme anhand verschiedener
Eigenschaften wie Nutzerfreundlichkeit und Sicherheit zu klassifizieren. (3) Sie diskutiert
die Vor- und Nachteile verschiedener autobiographischer Erinnerungen anhand von Beispie-
limplementierungen und gibt darauf basierend Empfehlungen zu deren Nutzung und Evalu-
ierung im Kontext der Fallback-Authentifizierung.
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This thesis is the result of several projects that I have accomplished in the past four years of
my time as a PhD student. None of these projects would have been possible without the help
of my wonderful colleagues and diligent students. To appreciate this collaboration, I decided
to use the scientific plural in this thesis. A clear overview of my personal contribution to each
of the projects will be given next.
Chapter 3: A Survey on Fallback Authentication
The content of this chapter is based on a bachelor thesis by Victoria Müller [127]. The idea
for the project was developed by me. I defined the project’s goals and set the frame for
the bachelor thesis. The work was conducted in a collaborative manner and each step in
the project was jointly discussed in weekly meetings. However, as a supervisor, I was the
key decision maker on how to proceed in the project (e.g., survey structure, question design,
study execution and study evaluation).
Part of this work was published at the International Conference on Human-Computer Inter-
action with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI 2015) with co-authors Alexander De
Luca, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Manuel Demmler and Heinrich Hussmann [77]. The main
corpus of the paper was written by me (except for the limitations section that was written by
Emanuel von Zezschwitz). Revisions to the paper were also made by me and were based on
the feedback by the co-authors.
Chapter 5: Fallback Authentication Based on Static Enrollments
The content of this chapter is based on two bachelor theses by Lara Hirschbeck and Michael
Richter [89, 145].
The idea for the first project was developed by me. I defined the project’s goals and set the
frame for the bachelor thesis. The work was conducted in a collaborative manner and each
step in the project was jointly discussed in weekly meetings, but I was the key decision maker
on how to proceed in the project (e.g., prototype features, study design and data analysis).
The second project was jointly supervised by Alexander De Luca and me. Again, the work
was conducted in a collaborative manner and each step in the project was jointly discussed in
weekly meetings. Alexander De Luca and I were the key decision makers on how to proceed
in the project (e.g., prototype features, study design and data analysis).
The results from this work were published at the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS 2015) with co-authors Alexander De Luca, Michael Richter, Matthew Smith and
Heinrich Hussmann [76]. The main corpus of the paper was written by me. Revisions to the
paper were also made by me and were based on the feedback by the co-authors.
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Chapter 6: Fallback Authentication Based on Implicit Enrollments
The content of this chapter is based on three main projects that, in turn, consist of several
bachelor theses.
The first project on dynamic security questions was based on two bachelor theses by Stephan
Thalhammer and Philipp Hauptmann [81, 173]. The idea for dynamic security questions
originated from Emanuel von Zezschwitz and Alexander De Luca. This idea was then
adapted to the context of fallback authentication by Alexander De Luca and me. The work
was conducted in a collaborative manner with the corresponding students and each step in
the project was jointly discussed in weekly meetings. Alexander De Luca and I were the key
decision makers on how to proceed in the projects (e.g., prototype features, study design and
data analysis).
Part of this project was published at the International Conference on Human Computer In-
teraction (CHI 2015) with co-authors Alexander De Luca and Heinrich Hussmann [75]. The
main corpus of the paper was written by me and was constantly improved based on the
feedback of the co-authors.
The second project on icon arrangements was based on two bachelor theses by John-Louis
Gao and Carina Saliger [62, 150]. The idea for both theses was developed by me. The work
was conducted in a collaborative manner with the students and each step in the project was
jointly discussed in weekly meetings. However, I was the key decision maker on how to
proceed in the project (e.g., prototype features, study design and data analysis).
Part of this project was published at the International Conference on Human Computer in-
teraction (CHI 2014) with co-authors Alexander De Luca and Heinrich Hussmann [74]. The
main corpus of the paper was written by me. Revisions to the paper were also made by me
and were based on suggestions by the co-authors.
The last project on app installations was based on a bachelor thesis by Manuel Demmler [45].
The idea for the project was developed by me. I defined the project’s goals and set the frame
for the resulting bachelor thesis. The work was conducted in a collaborative manner and each
step in the project was jointly discussed in weekly meetings, but I was the key decision maker
on how to proceed in the project (e.g., prototype features, study design and data analysis).
The project was part of a paper that was published at the International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Service (MobileHCI 2015) with
co-authors Alexander De Luca, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Manuel Demmler and Heinrich
Hussmann [77]. The main corpus of the paper was written by me (except for the limitations
section that was written by Emanuel von Zezschwitz). Revisions to the paper were also made
by me and were based on the feedback by the co-authors.
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When One Door Closes, Another Opens
Imagine a girl who joyfully descends from the airplane. It is her first travel to Denmark and
she is excited. She and her friend are now on the way to the train that is supposed to bring
them into the city. They chatter in anticipation, making plans for their stay. As the train has
not yet arrived, the girl wants to quickly drop a message to her parents that the airplane has
landed safe and sound. She picks up her phone and turns it on as she had switched it off
for the flight. Still focused on her friend’s chatter, she notices that the phone requires some
kind of PIN, but does not pay much attention to it. She repeatedly enters her lock screen PIN
despite the notifications that pop up to inform her that the input was wrong. Shifting her
attention back from her friend to the phone, she realizes that she just locked her SIM card.
She had mixed up the PINs. What is she supposed to do?
1.1 Losing the Key
Losing access to our smartphone or parts of it is comparable to losing the key to our homes
and thus to personal items like photos or financial records (e.g., [78,105,128]). While smart-
phones were mainly used for communication purposes in their early stages, they have trans-
formed to multipurpose devices, supporting users in different tasks, ranging from scheduling
appointments, initiating financial transactions to simply entertaining the user (e.g., [13,151]).
In order to protect the data that comes with these kinds of tasks, users can choose from
a variety of authentication schemes like PINs or passwords. However, these authentica-
tion schemes as well as their users are not infallible and make the availability of alternative
schemes as fallback options indispensable.
These alternatives are described by different terminology in the literature, such as last resort
authentication (e.g., [155]), backup authentication (e.g., [156]), password reset (e.g., [60])
or fallback authentication (e.g., [139]). In the remainder of this thesis, we will use the term
fallback authentication for several reasons: First, we do not consider the use of alternative
authentication options to be a last resort solution. In fact, the last resort in a mobile context
is resetting the phone to factory settings that, in turn, is coupled with the deletion of all data
on the device. Second, the term backup authentication is ambiguous as it also refers to the
authentication on backup systems that has nothing to do with lockout experiences. Third,
although the term password reset describes the use of alternative authentication schemes, we
were striving for a more general term that does not have a strong association with password
resets for online accounts.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: It introduces different scenarios in
which lockouts may occur in a mobile context (Section 1.1.1). It further gives an overview
of current fallback solutions to establish a basic understanding of fallback authentication in
practice (Section 1.1.2). This forms the basis to introduce our problem statement (Section
1.2) and main contributions (Sections 1.3 and 1.4).
1.1.1 Lockout Scenarios
Lockouts refer to situations in which the user is no longer able to authenticate via the primary
authentication scheme. They can, for example, happen when users are not able to recall
their passwords or when they repeatedly enter the incorrect passwords until the number of
allowed authentication attempts is exhausted and the primary scheme gets blocked. In a
mobile context, there exist different situations that can lead to lockouts.
SIM Card Lockouts
The introducing scenario of this chapter was an example for a SIM card lockout. SIM cards
are used to authenticate smartphones with the cellular network which, in turn, is required to
enable telephony-related functionality (e.g., making calls). Since these cards store sensitive
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data about the mobile subscriber, they can be protected by a PIN which, however, has to be
entered in special circumstances only, for example, when the device is restarted. Due to the
infrequent input, these situations are likely to cause potential lockouts due to forgotten PINs.
Lock Screen Lockouts
Lockouts can also occur during lock screen authentication on smartphones due to different
circumstances. For example, biometric schemes are prone to false negatives that are not
necessarily caused by the user, but are due to external factors, such as bad lighting [41]. In
these situations, users depend on alternative means of authentication to regain access. Lock-
outs can also happen with knowledge-based schemes, such as PINs or graphical passwords,
for example, when users enter them incorrectly multiple times in a row until the number of
allowed attempts is exhausted.
Account Lockouts
Most smartphones enable users to access their online accounts on the go, either using a
mobile browser or dedicated apps for these services (e.g., email or social networks). Due
to the inconvenience of text input on smartphones, users often have the possibility to store
their passwords for automated login. However, situations like spontaneous device sharing
sometimes require users to log out of their accounts (e.g., when a friend borrows the phone
to use an app [78]). This may lead to potential lockouts due to the lack of input training.
1.1.2 Current Solutions
For each of the described lockout scenarios, there are different fallback solutions. In this
section, we will focus on solutions that are actually used in practice. This is done to pro-
vide a basic overview of how fallback authentication works and what problems they may
cause. However, the main focus of this thesis aims at developing a profound understanding
of these problems from a scientific point of view. This has been rarely done in the research
community and we will elaborate on this later in more detail (see Section 1.2).
Solutions for SIM Card Lockouts
Personal unblocking codes (PUC) are often used for SIM card lockouts [148] and consist
of up to eight digits. They are usually sent to the user by postal mail or can be looked up
online. As the last resort (i.e., when the PUC is lost), users have to ask their service provider
for replacement.
Solutions for Lock Screen Lockouts
With respect to lock screen lockouts, the solutions vary and depend on the operating system
of the device as well as the type of authentication scheme used. For example, Android users
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with Face Unlock1 as their primary scheme are required to set up a graphical pattern as an
alternative in case of failure. If this pattern, in turn, is entered incorrectly multiple times in a
row, users have to wait for a certain amount of time before re-authentication with the same
scheme is possible. However, Android users that have their device connected to an email
account can circumvent these waiting times by performing email-based resets. As the last
resort, users can reset their devices to factory settings. However, this may be coupled with
the loss of their data if no backup was made beforehand.
In turn, iPhone users can set up a fingerprint-based authentication method called Touch
ID.2 In case Touch ID is activated, users have to provide an alternative PIN for fallback
authentication. If this PIN is repeatedly entered incorrectly, the system introduces a delay
before another authentication attempt is possible. To circumvent these waiting times, users
can connect their smartphone to Apple’s iTunes software. However, this method is coupled
with data loss if no backup has been made.
There are some operating systems that do not offer any fallback options at all so that resetting
the device is the only possibility. This is, for example, of concern for Windows Phone users
or Blackberry users who do not have business accounts.
Solutions for Account Lockouts
With respect to account lockouts, the alternatives are often adopted from the desktop environ-
ment and include, for example, email-based password resets or the use of security questions
(see Chapter 2).
1.2 Problem Statement
While it is comforting to know that solutions exist for most lockout situations, it is, at the
same time, unsatisfying that so little is known about how and when they are used. Since
mobile devices are often used on the go, current solutions may not work in all circumstances.
For example, the retrieval of tokens or the use of email-based resets is difficult when users
are not at home or Internet access is limited. In addition to this, some required tools, such as
computers, cables or software, may not be at hand to perform fallback authentication.
So far, these potential problems have received little attention by the research community:
there is no scientific data available that assesses the reasons that lead to lockout situations
and how users cope with them. Hence, it is not possible to decide what users need from
fallback solutions to recover from lockout situations and how these solutions should look
like. Instead, research in the field of usable security and privacy mostly focuses on primary
authentication. Fallback authentication (in particular on mobile devices) is often mentioned
1 https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/2781894?hl=en (last accessed 23/11/2015)
2 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201371 (last accessed 23/12/2015)
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as a side note only, for example, when proposed schemes do not work for primary authenti-
cation due to long authentication times (e.g., [83]).
The research that is available for fallback authentication is limited to the analysis and design
of security questions (see Chapter 2). The key insights from this research is that security
questions have very bad usability and security properties: questions that are easy to remem-
ber are often easy to guess, while questions that are hard to guess are often hard to remember
(e.g., [68, 101, 102, 139, 139]). Therefore, it is discouraged to use them, as is, for fallback
authentication. Although some endeavors have been made to design alternatives, finding
appropriate solutions remains a challenging task.
One of the main shortcomings of security questions is that most of them rely on personal
facts, such as facts about family members (e.g., mother’s maiden name), pets (e.g., name
of first cat) or personal preferences (e.g., favorite actor). Although easy to remember, these
kinds of information are also often known by persons close to the user or even researchable
by strangers through the help of public records or social networks [68, 101, 139].
However, what has been overlooked so far for the design of security questions is that au-
tobiographical information goes beyond personal facts. On the contrary, autobiographical
memory is a collection of memories from different brain structures, such as the semantic
memory, episodic memory or memory for procedural skills and habits. These memories are
all centered around the self and remembered more vividly than just facts [51,176]. Episodic
memories, for example, are not learned by heart, but instead are experienced through per-
sonal events and recalled more vividly [175]. Another example are procedural skills. They
are often acquired through training and also easier to recall when they become an automated
routine [32]. All things considered, autobiographical memories seem to be a great fit for the
design of fallback schemes. Therefore, we analyze in this thesis how well autobiographical
memories work in terms of usability (i.e., memorability) and security for fallback authenti-
cation to support users in lockout situations.
In summary, there are three major problems that we want to address. The first problem is the
lack of understanding of why lockout situations occur and how well users cope with these
situations. The second problem refers to the missing design space for fallback authentica-
tion: It is unclear which requirements should be met for the design of fallback schemes, for
example, to distinguish them from primary authentication schemes. The third problem is
related to the narrow view on autobiographical memory: Most security questions focus on
personal facts so that other types of autobiographical memories have been seldom explored
for fallback authentication.
1.3 Main Contributions
As previously discussed, the topic of fallback authentication has only been marginally
touched by previous research and there exists, in particular for the mobile context, little
knowledge about how well fallback solutions work, what kind of problems users have to
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cope with and how alternative fallback schemes should look like. The main objective of this
thesis is to provide a fundamental understanding on this matter. In order to achieve this, we
address several research questions on our way towards this goal.
1.3.1 Insights into Mobile Fallback Authentication
While there exist some numbers on the lockout frequency of online accounts (e.g., [166]),
there is no documentation available from manufacturers, service providers or research about
how often fallback authentication is required on smartphones. This thesis provides some
of the first solidly researched answers on this matter by using established research tools
(i.e., surveys and semi-structured interviews) to analyze the frequency with which users
experience different lockout situations on their smartphones (i.e., SIM card lockouts, lock
screen lockouts and account lockouts). In addition to this, we accompany the raw numbers
by personal anecdotes that allow to understand why certain problems arise and why certain
countermeasures are taken by users during fallback authentication. Overall, these insights
highlight the basic requirements for the design of mobile fallback schemes (see Chapter 3).
1.3.2 Framework for Fallback Authentication
We further provide a framework for fallback authentication to support usable security and
privacy researchers and practitioners in classifying their authentication schemes (Chapter 4).
The framework encompasses a clear definition of fallback authentication to depict the main
differences to primary authentication. It further analyzes the requirements for the design and
evaluation of fallback schemes. These requirements are derived from established usability
and security criteria and are later extended by the results presented in this work. In addi-
tion to this, we suggest the accuracy measure as a metric to find the best trade-off between
memorability and usability for knowledge-based authentication schemes. This metric uses
the ratio of the number of correct decisions made by a system to the number of all decisions
made to indicate how well a system (in our case a fallback scheme) works. We provide rea-
sons in favor and against the use of this measure in the context of knowledge-based schemes
and set an example by using it for the evaluation of our implementations.
1.3.3 Analysis of Autobiographical Memories
Since the human memory has more to offer than just personal facts, we review existing
work in this domain to identify other types of autobiographical memories for the design of
fallback schemes to overcome the shortcomings of traditional security questions (see Chapter
2). Through the design and implementation of five example prototypes, this thesis analyzes
the potential and challenges of different memory types that include the skill to draw, episodic
memories with a strong spatio-temporal context as well as episodic memories about recent
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smartphone activities, icon arrangements and installed apps. In particular, this thesis shows
how well/bad certain types of memories can be recalled by users and how secure/insecure
certain types of memories are against attacks by different adversaries. In addition to this, we
identify the memory types that have the best trade-off between the two factors, as the best
memories in terms of memorability are not necessarily the best in terms of security.
1.3.4 Design and Evaluation of Fallback Schemes
In addition to the evaluation of autobiographical memories, we further show how they can
be used for the implementation and evaluation of an actual fallback scheme. In particular,
we explore different design options, such as the type of enrollment used. While static en-
rollments require users to provide the needed information in advance (i.e., before fallback
authentication takes place), dynamic enrollments collect the needed information implicitly
in the background. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages that are dis-
cussed in this thesis based on our study results. We further demonstrate how authentication
schemes should be evaluated in the context of fallback authentication to simulate a realistic
fallback scenario (see Chapters 5 and 6).
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized in eight chapters that, in turn, can be structured in three main parts:
The first part focuses on the motivation of fallback authentication and creates its basic foun-
dation (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). The second part analyzes different types of autobiographical
memories through example implementations that take into account different design options
(Chapters 5 and 6). The third part assembles the individual results from each project to create
the big picture and to conclude this thesis (Chapters 7 and 8). The content of each chapter
can be summarized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives an overview of existing work that is related to fallback authentication. In
particular, we motivate the need for fallback authentication by describing the memorability
issues of passwords in general and by discussing the different measures that are available
to address these problems. We further provide an overview of current fallback solutions
in practice and depict their shortcomings, focusing on the use of security questions, which
have also found some interest in the research community. Since this thesis sets its focus on
smartphones, we present an overview of different types of mobile lock screen authentication
to identify potential issues that may lead to lockout situations. Due to the lack of research
on mobile fallback authentication, we review how smartphones are used to support fallback
authentication instead. The chapter concludes with an overview of the human memory and
the different memory structures, with a focus on autobiographical memories to motivate their
use for the design of fallback schemes.
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Chapter 3 provides detailed insights into the frequencies of lockout experiences as well
as the problems and countermeasures that users encounter in these situations. We present
the results of an online survey and complementary interviews on this matter. The chapter
provides a basic understanding for mobile fallback authentication and identifies important
requirements for the design of fallback schemes in a mobile context.
Chapter 4 derives a framework for fallback authentication that is based on the insights from
the previous chapters. The framework includes a clear definition of fallback authentication
and identifies the properties that distinguish it from primary authentication. The properties
are then translated into requirements and inspire the design of each prototype presented in
this work. In addition to this, the chapter overviews the design space of fallback authentica-
tion and presents our research methodology.
Chapter 5 presents the design and evaluation of two fallback schemes that are based on
static enrollments. While one of the schemes focuses on the skill to draw with two fingers
simultaneously, the other uses episodic memories with a strong spatio-temporal context for
the creation of location-based questions. We summarize the results to point out the potential
and challenges of the two memory types and make suggestions for improvements. The
chapter further highlights the importance of different usability factors that were assumed to
be less relevant in the context of fallback authentication.
Chapter 6 complements the preceding chapter by focusing on dynamic enrollments. We
exploit different types of smartphone activities to implement three example schemes for fall-
back authentication. In particular, our implementations set a focus on app-related activities
due to their promising trade-off between memorability and security. In addition, the chapter
identifies further factors that need to be taken into account for the design of dynamic enroll-
ments, such as privacy and data availability. Therefore, these factors extend the list of factors
that have been identified in Chapter 4.
Chapter 7 summarizes the key insights from the design and evaluation of each individual
implementation. Its main objective is to motivate the importance of fallback authentication
in research despite its infrequent occurrence as well as to overview the implications from
the study results for the design and evaluation of fallback schemes in general. We further
make recommendations for the use of autobiographical memories in the context of fallback
authentication.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of the main contributions and presents our
final definition of fallback authentication that is inspired by the study insights. We further
discuss the limitations of this work to give an outlook on the vision that we have for research
in the field of fallback authentication.
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Learning from the Past and Present
The use of passwords for authentication is a common procedure deployed by many web
services and is unlikely to change in the near future. Yet, they come with drawbacks like
the preference of users to select simple passwords due to memorability reasons. Despite the
efforts made to influence password selection, users often still pick easy-to-guess passwords,
perhaps due to the inconvenience of password loss (Section 2.1). Fallback schemes for
password recovery, such as the use of security questions, have shown major usability and
security issues. In particular, the memorability of security questions has to be considered
critically due to their infrequent use (Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Password selection is aggravated on mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) due to their small
form factor. Therefore, alternative schemes for primary authentication on these devices have
been proposed. However, users seem reluctant to adopt them due to the needed training.
Especially in the early phases users are prone to errors and password loss (Section 2.4).
However, documentation on password recovery when lockout happens on mobile devices is
almost non-existent. This makes recovery difficult for inexperienced users (Section 2.5).
This highlights the need for alternative fallback schemes, which, however, require further
understanding of human memory to overcome the memorability issues of current solutions
(Section 2.6). The human memory is a complex structure, consisting of multiple memory
types. In particular, autobiographical memory seems to be a promising source for the design
of fallback authentication schemes (Section 2.7).
2.1 Passwords, the Good and Evil
In this section we introduce the problems of user-chosen passwords and discuss different
practices to address these problems.
Introduced in the mid-sixties [34], passwords are still prevalent in the digital era due to their
convenience of use [84, 86]. While the number of passwords was manageable in the early
days, their number has increased steadily [180]. It is estimated that users have between 8
and 25 distinct accounts that require login (e.g., [37, 64]). In contrast to this, the number
of distinct passwords that they use to protect these accounts is few [37, 56, 64, 83, 166].
Still, remembering them all remains a challenging task. In a study by Chiasson et al. users
could recall only 70% of their passwords over a retention period of two weeks [27]. It is
not surprising that users start to develop undesirable habits like selecting weak passwords,
reusing them across accounts or writing them down [3, 15, 37, 83, 166, 180]. Typically weak
passwords are kept simple, short and are often based on biographical data like names or date
of birth [114,146,166,180]. These kinds of passwords are vulnerable to brute force attacks,
dictionary attacks and other guessing strategies [37, 125, 184]. Therefore, websites have put
some effort in encouraging users to create stronger passwords.
2.1.1 Password Advice
One approach is the use of password advice to support users during password creation (Fig-
ure 2.1, left). However, less than 25% of Internet websites offer this kind of support [17]
and the recommendations found there are of different quality. Some of them are vague,
outdated [58, 86] or too onerous [117]. In particular the latter situation impacts the mem-
orability of passwords or leads users to ignore given advice. Users do not do this because
they are lazy, but mostly due to the imbalance between the required effort and the perceived
benefit of following advice [85]. Therefore, it is important to keep password advice short to
minimize the effort for users. For example, this can be achieved by neglecting threats that
exist in theory, but that are unlikely to occur in real life [58].
2.1.2 Password Policies
A more stringent variant of password advice is the use of password policies that enforce
the compliance to certain requirements [188] (Figure 2.1, center). These requirements do
not follow a common standard, but vary across websites, ranging from loose policies (e.g.,
allowing even one-character passwords) to stricter ones (e.g., passwords of at least eight
characters from multiple character sets) [57]. However, stricter password policies do not
automatically lead to more secure passwords. Therefore, their selection needs to be done
carefully [111, 182]. Policies that are too strict impose a high burden on users, decreasing
the memorability of the selected passwords [93,159]. They also increase user frustration and
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Figure 2.1: Three types of support during password creation: password advice (left), password
policy (center), password meter (right).
cause the selection of passwords that fulfill the minimal requirements [120]. Studies by Das
et al. and Shay et al. showed that users seldom create new passwords, but prefer to use old
ones to adapt them accordingly, for example, by attaching digits at the beginning or end of
the password [37, 159].
2.1.3 Password Meters
Another recommendatory approach is the use of password meters that display the strength
of a password (Figure 2.1, right). These representations are based on so-called scoring al-
gorithms that, in turn, can be based on different approaches (e.g., [24, 162]). Popular imple-
mentations found on the web take password length, the use of numbers or blacklisted words
as a reference for strength calculation [177]. However, many of these calculations are inac-
curate, accepting weak passwords as strong and the other way around [183]. In addition to
the different scoring algorithms, password meters can also differ in their representation. This
includes text-based variants, bar-like visualizations or checkmark indicators [177]. Fifteen
different representations were tested by Ur et al. and their results showed that any kind of vi-
sual representation encourages users to create longer passwords [177]. However, most users
achieve this by attaching additional characters, digits or symbols at the end of their cho-
sen passwords. This indicates that users seldom create new passwords and the influence of
password meters is limited [180]. Egelman et al. argue that their influence is highly context
dependent, such as the importance of the account to be protected [53].
2.1.4 Short Summary
As can be seen from all this work, a lot of approaches have been proposed to motivate users
to select stronger passwords. Yet, the silver bullet has not been found as password advice,
password policies or password meters are often ignored by users. One of the reasons is
that password recovery, in particular in companies, is often cumbersome [93]. But even if
one of these mechanisms succeeded, passwords would not become more or less memorable.
Therefore, the availability of usable and secure recovery mechanisms that users can fall back
on remain important in two ways: First, they are a safety net to rely on when all other means
fail. Second, they may inspire users to follow security advice to create stronger passwords
when easy password recovery or reset is available in case of password loss.
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2.2 Current Practices in Fallback Authentication
In order to get a grasp of available fallback schemes in practice and their shortcomings, this
section summarizes corresponding insights from previous research and further presents the
results from an informal analysis.
Due to the many accounts that users have to manage, it is inevitable that, at some point, user-
names or passwords are forgotten [64]. Therefore, fallback solutions are needed to enable
users to regain access to their accounts and data [64, 122]. It is assumed that this happens
once per month or less [166]. In order to use fallback schemes in lockout situations, users
are required to set them up beforehand, for example, during registration. For this, users often
can choose from a set of fallback schemes. The selection, however, is very limited and has
hardly changed over the past few years. Research in this area suggests that users prefer the
use of security questions and email-based password resets [94, 122].
2.2.1 Fallback Authentication between 2007 and 2009
An assessment of password practices in 2007 showed that common mechanisms for fallback
authentication included the use of email links or security questions [60]. The latter was also
often found for online banking websites in 2008 [139] and for popular webmail providers
in 2009 (i.e., Google, Yahoo, AOL and Microsoft) [154]. While security questions are no
longer in use by Google and Microsoft, they have been kept by Yahoo and AOL as com-
plementary fallback options to email-based password resets. Interestingly, Yahoo still offers
the question “Where did you meet your spouse?”, although it has shown to be vulnerable
to educated guesses, in the case of U.S. Governor Sarah Palin, whose account was hacked
in 2008. Weak security questions were also the reason for the success of recent attacks on
celebrity accounts for Apple’s iCloud Service that led to the theft of sensitive photos.1
However, not only celebrities are prone to these types of attacks. A non-scientific experiment
by artist Risa Puno showed that people are willing to exchange their personal data (e.g.,
fingerprint, date of birth or mother’s maiden name) for a single cookie, revealing information
that is often required to answer security questions.2 These observations are in line with
previous research that showed the willingness of users to trade personal information for
small monetary amounts (e.g., [69,79,92]). Hann et al. tested whether monetary reward and
convenience affect user preferences for websites with different privacy policies. They found
that when the offered reward exceeds a threshold of 20$, users are willing to lay aside their
privacy concerns [79].
1 http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/02Apple-Media-Advisory.html (last accessed 26/12/2014)
2 http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-of-your-data-would-you-trade-for-a-free-cookie (last accessed
26/12/2014)
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Figure 2.2: The distribution of fallback authentication schemes of Alexa’s top websites in 2014.
2.2.2 Fallback Authentication in 2014
Though still available, the use of security questions has diminished over the past few years.
In December 2014, we analyzed the available fallback options of 43 websites after removing
duplicates and no-signup websites from the 100 top websites (as listed by Alexa3). Figure 2.2
provides an overview of the distribution of the various fallback schemes that we discovered
after consulting the support pages of the corresponding websites and visiting their forgot-
my-password links. The majority of websites relies on email-based password resets (97.7%).
Only few of them have other fallback options, such as security questions (11.6%), phone-
based password resets (11.6%) or trusted contacts (4.7%). Instead, most of them refer their
users to customer service when email-based password reset does not work (16.3%). Other
fallback schemes were the use of alternate (i.e., not previously registered) email addresses for
password recovery (7%). This approach was mostly used in combination with the provision
of account-related information to verify the identity of the user (4.7%). A detailed overview
of each website and its fallback scheme can be found in Appendix A.1.
2.2.3 Password Managers
Password managers support users in storing and organizing their passwords (e.g., LastPass4)
[166]. In case users forget their password to one of their accounts, they can use the password
manager to look it up. In oder to do so, they usually have to authenticate with a master
password to get access to the password manager. This is, although not in the traditional
sense, another form of fallback authentication. However, this also means that password
managers are a single point of failure. Once the master password is revealed, potential
adversaries get access to many accounts. In general, the use of password managers is helpful,
but needs further improvements in terms of usability and security (e.g., [28, 106]).
3 http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last accessed 29/12/2014)
4 http://www.lastpass.com (last accessed 27/12/2014)
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2.2.4 Short Summary
All things considered, email-based password recovery/reset has been, and still is, one of
the most common procedure used for fallback authentication. Though this approach works
well [63], it does not take into account situations in which email access is not possible (e.g.,
expired accounts or public kiosks that the user does not want to trust with the email pass-
word). Only few web services offer alternative options. One of the reasons may be the im-
plementation costs, but also the increased security risks with each additional authentication
option that give potential adversaries the chance to circumvent the primary authentication.
2.3 The Design of Security Questions
Most research on fallback authentication is centered around security questions. The insights
from this research are discussed in this section to depict their potential and challenges. Re-
search on security questions can be traced back to the late eighties when Smith proposed the
use of word associations for authentication that, in the broad sense, can be considered as a
special kind of security question [161]. His approach was based on passwords that consisted
of multiple cue-association pairs (e.g., pink-grapefruit, water-melon). For authentication, the
cues (e.g., pink) were shown to ask users about the associations they provided when setting
up the password (e.g., grapefruit). Zviran and Haga extended this idea and suggested the use
of cognitive passwords: security questions that are based on personal facts or opinions of the
user (e.g., “What is your mother’s maiden name?” or “What is your favorite color?”) [190].
Interestingly, most of the proposed questions have been adopted by many web services for
automated password reset.
2.3.1 Classification
While Zviran and Haga differentiate between fact-based and opinion-based questions [190],
the design of security questions can be influenced by additional factors. In general, one can
distinguish between three types of questions and three types of answers [101].
Question Types
Security questions can be fixed, open and controlled [55,101,132,133]. Fixed questions are
predefined and do not allow any customization. Usually, they are presented in a list from
which users can choose one or more questions that are found to be most applicable [101].
Typical examples are shown in Table 2.1.
Open questions, in turn, leave room for creativity and require users to define their own ques-
tions as free text. Such questions are, at least in theory, highly individual [101]. However,
studies have shown that users often lack creativity and define questions with low entropy
answers [103].
14
2 Learning from the Past and Present
AOL Yahoo
What was the name of your first pet? In which city did you study abroad?
What was your childhood nickname? What was your first holiday destination ever?
What was your favorite childhood book? Who was your date on prom night?
What was the name of your first school? Where did you spend your honeymoon?
In which city did your parents meet? Where did you meet your spouse?
What is your oldest cousin’s name?
What is your youngest child’s nickname?
What is the first name of your oldest [niece | nephew]?
What is the first name of your favorite [aunt | uncle]?
What town was your [mother | father] born in?
Table 2.1: Subset of the security questions used by AOL and Yahoo in 2014.
The third question type, controlled questions, is a hybrid of fixed and open questions that
occurs in different variations. One of them uses variable fragments that are indicated by
blanks [101], such as: “What is your favorite ___ ?”. The blanks can be filled by the user
with different terms, such as “food”, “color” or “restaurant”. Another variant is the defi-
nition of hints for each question to remind users of their answer during authentication. For
example, Renaud and Just propose a system in which users select an image per question to
serve as an associative cue [144]. However, it has been shown that customization is rarely
done and rather targeted at more advanced users [122].
Answer Types
Analogous to question types, answers to security questions can be fixed, open or controlled.
Fixed answers present to users a variety of options for selection. This includes, for example,
drop-down lists or multiple choice fields. In turn, open answers require users to enter free
text (usually in a text field). A special form of open answers is the use of controlled answers
that impose further restrictions, such as the compliance to a certain format (e.g., dates that
have to be entered in the form of YYYY-MM-DD) [101].
2.3.2 The Usability of Security Questions
Although the various question and answer types provide some combination possibilities for
the design of security questions (e.g., [132]), each of them comes with potential usability
and security issues. For example, fixed questions do not allow any kind of customization
and thus can cause applicability issues. Open questions, in turn, require creativity that not
all users may possess [55, 100, 103]. In general, there are three major usability weaknesses:
inapplicability, ambiguity and low memorability [100, 139].
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Inapplicability
A question that most users are not able to answer truthfully is inapplicable [139]. For ex-
ample, the question “What was your first pet’s name?” does not apply to a large fraction of
the public as about 40% of the U.S. population does not own a pet (as of 2012).5 While it is
acceptable if some questions within a set are inapplicable, the problem becomes severe when
their number increases as it limits the choices that users have during enrollment. An anal-
ysis of security questions from 16 online banking websites in 2008 identified almost 50%
of the questions to be inapplicable. Most of those questions referred to spouses, marriage
or children [139]. Interestingly, these are exactly the types of questions that are still in use
by Yahoo (Table 2.1, right). The lack of viable options is critical as it may cause undesir-
able behaviors, such as choosing less memorable questions (that are at least applicable) or
answering questions untruthfully [154]. Both behaviors can lead to memorability issues.
Ambiguity
There are two kinds of ambiguity when it comes to security questions: semantic ambiguity
and lexical ambiguity [100]. The former is of concern when there exists more than one
possible answer to a question. For example, when asked for their favorite actor, users may
consider more than one person as a possibility. When the actual fallback authentication takes
place, users may not remember which answers they decided to provide during enrollment. It
is also possible that their favorite actor has changed over time [139].
Lexical ambiguity, in turn, refers to the variations in the representation of an answer [100].
For example, though semantically similar, the term “street” can include uppercase letters
(e.g., “Street’’, “STREET”), use lowercase letters only (e.g., “street”) or use abbreviations
(e.g., “St”) [59, 154]. An analysis of 117 security questions by Just and Aspinall revealed
that after four weeks 18% of the answers were semantically correct, but did not match exactly
the answers provided during enrollment [102]. Most fallback systems are tolerant to small
lexical variations. However, there exist also more complex variations that are more difficult
to implement [59]. In those cases, users are often left with no other choice but to walk
through numerous possibilities until they find the correct one or until they have exhausted
the number of allowed attempts [154]. In particular, ambiguity is of relevance when open or
controlled questions are implemented. The problem does not exist for fixed answers where
users select from a set of options [100]. However, using fixed answers comes with other
issues like facilitated guessability [101].
Memorability
Memorability refers to the ability of users to recall the answers to security questions. As
those questions are based on personal information, it is assumed that no explicit memo-
rization is required by the user so that recall is made easier [190]. In reality, memorability
5 https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Statistics/Pages/Market-research-statistics-US-pet-ownership.aspx
(last accessed 05/11/2014)
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First Author Year Respondents Time Question Type Recall Guess
Smith [161] 1987 4 6 months Association 94% n/a
18 months Association 86% n/a
Zivran [190] 1990 106 3 months Opinion 88% 23%
Fact 94% 37%
Haga [72] 1991 106 3 months Association 69% 26%
Opinion 70% 33%
Fact 84% 45%
Zivran [191] 1993 103 3 months Association 69% n/a
Opinion 84% n/a
Fact 74% n/a
Podd [136] 1996 86 2 weeks Association 39% 7%
Opinion 72% 23%
Fact 88% 56%
Bunnell [23] 1997 90 2 weeks Association 39% 7%
Opinion 72% 23%
Fact 88% 56%
Pond [138] 2000 73 2 weeks Association 66% 12%
Just [102] 2009 39 28 days User Chosen 75% n/a
Just [103] 2009 97 23 days Mixed 8% n/a
Schechter [154] 2009 130 6 months Mixed 80% 22%
Renaud [144] 2010 90 1 week Mixed 56% 32%
Table 2.2: Overview of recall and guessing rates of security questions from different research.
The table includes results about association-based, opinion-based, fact-based and user-chosen
security questions. Some studies did not distinguish between the different question types and
are depicted by the term mixed.
issues are not uncommon, in particular when the time between enrollment and authentica-
tion increases. While early studies showed that users were able to recall almost 95% of
their answers after several months [72, 190], these numbers have to be interpreted carefully
(Table 2.2). Those studies were either with very few participants or came with high guess-
ability rates. More recent studies (between 2000 and 2010) showed lower recall rates that
ranged between 56% [154] and 80% [102]. Table 2.2 compares the different recall rates
from different user studies.
2.3.3 The Security of Security Questions
While usability factors focus on the ability to recall the answers to security questions, it is
equally important to analyze such questions from a security point of view. In general, there
are three factors that influence the security of security questions: guessability, researchability
and the type of adversary [101, 139].
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Guessability
The term guessability refers to the difficulty with which an answer to a security question
can be guessed without any knowledge about the user [101, 139]. Many questions have
a small answer space [94, 101]. For example, the question “What is your eye color?” is
likely to be guessed within a small number of attempts [101]. A security analysis by Rabkin
[139] classified at least 33% of security questions form 16 different financial websites as
guessable, meaning that they found an answer for these questions that was likely to be correct
in excess of 1%. Another analysis by Schechter et al. showed that 13% of security questions
could be answered through statistical guessing by choosing the five most popular answers
to the corresponding question [154]. In particular, questions about names have proven to be
vulnerable to statistical attacks, due to the lack of diversity of human names [16].
Researchability
Many security questions can be attacked by additional knowledge about the user [139]. This
knowledge can be obtained by personal communication, online research or even automated
processes that, for example, mine the needed information from online resources, such as
search engines, personal homepages or social networks [68, 101, 139, 140, 163]. This also
means that the success of such attacks depends strongly on the availability of information.
Research has shown that social networks have become popular platforms for self disclo-
sure [99, 112] that reveal many personal information like contact details (e.g., email, instant
messaging or full address [88, 110]), personal interests (e.g., hobbies, political orientation
and sexual orientation [48]) and other personal data (e.g., date of birth [2]).
Type of Adversary
The success of such attacks (guessing as well as researching) depends on the type of ad-
versaries. Attacks can be automated (formed by a computer) or by dedicated human be-
ings [139, 161]. It was early noticed that adversaries that are close to the user (e.g., signifi-
cant other) are a serious threat. They, in comparison to strangers, know much more about the
user and thus are also more likely to know the answer to a question [72,101,122,190]. Table
2.2 lists the guessing rates from various user studies that have been conducted over the past
years. One of the key insights from the early studies was that fact-based security questions,
though easy to be recalled by users, are also more easily guessed by close adversaries than
any other type of question [23, 136, 190].
2.3.4 Advancements in Fallback Solutions
Since most security questions lack in usability, security or both, some effort has been made
to improve them or to find alternative approaches for them. Some of these solutions are
discussed next.
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Social Authentication
For example, some proposals include the help of third persons, such as friends or acquain-
tances, that are appointed by the user during registration [19, 155]. In case of lockout, users
are required to contact a subset of them (e.g., by mail or phone) to collect codes that are
needed for account recovery [155, 158]. Though the approach works well, it still suffers
some usability and security issues [155]. Recalling the trustees one has appointed is dif-
ficult when a long time between registration and re-authentication has passed. In general,
the selection of trustees has to be done carefully for multiple reasons. Relationships may
change over time and some trustees may not be as trusted anymore. It has also been shown
that trustees that are not so close to the user are prone to revealing recovery codes through
phone-based attacks.
Another form of social authentication is the use of photos from social networks. In order
to authenticate, users have to answer a number of questions, such as identifying persons on
these photos [189]. Due to the use of multiple questions (and thus the time needed for au-
thentication), the approach seems to be most suitable as a second factor of authentication6
or as fallback option. However, social authentication has to be viewed critically as it comes
with certain drawbacks. Advances in the area of face recognition make the threat of auto-
mated attacks more prevalent. Human adversaries are often in a close relationship to the user
(e.g., jealous spouse) and have advanced knowledge or access to information (e.g., common
friends) [109]. But also strangers can research related information by issuing friend requests
and browsing friend lists in social networks [137].
Preference-Based Security Questions
The basic idea of preference-based security questions is inspired by online dating platforms
that allow users to state their likes and dislikes on certain topics in order to find poten-
tial matches. In the context of fallback authentication, users are presented with a set of
preference-related questions, such as “Do you like country music?”. The answers are pro-
vided by selecting from three answer options (i.e., really like, really dislike and neutral) [97].
In a simplified version of the described approach, users are presented with a set of images
from which they have to choose five items that they like and dislike, respectively. The re-
maining images are classified as neutral [96].
It is assumed that preferences remain stable over time, meaning that radical preference
shifts (e.g., from really like to really dislike) happen less frequent than small preference
changes (e.g., from really like to neutral) [97]. Though preference-based authentication
yields promising results in terms of false positives and false negatives [96, 97], they come
with further shortcomings, such as the high number of questions required [97], insider
threats [96] or the mining of preferences from social networks [70]. Furthermore, the stabil-
ity of preferences has to be considered critically as there does not exist a clear consensus on
this topic [90].
6 https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/a-continued-commitment-to-security/486790652130 (last ac-
cessed 18/12/2014)
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Image Priming and Labeling
Another image-based approach primes users during enrollment by showing them a set of
images that they have to label. This procedure is repeated during authentication, but with
additional images that have not been shown before. It is assumed that priming affects the
labeling performance of users, in such way, that primed images are more likely to be labeled
correctly than non-primed images. Though the results seem promising, the priming effect is
not as strong as expected [46].
Context-Based Security Questions
Some attempts have been made to design security questions that take the user’s current
context into account. This can be trivial information from the user’s environment, such
as “Where is a wall clock in your house?” [132, 133], but also includes more dynamic in-
formation like office arrival/departure or recent events from calendars (e.g., [130,131]). The
use of context information has the potential of overcoming issues like applicability as well
as memorability. However, these types of questions have gained little attention by the usable
security and privacy community and thus will be explored more thoroughly in this thesis.
2.3.5 Short Summary
All these examples show that the design of security questions is a challenging task. While
the perfect security question is easy to remember by the legitimate user and hard to guess by
potential adversaries, this requirement seems impossible to be met. Current security ques-
tions come with usability issues (i.e., inapplicability, ambiguity, and memorability) as well
as security threats (i.e., guessability and researchability) by different types of adversaries.
Though several alternatives have been proposed to fact-based security questions, the best
trade-off between usability and security has yet to be found. It is clear that any fallback
option will have some negative and some positive aspects. But in particular for a mobile
context, the discussed solutions do not seem to be a good fit. For example, social authen-
tication is difficult in a mobile context when the device is locked and contact details on the
phone are not accessible. Furthermore, fallback authentication on mobile devices happens
infrequently (see Chapter 3) so that preference-based approaches are problematic due to
possible preference changes. So far, dynamic fallback approaches have shown promising re-
sults, but have not yet been evaluated thoroughly. One part of this thesis picks up this aspect
and contributes to deeper insights in this area.
20
2 Learning from the Past and Present
2.4 Smartphone Authentication
This section gives an overview of primary authentication schemes on smartphones and their
problems to motivate the need of fallback authentication.
While the design of passwords and their corresponding fallback options has mostly focused
on the desktop environment, their importance in the mobile environment has increased due
the transformation of mobile devices from simple communication tools to so-called Swiss
army knives that contain a lot of sensitive data [13,151]. However, the small form factor and
keyboard characteristics of smartphones make it difficult to enter textual passwords (as used
in desktop environments) [153]. This has aggravated the situation of password selection:
Users prefer even shorter passwords [181]. Thus, several alternative authentication meth-
ods are available on smartphones, such as personal identification numbers (PINs), graphical
passwords or biometric approaches.
2.4.1 Passwords and PINs
PINs on smartphones often consist of a sequence of only four digits, since most users have
difficulties in memorizing more complex ones [53]. Nonetheless, users have many memo-
rizing strategies that come at the cost of security [9]. An analysis of real PINs from over
200000 iPhone users showed that even short PINs are kept as simple as possible (e.g., 0000
or 1234).7 They are often based on birth dates [18] or consist of numbers that are located
close to each other [108]. In the last resort, when even these questionable methods fail, users
start to write down their PINs [141].
2.4.2 Graphical Passwords
In recent years, graphical passwords have become a popular authentication method on An-
droid devices. Their idea was first introduced by Blonder8 and was based on the pictorial
superiority effect, which assumes the better memorization of visual input [129]. In order to
authenticate, users are required to draw their password on a given grid (e.g., [43,98,180,185])
or background image [50]. While this approach is based on pure recall and often referred to
as drawmetrics, there exist other variations that use cued-recall (i.e., locimetrics) or recog-
nition (i.e., searchmetrics or cognometrics) [12, 38, 143, 186]. Popular examples for cogno-
metrics are Use Your Illusion [82], DéjaVu [47] or PassFaces [20], while PassPoints [186]
or Cued Click Points [29] are representatives of locimetrics. Though it is easier for users
to memorize graphical passwords than PINs [123], graphical authentication systems have
similar problems [12,124]. While the theoretical password space may be large, users tend to
select the obvious [49, 142] due to memorability reasons [38, 142, 143, 186].
7 http://danielamitay.com/blog/2011/6/13/most-common-iphone-passcodes
8 Patent: Blonder, Greg E. Graphical password. U.S. Patent No. 5,559,961. 24 Sep. 1996.
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2.4.3 Biometric Passwords
In general, one can distinguish between physiological biometrics (e.g., fingerprint, face or
iris) and behavioral biometrics (e.g., gait or location [35, 61, 172]) [187].
Popular implementations that use physiological features are Apple’s Touch ID 9 or Android’s
Face Unlock10. While both systems take advantage of only one feature (i.e., fingerprint
and face, respectively), a combination of multiple features is also possible for biometric
authentication (e.g., [21, 26, 91, 118, 135, 147]).
In contrast to this, behavioral biometrics authenticate users implicitly by the way they do
certain things (e.g., [40]). Popular behavioral cues are the use of gait (e.g., [35, 61, 172]),
location (e.g., [95, 160, 172]) or keystroke dynamics (e.g., [22, 113]).
Though the use of biometric systems has gained popularity, there are still circumstances in
which authentication does not work. Dirty fingers can make fingerprint authentication diffi-
cult, while bad lighting makes Face Unlock impossible. In these cases, alternative means of
authentication are needed [41]. The same applies for behavioral cues that are often proposed
for continuous authentication. In case users behave differently than expected by the system,
they have to authenticate through other means, such as PINs or passwords (e.g., [172]).
2.4.4 Short Summary
There exist a variety of knowledge-based authentication schemes to protect sensitive data on
smartphones (e.g., PINs or graphical passwords). Still, a remarkable number of smartphone
owners do not protect their device [52] and those who do, exhibit insecure behaviors by
selecting weak passwords [181]. Thus, some effort has been made to design alternative
systems that encourage the selection of stronger passwords on mobile devices. However,
the need for fallback options remains as users may still forget their passwords, for example,
when a new authentication scheme is set up [20, 38, 47, 50, 186].
In contrast to this, biometric authentication schemes do not have any memorability issues.
Nonetheless, it is important to understand that in case biometric features are compromised,
it is difficult (in most cases impossible) to change them. Furthermore, false negatives are
inevitable when using biometric authentication and thus the need for knowledge-based (or
token-based) alternatives remains. The design of those alternatives is challenging. The
better a biometric system works, the rarer these alternatives are needed, causing potential
recall issues when the actual fallback authentication takes place.
9 http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT5883 (last accessed 27/12/2014)
10 https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/2781894?hl=en (last accessed 25/10/2015)
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2.5 Fallback Authentication on Smartphones
The rare occurrence of fallback authentication on smartphones is reflected in the little interest
that it has received, until now, by smartphone manufacturers and the research community. It
is unclear what the requirements of mobile fallback authentication are and whether current
destkop solutions can also be applied in the mobile context.
Research in the area of mobile fallback authentication has mainly focused on the use of
mobile devices as assisting tools for authentication at public terminals (e.g., [39, 42, 157])
or for password recovery. A common example for the latter is the use of mobile devices
for phone-based password resets.11 In case of lockout, a temporary password is sent to the
user’s mobile phone number to log into the blocked account and to create a new password.
Mannan et al. extend this idea with a public-private key infrastructure that is used to encrypt
and decrypt the new password, respectively [116].
In general, the documentation of actual fallback authentication on smartphones is lacking.
This thesis will cover this neglected area of research to provide deeper insights into mobile
fallback authentication, including the circumstances in which lockout happens and the re-
quirements that need to be taken into account (e.g., memorability factors). This will help to
understand how fallback solutions should be designed and whether current desktop solutions
could also be applied to the mobile context.
2.6 The Human Memory
Since memorability has been depicted as one of the key factors of current fallback solutions,
it is essential to learn about the general structure of human memory. Understanding the
functions, strengths and weaknesses of the different memory types will be helpful to guide
us in the design of alternative fallback schemes.
2.6.1 The Multi-Store Model of Memory
The human memory was long treated as a unitary system [7]. However, this view started
to degrade in the late sixties when Atkinson and Shiffrin proposed their multi-store model
of memory which assumes the existence of three, closely related, memory systems: the
sensory register, the short-term store and the long-term store [5]. Figure 2.3 depicts the
three memory types and their relation to each other. The sensory register is responsible for
capturing stimuli from the environment. While most of this stimuli decay within a fraction
of a second, a small subset of it is transferred to the short-term store for further processing
(e.g., by complementing the input with previous knowledge). The input is lost when not
rehearsed or not transferred to a more permanent structure (i.e., the long-term store) [7].
11 O’Connell, Ellen R. Automated Password Reset. U.S. Patent No 5,991,882, Nov 1999
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Figure 2.3: Structure of human memory by Atkinson and Shiffrin. Reproduced from [5].
The three memory components correspond to the main tasks of the human memory: encod-
ing (i.e., the registration of stimuli by the sensory register), storage (i.e., the maintenance
of information in the long-term store) and retrieval (i.e., the recall of memories from the
long-term store) [8]. The latter task can be further divided into two modes that Ebbinghaus
refers to as voluntary and involuntary retrieval [51]. While voluntary retrieval happens by
the use of the will, the involuntary retrieval is triggered by associative cues [11, 51].
2.6.2 Long-Term Memory
From the three presented memory stores, the long-term store is the most important one for
fallback authentication as it is the basis of an individual’s complete knowledge. Long-term
memories can be of explicit or implicit nature and encompass knowledge of different kinds
[165] (Figure 2.4). Implicit memories, for example, refer to performance-related knowledge
like motor skills or habits. Explicit memories are further distinguished in semantic and
episodic memories. The main difference between the two lies in the information they hold
and the way they are accessed [175, 176]. While semantic memories consist of general
knowledge about the world and its relation to other knowledge, episodic memories relate to
personal experiences with spatio-temporal context. We often refer to them as something we
know and something we remember, respectively.
Imagine, for example, a girl that had her first kiss at the banks of the Seine when she was
sixteen. This experience is stored in episodic memory and can be remembered to relive the
past. In turn, knowing that the Seine is a river in France is semantic information that is
detached from personal experiences, as temporal as well as spatial information are absent.
Tulving describes this phenomenon as anoetical retrieval (for semantic memories) and auto-
noetical retrieval (for episodic memories) [176]. This distinction is similar to Ebbinghaus’
classification of voluntary and involuntary retrieval [51].
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Figure 2.4: Classification of human memory (HM) and construction of autobiographical mem-
ory (AM). Reproduced and adapted from [165].
2.6.3 Autobiographical Memory
The term “episodic memory”, as introduced in the previous section, has often been (and
still is) treated synonymously with the term “autobiographical memory”. Even though both
types of memories are closely related, more recent research has attempted to find a clearer
distinction [32]. It is assumed that the retention times of episodic memories are very short
and in the dimension of minutes, hours or days, while autobiographical memories are stored
for days, weeks or even for a lifetime [33]. Nonetheless, episodic memories (not all) can
become part of autobiographical memory when a transfer from one to the other is initiated.
Such transfer depends on various factors like importance, involvement, repetition and pre-
sentation of the experienced episode [119].
Though autobiographical memory consists of many episodic memories, it also includes other
types of information that come from the semantic memory (e.g., one’s date of birth) as well
as the procedural memory (e.g., one’s skill to drive) [32,119]. All this information is retained
with different levels of specificity and forms a hierarchical structure that includes life-time
events, general events and event-specific episodes [32,33]. Consider the following example:
“When I was in high school, I liked walking in the woods. However, during one of these
walks, I stumbled and broke my leg.” These memories refer to a life-time period (e.g., the
time in high school), which in turn consists of general events (e.g., the habit to walk in the
woods) that, again, consists of event-specific episodes (e.g., the broken leg).
Based on these insights from psychological research, the remainder of this thesis will define
the term “autobiographical memory” as follows:
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Autobiographical memory reflects an individual’s personal life history. It is composed
of self-related information from different memory types. This includes personal facts
(semantic memories), skills (procedural memory) and episodic experiences (episodic
memory). All this information is retained with different levels of specificity that can be
classified as life-time periods, general events and event-related information.
2.6.4 Short Summary
Human memory is a complex structure that consists of multiple components to encode, store
and retrieve information. Since fallback authentication happens infrequently, explicit mem-
ories from the long-term store are a promising information source for their design. Current
solutions also take advantage of the long-term store, but mainly focus on personal facts and
opinions. However, autobiographical memory is not limited to this kind of information, but
instead, also consists of life episodes that, once transferred to autobiographical memory, can
last for a lifetime. Psychological research has shown that episodic memories are retrieved
autonoetically, which is faster and easier than anoetical retrieval. Therefore, this thesis will
explore the potential of episodic memories as part of autobiographical memory for the de-
sign of alternative fallback authentication systems and evaluate them in terms of usability as
well as security.
2.7 Lessons Learned
This chapter has given an overview of relevant work in the field of authentication as well as
fallback authentication (both in desktop and mobile environments). The take-home messages
of this chapter can be summarizes as follows:
• Users forget passwords. Users are bad at memorizing complex passwords and thus
prefer to select weak passwords. If this problem already is prevalent for primary
authentication, it can be assumed to be even more severe in the context of fallback
authentication as it happens less frequently. This factor must be considered when de-
signing fallback schemes.
• Fallback authentication is not well documented. Though it is indisputable that fall-
back authentication happens, there exist little information about the situations in which
fallback authentication happens, the available fallback schemes and their usage in the
wild. This is in particular the case for mobile devices.
• One solution is not enough. While email-based password resets are reasonable, the
need for alternatives remains as there are situations in which email accounts are not
accessible.
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• Security questions are not the answer (yet). Security questions have major usability
issues (i.e., inapplicability, ambiguity, memorability) and security issues (i.e., guess-
ability and researchability). Nonetheless, they are still deployed by some web services
despite the incidents where security questions have been exploited to circumvent pri-
mary authentication and to steal sensitive data.
• Autobiographical memories are more than personal facts. Autobiographical mem-
ory reflects a person’s personal history. Though it contains personal facts that are often
used for security questions, it is also a repository for many other types of information,
such as episodes about one’s personal life. These memories seem worth exploring as
they are stored more permanently and are accessed differently than personal facts.
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3
A Field Study on
Mobile Fallback Authentication
Smartphone owners spend a substantial amount of time with authentication tasks, such as
unlocking their device [80, 178]. However, little is known about the circumstances and
frequencies in which these tasks fail, in such way, that complete lockout happens.
This chapter gives an overview of potential lockout scenarios on smartphones (Section 3.1)
and provides first insights into the frequencies, reasons, countermeasures and problems of
lockout occurrences (Section 3.2). The results are based on an online survey (n=244; Section
3.3) and semi-structured interviews (n=12; Section 3.4).
We found that lockouts happen infrequently and seldom lead to severe situations. How-
ever, special circumstances make mobile fallback authentication difficult and leave room
for improvements through design. These insights are helpful to identify aspects that should
be taken into account when designing alternative fallback schemes on mobile devices and
inspire the fallback approaches presented in this work (Sections 3.5 and 3.6).
Personal contribution statement: The content of this chapter is based on a bachelor thesis by Victoria
Müller [127] that was supervised by the author. Part of this work was published at the Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI 2015), with co-authors
Alexander De Luca, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Manuel Demmler and Heinrich Hussmann [77]. A
detailed overview of task responsibilities can be found in the disclaimer.
3.1 Fallback Authentication on Smartphones
In general, lockouts on smartphones may occur whenever authentication is needed, for ex-
ample, when users authenticate with the cellular network, when users unlock their device or
when users access their online accounts. The remainder of this section describes the three
authentication types in more detail and provides examples on how they may lead to lockouts.
3.1.1 Cellular Network Access
In order to use general phone functionality (e.g., making calls), smartphone owners have
to authenticate with the cellular network. The way authentication is done depends on the
network used. Due to historical reasons, multiple network types coexist. Popular exam-
ples are Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), its successors Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) as well as Code Divi-
sion Multiple Access (CDMA) networks [44].
GSM, UMTS and LTE use subscriber identity modules (SIM cards) to authenticate their
users. In turn, authentication with CDMA networks does not require any additional com-
ponents. However, there are exceptions: Some devices include slots for CDMA subscriber
identity modules (CSIM) [1] or SIM cards to enhance the device’s functionality, for example,
to support roaming or LTE usage.
Since these modules store sensitive information about the user, they are usually protected
with a PIN code [152]. In case a PIN code is used, lockouts may occur, when the number of
authentication attempts is exhausted, for example, when users repeatedly enter the incorrect
PIN. A popular solution for these kinds of situations is the provision of a personal unblocking
code (PUC): an eight-digit number that needs to be entered by the user [148]. This number
is usually sent to the user by the service provider or can be looked up online.
3.1.2 Device Unlock
Smartphone users can choose from a variety of authentication schemes to protect their data
from unauthorized access (see Section 2.4). While most schemes are knowledge-based (e.g.,
PIN code or Android pattern), some approaches are based on biometric features (e.g., Touch
ID or Face Unlock).
Alternatives for these schemes are needed when users fail to provide the correct password
within a limited number of attempts. In practice, these alternatives vary and depend on the
primary scheme used. For example, Android users with Face Unlock are required to set up
a graphical password as fallback option that, in turn, uses email-based resets for fallback
authentication.
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Figure 3.1: Authentication deadlock. (1) User has to authenticate on the smartphone. (2) User
fails to provide the correct password and gets locked out completely. (3) User has to rely on
fallback authentication. (4) User has to use tools or tokens for fallback authentication. (5) User
fails to do so as these tools or tokens are located on the locked device.
3.1.3 Account Login
The use of online accounts is not limited to the desktop environment, but is also commonly
done on smartphones by using apps or the mobile browser. Lockouts occur when users
forget their credentials. In most cases, there are no fallback schemes that are specifically
designed for the mobile context, but instead, common fallback practices known from desktop
computers are re-used for this purpose (see Section 2.2).
3.2 Research Strategy
The previous section depicted situations in which lockouts may occur and gave examples
of currently available solutions for fallback authentication. The main problem that we see
with these solutions is their potential to cause authentication deadlocks, as they often rely
on tools or tokens that are not always accessible without the locked device (Figure 3.1). In
this section we briefly explain potential problems of current fallback solutions. We further
introduce our research strategy to show how we analyze these problems in more detail.
Imagine a user who is prompted to enter the PIN code for the SIM card after an unexpected
restart of the device during a vacation. Due to the infrequent use of the PIN code, the user
fails authentication and gets locked out completely (Figure 3.1, steps 1-2) and thus needs
to provide the PUC for fallback authentication (Figure 3.1, steps 3-4). Since the device is
locked, the user does not have the needed Internet access to retrieve it (Figure 3.1, step 5).
Since little data is available on how often these problems occur on smartphones, our research
strategy is twofold: (1) we survey a large sample of smartphone owners to get a general
overview of the frequency in which lockouts happen; and (2) we complement these numbers
with in-depth interviews about lockout experiences to learn about the reasons for lockouts
as well as the problems and solutions that users have during these situations.
31
3.3 General Overview of Fallback Experiences
In order to obtain a general overview of the frequency of fallback experiences, we conducted
an online survey (n=244) in June 2014 that focused on three lockout scenarios: (1) SIM card
lockouts; (2) lock screen lockouts; and (3) account lockouts (see Section 3.1). The design of
the survey, its evaluation as well as results are reported next.
3.3.1 Survey Design
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to conduct the online survey. It is a platform
that allows the recruitment of people over the Internet to solve small tasks that require human
intelligence. The MTurk platform was shown to be helpful for usable security and privacy
research when preventive measures are taken into account (e.g., the use of control questions)
[107].
The survey was open to all workers from the U.S. with a HIT approval rate of 90% or higher.
In addition to this, workers were required to own a smartphone. Therefore, they were re-
quested to visit a website on their smartphones for device detection. This information was
stored in association with the provided worker ID for verification purposes. Smartphone
owners who use CDMA devices were not excluded from the survey as some of these devices
also have SIM capabilities (see Section 3.1). The survey lasted for about 20 minutes and
workers received 1$ for their participation. The earnings were based on the recommenda-
tions provided by Amazon that suggest to pay 4$-5$ per hour.
The survey was structured in four parts and started with demographic questions (e.g., gender
and age). The remaining parts each focused on one lockout scenario. Each part started with
a brief introduction to the lockout type it was dedicated to and was followed by questions
about the security measures that participants use on their smartphones (e.g., “Do you use a
PIN code to protect your SIM card?”).
We also asked participants about their general experiences with [SIM card | lock screen |
account] lockouts and asked them to provide more details on their last fallback experience,
in case it was available. This included questions about the reasons for lockout, the taken
countermeasures and the problems they had to face. In order to avoid that participants answer
all questions with no (to finish the survey quicker), each branch in the survey consisted of
similar amounts of questions. For example, we added authentication-related questions (e.g.,
“What do you do to not forget the PIN of your SIM card?”) to the no-branches.
3.3.2 Coding
Two researchers independently developed codes for the free-text answers and met to find an
agreement on the codes to create a final code plan that was used by a third researcher.
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Age Range n % Highest Education n %
18-24 55 22.5 Junior high school 1 0.4
25-34 111 45.5 Senior high school 51 20.9
35-44 57 23.4 College 71 29.1
45-54 14 5.7 Bachelor’s degree 93 38.1
55-64 6 2.5 Master’s degree 20 8.2
65+ 1 0.4 Advanced graduate work or PhD 7 2.9
Other 1 0.4
Occupation n % Occupation (continued) n %
Creative 7 2.9 Jobless 24 9.8
Aministration 13 5.3 Retail 5 2.0
Academia / Research 5 2.0 Sales 5 2.0
Estate 4 1.6 Security 4 1.6
Finance 8 3.3 Service 13 5.3
Healthcare 14 5.7 Social 3 1.2
IT 27 11.1 Student 29 11.9
Law 6 2.5 Teaching 15 6.1
Literature / Writing 12 4.9 Technical 17 7.0
Management 20 8.2 Other 13 5.3
Table 3.1: Age distribution, highest level of education and profession of the 244 participants
from the online survey.
3.3.3 Participants
The survey was active for one week, during which 272 submissions were made. After in-
specting the control questions, we removed 28 submissions (10.3%) as some answers did not
fulfill the desired requirements. Criteria were the time needed to complete the survey, the
length of the answers and the answers to control questions. For example, two participants
answered almost all open questions with the text “n/a”. Some other participants reported
to own devices that were not smartphones and some other participants selected the wrong
answer to the control question “Please select number four so that we know you are paying
attention”. Thus, we were left with the responses of 244 survey participants (104 female,
42.6%). They were between 18 and 66 years old (average: 32 years). Most participants (191,
78.3%) were employed and had different professional backgrounds (e.g., design, healthcare,
IT, etc.). The remaining participants were students (29, 11.9%) or unemployed (24, 9.8%).
Most participants owned an Android device (139, 57%), 99 had an Apple device (40.6%) and
6 had a Nokia device (2.5%). Table 3.1 lists the age distributions, education and professions
of our participants.
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SIM PIN Lock Screen AccountAuthentication
Used on Smartphone? Yes 111 (45.5%) 165 (67.6%) 237 (97.1%)No 133 (54.5%) 79 (32.4%) 7 (2.9%)
Lockout Experience? Yes 4 (3.6%) 56 (33.9%) 75 (31.6%)No 107 (96.4%) 109 (66.1%) 162 (68.4%)
Table 3.2: Overview of the number of participants that use a PIN for their SIM card, lock their
lock screen (e.g., with PIN) or use web accounts on their smartphones. The table also shows the
number of participants that have experienced lockouts.
3.3.4 Results
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the lockout frequencies for each lockout scenario. More
detailed information about these lockouts is reported next.
SIM Card Lockout More than half of the participants (133, 54.5%) responded to have
never used a PIN to protect their SIM card. Main reasons for this were the unawareness of
the availability of a SIM PIN or the confusion with other concepts, such as the use of PIN
codes for lock screen authentication (74, 55.6%). Being unconcerned about the security of
their SIM card was mentioned by 45 participants (33.8%). Other reasons were, for example,
the ownership of CDMA devices, inconvenience or fear of lockout.
While 111 participants (45.5%) reported to protect their SIM card with a PIN, only 4 of
them (3.6%) had experiences with lockouts. The four participants provided different reasons
for the lockouts. This includes forgetting, mistyping or confusing the PIN as well as the
involvement of another person (e.g., mother who tries to access the phone). In order to
unlock their SIM card, participants were required to enter the PUC, which not all participants
were able to provide. Two participants had to contact the service provider to request a SIM
card replacement/new PUC.
Lock Screen Lockout Altogether, 165 participants (67.6%) stated to use or have used
lock screen authentication, such as PIN codes (106, 64.2%), graphical patterns (52, 31.5%),
Touch ID (13, 7.9%) or face recognition (1, 0.6%). The numbers do not add up to 100% as
some participants mentioned the use of multiple authentication schemes.
The experience of lock screen lockouts was reported by 56 (33.9%) participants. The rea-
sons were mistypes due to hurry (14, 25%), inattentiveness (8, 14.3%) or being “too drunk
or otherwise intoxicated to correctly input the pattern” (2, 3.6%). Other reasons were re-
cent password changes (8, 14.3%), technical reasons (7, 12.5%), momentarily forgotten
passwords (6, 10.7%) or the involvement of third parties, such as children playing with the
phone (3, 5.4%).
In order to regain access to their devices after lockout, participants mentioned the use of
PIN codes (e.g., as a fallback scheme for Touch ID; 4, 7.1%) or email-based resets (e.g., as
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a fallback scheme for PIN codes; 2, 3.6%). However, the majority had to do nothing, but
wait between 30 seconds and 15 minutes (48, 85.7%) before re-authentication was possible.
In one particular case, a participant reported waiting times of several years and as a conse-
quence bought a new phone (“I couldn’t unlock the phone because my daughter reset the
code and couldn’t remember it. Had to buy a new phone”).
The use of waiting times was perceived ambiguously. While 21 out of 56 participants
(37.5%) described them as easy and quick, other 21 out of 56 participants (37.5%) found
them annoying, so that six out of 56 participants (10.7%) even removed lock screen authen-
tication. However, fallback experiences were not the main reasons for removing lock screen
security. Interestingly, some participants (13 out of 56, 23.2%) considered the lockout ex-
perience as a proof of concept of the security of a system (“works and keeps other people
out”).
Account Lockout The majority of participants use special apps or mobile browsers to
access online accounts on their smartphones (237, 97.1%). Seventy-five of them (31.6%
reported lockout experiences.
The main reasons were the use of incorrect passwords due to password loss (50, 21.1%),
password confusion (5, 2.1%) and typos (21, 8.9%). Other reasons were device constraints
(6, 2.5%) or technical reasons (5, 2.1%). This included small keyboards, small screens or
automatic logouts.
Most participants used traditional fallback schemes for password retrieval, such as email-
links (63, 26.6%) or security questions (5, 2.1%). Other participants mentioned the use
of password managers and written notes (5, 2.1%), while two participants noted that they
usually postpone the password recovery until access to a computer is available (0.8%).
In general, participants did not notice major problems during account recovery, but some of
them (45, 19%) criticized the usability of current schemes that often involved waiting times
before recovery was possible. Nonetheless, the experience of being locked out of one’s
account, similar to lock screen lockouts, was considered as a proof of security. This was
mentioned by 23 participants (9.7%).
3.4 Individual Reports on Fallback Experiences
The results from the online survey suggest that fallback authentication does not happen fre-
quently. However, for some users, recovery from lockouts seems to be more difficult than
for others (e.g., one participant got rid of her phone). In order to gather more qualitative
insights about these kinds of difficulties, we conducted semi-structured interviews (n=12) in
July 2014. The design of the interviews, their evaluation and results are reported next.
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3.4.1 Interview Design
The structure of the interviews was similar to the online survey, but used a between-groups
design, meaning that each participant was questioned about only one lockout scenario (i.e.,
four interviewees per group). This was done to collect more details about the individual
fallback experiences for each of the scenarios.
Interviewees were not participants from the online survey, but were recruited through mail-
ing lists, bulletin boards and social media. It was a prerequisite to own a smartphone and to
have experienced at least one of the three lockout scenarios in order to participate.
The interviews started with questions about the interviewee’s demographics and smartphone
usage. This was followed by the question whether interviewees have experienced [SIM card |
lock screen | account] lockouts. Based on their response, interviewees were assigned to one
of the three lockout scenarios for which they were encouraged to report more details about
their last fallback experience. For example, they were asked where it happened, how it
happened and what problems they encountered during fallback authentication.
The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and later summarized by the interviewer for
evaluation. Each interview lasted for about 30 minutes and interviewees received 5AC gift
vouchers as incentive for their participation.
3.4.2 Participants
We interviewed 12 smartphone owners (6 female). The interviewees were between 17 and 55
years old (average: 27 years) and nine of them were students from different field of studies,
such as media informatics, teaching, construction or law. Two interviewees were already
employed in construction engineering or IT services, while one was a high school student.
Ten interviewees owned an iPhone (three with Touch ID). The remaining two had an Android
device and Blackberry device, respectively. Interviewees reported to own their device for
between 7 and 41 months (average: 20 months).
3.4.3 Results
SIM Card Lockout All interviewees stated to use a PIN to protect their SIM card, but only
eight of them (66.7%) reported experiences with SIM card lockouts (Table 3.3).
The four interviewees that were assigned to this scenario provided additional details about
how the lockout happened. Two of them explained that they owned multiple SIM cards with
different PINs that they mixed up during authentication. The remaining ones stated that their
smartphone battery died unexpectedly so that they had to enter the SIM PIN. However, both
of them could not recall the exact PIN and tried multiple combinations until their devices
got locked completely.
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SIM PIN Lock Screen AccountAuthentication
Used on Smarthone? Yes 12 (100%) 11 (91.7%) 12 (100%)No 0 (0%) 1 (8.3%) 0 (0%)
Lockout Experience? Yes 8 (66.7%) 9 (81.8%) 11 (91.7%)No 4 (33.3%) 2 (18.2%) 1 (8.3%)
Table 3.3: Overview of the number of interviewees that use a PIN for their SIM card, lock their
lock screen (e.g., with PIN) or use web accounts on their smartphones. The table also shows the
number of interviewees that have experienced lockouts.
None of them was able to unlock the SIM card without additional help. For example, one
interviewee was locked out during a vacation in Spain. The interviewee was stuck in an
authentication deadlock as the required PUC was not at hand and the device was locked so
that no calls could be made. The interviewee was lucky to be able to borrow the phone
of a friend to call a family member who looked up the PUC. However, the interviewee
complained about the long waiting time (about an hour). This was also mentioned by other
interviewees, who found it annoying to wait up to several days until the service provider
unlocked their SIM card.
Lock Screen Lockout Eleven interviewees (91.7%) claimed to protect or have protected
their lock screen (Table 3.3). The protective measures mentioned were: PIN Code (7;
63.6%), Touch ID (3; 27.3%); Android Pattern (1; 9%) and alphanumeric password (1;
9%). Lockouts were experienced by nine interviewees (81.8%).
Two interviewees assigned to this scenario were Touch ID users who reported failed finger-
print recognition as reasons for lockouts. The other two in this group used PIN codes for
authentication. One of them was locked out due to being in a hurry, while the other one
reported that the lockouts were caused by friends who tried to play a prank. This happened
multiple times and led to waiting periods that ranged from a few minutes to several days.
In the latter case, the corresponding interviewee was too impatient to wait until the timeout
period was over and took the phone to a store to get the lock removed. In turn, the Touch
ID users did not have to wait, but had to enter a PIN code instead. Both of them noted that
recalling the PIN code was not difficult as they reused a code that they had already used on
an older phone. Both Touch ID users mentioned higher lockout frequencies than the other
interviewees. They experienced lockouts on a monthly or even weekly basis.
Account Lockout All interviewees noted that they use their smartphones to access online
accounts and 11 of them (91.7%) had experiences with account lockouts (Table 3.3).
Three of the four interviewees in this group gave forgetting their passwords as lockout rea-
sons. For example, one interviewee explained that she usually saves her passwords to be
logged in automatically, making it difficult to recall them when she gets logged out (e.g.,
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when friends borrow the phone to access their online accounts). Nonetheless, all three de-
scribed the fallback procedure as simple.
One interviewee found her last fallback experience very difficult. She was on vacation when
she tried to access her Facebook account using the corresponding app. Though she was sure
that she entered the correct password, she was not able to log in. The same attempt failed
when she tried it on her boyfriend’s phone. Furthermore, the app did not display any details
about the problem. The problem was caused due to the unavailability of a desktop com-
puter. Later, when she had access to one, she found out that she had to complete additional
authentication tasks by identifying persons on photos to login.
3.5 Discussion
The online survey gave a general overview of fallback authentication in the wild and was
complemented by interviews that provided further details about individual lockout experi-
ences. The results suggest that lockouts are experienced infrequently, but regaining access
to the device or account becomes difficult when certain circumstances apply, for example,
when smartphone owners are out of their usual context (e.g., vacation).
This does not mean that current solutions need to be replaced, but leave room for improve-
ments. For example, waiting times can be annoying so that the use of fallback schemes may
be more convenient to the user. These schemes exist, but are seldom shown to the user or
sometimes not usable in lockout situations due to their dependency from third parties. The
following discussion summarizes these problems and proposes ideas that should be consid-
ered in the future design of fallback schemes.
3.5.1 Lack of Information
Most participants had no difficulties during fallback authentication and knew what they had
to do. However, some participants were not able to log in as they were caught in an au-
thentication deadlock (e.g., the provided fallback option did not work out). For example,
one participant forgot her PIN code that she entered incorrectly multiple times in a row.
This resulted in a waiting period. Since she had forgotten her PIN code, she ended up with
increasing waiting times.
Therefore, users should be informed by the system about other alternatives when they repeat-
edly fail a particular fallback scheme. For example, users that reach unacceptable waiting
times of multiple years should be advised that there is also the possibility of email-based
password resets and, as a last resort, the option to reset their device to factory settings.
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3.5.2 Feeling Secure, but Annoyed
The availability and experience of fallback authentication was considered by participants as
a proof that their device is secure against unauthorized access. However, lockouts were also
often described as annoying, mostly due to idle time periods in which users could do nothing
but wait.
Previous work has shown that waiting is often associated with boredom [31] and has a neg-
ative impact on mood, customer satisfaction as well as perceived duration [25]. To improve
the subjective assessment of time, Chebat and Filiatrault suggest the creation of interesting
tasks [25]. Though this suggestion was made in the context of customer service, it seems
worth exploring for fallback authentication as well. Instead of waiting times, alternative
fallback solutions could engage users more actively in the authentication process by creating
small security tasks, such as drawing scribbles (e.g., [134]) or asking users about their recent
phone activities (e.g., [37]). Though these kinds of tasks take longer than the actual waiting
times, the perceived duration may be shorter.
3.5.3 Third-Party Dependencies
Most participants who encountered difficulties during fallback authentication were not able
to solve the problems by themselves. Instead, they had to rely on other persons that, for
example, looked up information (e.g., PUC) or that provided them with technical equipment
(e.g., phone or computer) that was not at hand due to special circumstances (e.g., vacation).
Most common fallback solutions do not take these problems into account and some of them
do not even adapt to the mobile environment, meaning that they can only be used on non-
mobile devices. Thus, it seems advisable to complement existing solutions with alternative
options that can be used immediately (to reduce waiting times) and that are independent from
information that is hard to obtain when the device is blocked (e.g., limited Internet access).
3.5.4 Third Parties
Most lockouts were self-inflicted, but participants also reported on lockouts that were caused
by close persons (e.g., friends, children). Some of them caused lockouts unintentionally,
while others did this on purpose.
This suggests that alternative fallback schemes must be at least as secure as the primary
authentication scheme to prevent the latter type of adversary (i.e., adversaries that try to
authenticate as the legitimate user) from circumventing other authentication schemes to gain
access to the device.
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3.6 Lessons Learned
In this chapter we have presented three scenarios in which fallback authentication on smart-
phones may take place and evaluated their actual occurrences in the wild through an online
survey and complementary interviews. Since only few smartphone owners seem to have dif-
ficulties during fallback authentication, the reported problems are not representative of the
general population. Nonetheless, there are users that are unable to regain access with cur-
rently available solutions when experiencing lockouts (i.e., authentication deadlocks). The
main goal of this thesis is to support this target group and to explore alternative fallback
schemes whose design requirements are based on the reported problems. These require-
ments can be summarized as follows:
• Independence. Alternative fallback schemes should be independent of additional
components (e.g., persons, technical equipment or tokens). This is important to en-
sure the applicability of the fallback schemes in any kind of situation.
• Immediacy. Alternative fallback schemes should be immediate. For example, users
should not have to wait multiple days before they can retry authentication.
• User engagement. Alternative fallback schemes should require the active engagement
of users in the overall fallback process to be less likely to cause annoyance.
• Security. Alternative fallback schemes should be at least as secure as the primary
authentication as the security of a system is defined by its weakest link, meaning that
each additional alternative represents a potential point of attack for adversaries.
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A Framework for Fallback Authentication
The objective of this chapter is to motivate our design decisions and our evaluation strate-
gies. It starts with a formal definition of fallback authentication that elaborates on the simi-
larities and differences of primary authentication to fallback authentication (Section 4.1).
Based on this, we derive a design space that drives the projects presented in this work. Each
project is briefly summarized to illustrate what is to be expected in the remainder of this
thesis (Section 4.2). This is followed by an overview of our evaluation strategies that takes
into account usability factors (e.g., memorability) and security factors (e.g., human threats)
to identify the best trade-off between the two by using the accuracy metric (Section 4.3).
The chapter concludes with a summary of the key aspects of the presented framework for
fallback authentication (Section 4.4).
4.1 Fallback Authentication
So far, we have described fallback authentication as an alternative authentication scheme
that is used when the primary scheme fails. A more formal definition is developed next.
4.1.1 The Authentication Chain
According to Renaud et al., authentication is a three-stage process that consists of enroll-
ment, authentication and replacement [143]. Enrollment refers to the registration of the user
with the system where a secret key for authentication is defined (e.g., password). This key is
then used during authentication to get access, but needs replacement when users forget it.
Fallback authentication is part of the third stage when users lose their secret key. Since a new
key cannot be issued without verifying the user’s identity, replacement (i.e., fallback authen-
tication) also encompasses the three stages of enrollment, authentication and replacement.
In this context, enrollment refers to the process where users share an alternative secret with
the system (e.g., by answering security questions) that is then used as an alternative means
of authentication. However, if this alternative secret is forgotten as well, a replacement for
the replacement is needed.
Based on this consideration, the authentication process is a chain of multiple authentication
schemes. It starts with a primary scheme and is followed by several alternatives that are
used successively when replacement is needed (Figure 4.1). A practical implementation is
the authentication chain found on Android devices. It starts with Face Unlock (if set up) and
continues with a graphical pattern, email-based reset and factory reset as fallback options.
4.1.2 Classification of Fallback Authentication
Since fallback authentication is only a special occurrence of authentication in general,
both of them can use the same classification, meaning that one can distinguish between
knowledge-based schemes (i.e., something you know), biometric schemes (i.e., something
you are) and token-based schemes (i.e., something you have) [187]. However, this raises the
question of the differences between the two, if the same classification is applied.
An important factor in this regard is their scenario of use [86]. Primary authentication is the
main authentication scheme of a system and needed more frequently than fallback options.
The latter is only required when the former fails, which, in the best case, should never
happen. Transferring this view to the authentication chain implies that schemes located at
the end of the chain are needed less frequently than those at the beginning.
As a consequence, different usability and security requirements must be considered in the
design of primary schemes and fallback schemes [85]. Factors that are important for the
former may weigh less in the design of the latter and the other way around. Kainda et
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Figure 4.1: Fallback authentication chain based on the three-stage authentication procedure
described by Renaud et al. [143].
al. identified several factors that are commonly used for the evaluation of authentication
schemes [104]. We will summarize them in the following and discuss them with respect to
their importance to primary authentication and fallback authentication.
Effectiveness An authentication system is effective when it is able to distinguish between
legitimate users and illegitimate ones. This factor is essential for all authentication schemes.
However, in the best case, all legitimate and illegitimate users are identified correctly by the
primary scheme to render the need for fallback schemes obsolete as the latter is only required
when the primary scheme becomes ineffective.
Accuracy The accuracy of an authentication system is closely related to its effectiveness.
It depicts the success rate of the system in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate
users and thus similar to the effectiveness, is important for all authentication schemes. More
details about the accuracy measure will be discussed later (Section 4.3.3).
Efficiency The effort or time that users need to authenticate is referred to as efficiency.
This factor is critical for primary authentication due to its frequent use (e.g., lock screen
authentication), but has a lower priority in the context of fallback authentication. However,
efficiency-related requirements also depend on the scenario of use, meaning that schemes
located at the beginning of the fallback chain are more time-sensitive than those at the end.
Satisfaction User satisfaction is a crucial factor to prevent users from disabling security
measures or exhibiting insecure behaviors. Though satisfaction, to some extent, is important
for all authentication schemes, it should have a higher impact on the design of primary
schemes due their frequency of use. For example, even though most fallback experiences
are annoying, they are, in the most cases, not the main reason for removing security measures
(see Chapter 3).
Memorability The ease with which users can recall their passwords during authentication
relates to the memorability of an authentication scheme. In particular, knowledge-based
schemes are known for their memorability issues due to the number of passwords that users
have to cope with (Section 2.1). While memorability is indisputably important for primary
authentication, it is even more important for fallback schemes as they are needed less fre-
quently so that recall becomes more challenging.
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Learnability The ease with which users can learn how to use an authentication scheme is
called learnability. It is the first hurdle that users encounter when they authenticate/enroll
for the first time. Although learnability is important for primary as well as fallback authen-
tication, the reasons for this are different. While primary schemes need good learnability to
avoid high dropout rates, fallback schemes need it due to the lack of training that users have
with the corresponding scheme. In addition to this, users may not be aware of the impor-
tance of fallback authentication (e.g., they may assume that they will never need it) and so
learnability is essential to encourage them to set up these schemes.
Motivation Users have different motivations to protect their data which, in turn, impacts
their password selection (Section 2.1). For example, users may use longer passwords for
sensitive accounts and shorter ones for unimportant accounts. The different motivations are
relevant for the design of primary schemes, but also for fallback schemes as they can impact
the time that users are willing to spend for enrollment.
Social Context Humans are often surrounded by other humans that interact and commu-
nicate with each other (e.g., family, friends or strangers). But humans can also turn into
potential adversaries that take advantage of shared secrets to compromise systems. These
adversaries exist both for primary and fallback schemes, but the threats that are of concern
may differ.
In summary, many factors are important for the design of primary schemes as well as fall-
back schemes. They influence different stages of our research: Learnability and motivation
inspire various of our designs to enable authentication without prior enrollment by the user;
memorability and efficiency are key factors of our evaluation strategy, while the factor social
context plays a particular role in the definition of potential threats for our security analysis.
In turn, we find efficiency and satisfaction less relevant due to the infrequent occurrence of
fallback authentication.
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4.1.3 Definition of Fallback Authentication
Based on the preceding comparison between primary authentication and fallback authenti-
cation, we derive the following definition for fallback authentication:
Definition.
Fallback authentication is part of an authentication chain that consists of 1 . . .n authentication
schemes, with n∈N. Each authentication scheme in the chain involves a three-stage process:
enrollment, authentication and replacement. An authentication scheme is called fallback
scheme if it is preceded by another authentication scheme in the chain. Otherwise it is
referred to as the primary scheme.
Fallback schemes should further fulfill the following requirements:
Effectiveness and Accuracy
Fallback schemes must be at least as secure as the authentication schemes that precede them
in the chain to ensure security.
Efficiency
Fallback schemes are less time-sensitive than the schemes that precede them, but more time-
sensitive than the ones that follow them. This is done to reflect their frequency of use and to
define their order of issue.
Learnability
Fallback schemes must be usable without prior training, meaning that users should immedi-
ately know how to authenticate when they encounter the scheme for the first time.
Memorability
Fallback authentication must not rely on information that is learned by heart (e.g., through
repetition), but should take advantage of recent memories or memories that are less likely to
be forgotten over time (e.g., episodic memories).
Satisfaction
Fallback schemes can be, but do not have to be satisfying due to the infrequent occurrence
of lockouts.
Motivation
The enrollment effort for fallback schemes must be kept to a minimum to motivate users to
set them up.
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4.2 Exploring the Design Space
The design space for alternative fallback authentication schemes can be defined along four
dimensions: type of replacement, type of enrollment, type of challenge and type of response
(Table 4.1). These dimensions are based on the three authentication stages and are discussed
in more detail in the remainder of this section.
4.2.1 Type of Replacement
The type of replacement (i.e., the type of fallback scheme) can be categorized as biometric,
knowledge-based and token-based. Since the focus of this thesis lies on the use of autobio-
graphical memories, we will only cover knowledge-based fallback schemes and behavioral
fallback schemes within the design space.
4.2.2 Type of Enrollment
Enrollment is required to define a shared secret between the user and the corresponding
system. It can occur explicitly (e.g., [34]) or implicitly (e.g., [40]). While the former requires
active involvement by the user, the latter happens in the background, for example, during the
user’s interaction with the device. With respect to the secret shared, explicit enrollment
deals with static information that only changes when initiated by the user, while implicit
enrollment handles dynamic information that is updated automatically with each interaction.
The remainder of this thesis will refer to them as static enrollment and dynamic enrollment.
4.2.3 Type of Challenge and Type of Response
Authentication is based on a challenge-response model where the system confronts the user
with a challenge that the user has to respond to. Based on the distinction by Just [101], we
classify challenges and responses as fixed, controlled and open.
4.2.4 Overview of Example Implementations
Based on the given design space, there are 2×3×3 = 18 possible combinations for the three
dimensions of enrollment (with two levels), challenge (with three levels) and response (with
three levels). For each of the possible combinations, numerous implementation options exist.
Overall, we explore twelve combinations for the design of fallback schemes. These schemes
cover static and dynamic enrollments, but focus on the latter due to motivational factors (see
Section 4.1) and the known problems of static enrollments (see Section 2.3). The type of
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· 2-Finger Sketches º Installed Apps
¸ Smartphone Activities
Table 4.1: Design space for alternative fallback schemes based on a challenge-response model.
The numbers refer to the aproaches covered in this work and their classification within the de-
sign space. A detailed description to the corresponding numbers can be found in section 4.2.4.
Cells with a vertical score represent combinations that are not viable, while empty cells are
combinations that are not covered in this thesis.
challenge and the type of response was chosen based on their suitability for the correspond-
ing scheme. For example, we focused on fixed challenges for dynamic enrollments as they
happen without the active involvement of the user, rendering the possibility to define own
challenges obsolete. We further favored controlled responses over open responses as the
latter is only a more general version of the former. An overview of the different fallback
schemes covered in the scope of this thesis and their classification within the design space
is given in Table 4.1. The remainder of this section will provide a brief description for each
fallback scheme covered in this work. The schemes are sorted by their type of enrollment.
Static Enrollment
¶ Location-Based Questions Personal experiences are remembered with a strong spatio-
temporal context (Section 2.6). We exploit this characteristic for the design of location-
based questions (e.g., “Where did your first kiss take place?”). In comparison to traditional
security questions, the answers are not provided as text, but as locations on a map. We
evaluate how accurate these locations are recalled by users and how easy they are guessed
by different types of adversaries.
· 2-Finger Sketches The use of biometric features from drawn sketches has produced
promising results in the context of primary authentication (e.g., [40]). Therefore, we explore
if sketch-based authentication can also be exploited for fallback authentication. We designed
a fallback scheme that requires users to reproduce predefined sketches with two fingers si-
multaneously. This was done to positively influence the recall of stroke order which is an
important feature for biometric authentication.
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Dynamic Enrollment
¸ Smartphone Activities Many interactions with the smartphone are part of autobio-
graphical memory, such as a call with one’s significant other or a photo taken during a
vacation. In this approach, we examine the suitability of different smartphone activities
(e.g., receiving a call or taking a photo) for the design of alternative fallback schemes.
¹ Icon Arrangements Smartphone owners start a substantial amount of apps from home
screens (i.e., the mobile counterparts to desktops on computers) [73]. Since interaction with
these screens happens regularly, it is assumed that users implicitly learn the arrangement of
their apps [71]. This approach evaluates the accuracy with which users can reproduce their
home screen layout as well as the suitability of icon arrangements for fallback authentication.
º Installed Apps Previous work has shown that app usage is closely related to a person’s
personality [30]. For example, introverted people exhibit other smartphone usage patterns
than extroverted people. This approach explores the potential of installed apps for the design
of fallback schemes where users authenticate by deciding whether certain apps are or are not
installed on their device.
4.3 Research Strategy
For each of the example implementations, our research strategy is threefold: (1) we
demonstrate how different types of autobiographical memories can be leveraged in fallback
schemes; (2) we evaluate the usability (i.e., memorability) and security of these memories for
fallback authentication; and (3) we identify the best trade-off between the two factors (i.e.,
usability and security) and discuss their implications on the design of fallback schemes.
Since a brief overview of the example implementations has already been given in the previ-
ous section, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the evaluation methodology in this
work and the metrics used.
4.3.1 Usability Evaluation Methodology
Memorability is one of the main factors that we will consider for usability evaluation, since
it was shown to be one of the major issues of current knowledge-based solutions for fallback
authentication (see Section 2.3). Memorability can be measured by the ratio between the
number of correct responses and the number of all responses given by users (i.e., success
rate [104]). However, this ratio is influenced by different variables that are explained next.
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Time Passed The time that passes between enrollment and fallback authentication is
likely to influence memorability as the recall of information is prone to deteriorate over
time. Thus, it is important to conduct short-term and long-term memorability tests. This is a
common approach in the domain of fallback authentication (see Section 2.3).
Number of Challenges The number of challenges that users have to respond to has an im-
pact on factors like memorability, efficiency and security. For example, the more challenges
are required, the higher the burden is on memorability and the longer the authentication lasts.
Nonetheless, the use of multiple challenges is well-established to prevent random adversaries
from authenticating successfully by chance.
Number of Attempts Since the increasing number of challenges can cause users to make
more errors, it is advisable to give them multiple attempts to provide the correct responses
in case they fail. However, it is important to limit the number of attempts as it increases the
risk of potential adversaries to guess the right answers.
In summary, memorability is a key factor for the usability evaluation of fallback schemes. In
the scope of this thesis, we will evaluate memorability at different points in time after enroll-
ment to test the short-term memorability and long-term memorability of the corresponding
fallback schemes (e.g., immediately after enrollment and six months later). Memorability
will be measured by the success rate of users to recall their responses, but will also take
into account parameters like the number of challenges and the number of allowed attempts
that are crucial to decide whether an authentication is considered as successful or not. More
details on this will be provided later (Section 4.3.3).
4.3.2 Security Evaluation Methodology
The security of an authentication scheme can only be analyzed when potential threats are
identified and their prevalence is estimated. This is done to decide against which threats an
authentication scheme should protect [86]. Our threat models focus on threats that are based
on the ones identified by Just and Aspinall [103]: insider attacks, focused attacks and blind
guesses. We classify these threats according to the relationship between the adversary and
the victim as this factor was shown to be important by past work (e.g., [128, 170]) and was
also observed during the survey and interviews (see Chapter 3). With respect to other types
of threats that are less prevalent (e.g., shoulder surfing), we will discuss them individually in
the corresponding chapters in case these threats apply.
Insider Attacks The first threat model assumes a close adversary (e.g., significant other,
best friend) who is in possession of the victim’s device. In order to access it, the adversary
tries to guess the victim’s password, but fails so that the device gets locked and fallback
authentication is required. Since the adversary has advanced knowledge about the victim,
guessing the right answers is not plain luck anymore.
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Focused Attack The second threat model assumes a stranger as adversary who has gotten
hold of the victim’s device (e.g., by stealing it). The adversary wants to get access to the
device, but gets locked out completely and thus tries to exploit the fallback scheme. The
adversary further researches the responses to the challenges (e.g., from social networks) so
that guessing the right answers is above chance.
Blind Guesses The third threat model also assumes a stranger as adversary who has
gained physical access to the victim’s device (e.g., by finding it on the street). The adversary
tries to access the device, but gets locked out completely so that fallback authentication is
required. Since the victim is unknown, the stranger guesses the answers arbitrarily.
In summary, there are different kinds of threats in the context of mobile fallback authenti-
cation that are motivated by the adversary’s relationship to the victim. In the scope of this
thesis, all three threats will be considered (where appropriate), but with a focus on insider
attacks as they are one of the worst-case scenarios. This means that we will evaluate the
fallback schemes not only from a theoretical point of view, but also with human adversaries
that have a close relationship to the user.
4.3.3 Accuracy Metric
In order to analyze the best trade-off between usability and security of a fallback scheme, we
will take advantage of the accuracy metric which is a good indicator for how well a system
works [121]. This metric is used in various domains, such as medical diagnoses, physics,
chemistry or security research.
In general, accuracy is represented by the ratio of the number of correct decisions to the
number of all decisions made by a system [121]. In the context of authentication, correct
decisions are made when legitimate users are authenticated successfully, while adversaries
are rejected rightfully. These decisions are also referred to as true positives (TP) and true
negatives (TN), respectively. In turn, incorrect decisions are referred to as false negatives
(FN) and false positives (FP), meaning that legitimate users are rejected, while adversaries
are accepted. In other words, the accuracy for an authentication scheme is the ratio of correct
authentication decisions to all authentication decisions made and can be described by the
following formula:
Accuracy = ∑T P∑T P+∑FN+∑T N+∑FP +
∑T N
∑T P+∑FN+∑T N+∑FP
The formula returns a value between 0 and 1 (0 and 100 in percentage values). In the best
case, the accuracy is 1 (or 100%), meaning that all legitimate users and adversaries are
identified as such.
Accuracy values must be interpreted carefully. For example, two fallback schemes can yield
the same accuracy values, but still perform differently: while the incorrect decisions of one
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scheme may consist of FN only, the incorrect decisions of the other may all be FP. This
leads to different implications for the usability and security of a system. Therefore, it is
important to complement accuracy values with two types of success rates that are referred to
as sensitivity and specificity [121]:
Sensitivity = ∑T P∑T P+∑FN Specificity =
∑T N
∑T N+∑FP
Sensitivity refers to the success rate of users and is depicted by the ratio of successful au-
thentication attempts to all attempts made by them. In turn, specificity is the failure rate
of adversaries, represented by the ratio of successfully rejected attacks to all attacks made.
Thus, a high sensitivity implies good usability, while a high specificity implies good security.
So far, we have mentioned successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts. However, it
is still unclear when an authentication attempt is considered as successful or unsuccessful.
For this, a so-called decision threshold is needed that is influenced by various implicit vari-
ables [121]. In the context of challenge-response systems for authentication, these variables
are the number of challenges that needs to be answered correctly as well as the number of
attempts allowed to respond to each challenge (see Section 4.3.1). Since these parameters
influence the number of FP and FN, they will also have an impact on the accuracy values.
In summary, the main motivation of the accuracy metric in the scope of this work is to
quantify the trade-off between usability and accuracy. This includes the identification of the
best parameters (i.e., number of challenges, number of attempts) and their impact on the
success rates of users and adversaries. This is important to discuss design implications for
possible real-world deployments.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have provided a theoretical framework for fallback authentication to mo-
tivate the design and evaluation of alternative fallback schemes that will be presented in this
work. The content of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Definition of Fallback Authentication. Fallback authentication is a chain of alterna-
tive authentication schemes that are issued successively if the primary scheme fails.
Although any scheme for primary authentication could be used for fallback authenti-
cation, their scenario of use imposes different requirements on their design.
• Differences to Primary Authentication. The main difference between primary au-
thentication and fallback authentication is their frequency of use so that certain us-
ability and security factors become more/less important in the design of one or the
other. For example, while efficiency is a crucial aspect for primary authentication, it is
less critical in the context of fallback authentication. Instead, the factor memorability
should have a higher priority for the latter.
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• Design Space for Fallback Authentication. The design space for fallback authenti-
cation can be defined along four dimensions: type of replacement, type of enrollment,
type of challenge and type of response. In the scope of this thesis, we focus on re-
placement schemes that have a relation to autobiographical memory. The different
types of memories are explored in various approaches that are either based on static or
dynamic enrollments.
• Evaluation Strategy. Since most fallback schemes were shown to be lacking in mem-
orability, the usability evaluation in this work focuses on memorability-related factors
(i.e., number of recalled items, number of challenges and number of allowed attempts).
In terms of security, different types of threats are considered that take into account the
social context of the user (e.g., insider attacks). Last, but not least we use accuracy
calculations as a metrics to identify the best trade-off between usability and security
to discuss the potential of different types of memories for fallback authentication.
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5
Fallback Authentication
Based on Static Enrollments
The use of static enrollments for fallback authentication has the advantage that users are
actively involved in the definition of the secrets that they share with the system they register
for. This way, they get to know the authentication scheme before the actual lockout happens
and thus are not unprepared when fallback authentication takes place.
However, static enrollments also have their shortcomings, such as requiring users to spend
a certain amount of time to provide the needed information. More seriously than that, they
often cause memorability issues when their design does not take into account that a long
time may pass after enrollment before the provided information is needed again.
In this chapter, we evaluate two approaches that use declarative and non-declarative knowl-
edge about autobiographical memories for fallback authentication. While one of them fo-
cuses on the skill to draw (Section 5.1), the other takes advantage of the strong spatio-
temporal context of episodic memories to create location-based questions (Section 5.2).
These types of memories are, even after longer periods of time, easier to recall than per-
sonal facts that are often used for traditional security questions (see Section 2.6).
We found that drawing skills (in our implementation) do not work for authentication. The
presented fallback scheme is a prime example that memorability is not the only usability
factor that is important for fallback authentication; user satisfaction is also essential for an
authentication scheme to work. With respect to location-based questions, the results are very
promising and we see a high potential for their deployment in a real-world setting (Section
5.3).
Personal contribution statement: The content of this chapter is based on two bachelor theses by
Lara Hirschbeck [89] and Michael Richter [145]. Both theses were supervised by the author. Part
of this work was published at the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015), with
co-authors Alexander De Luca, Michael Richter, Matthew Smith and Heinrich Hussmann [76]. A
detailed overview of task responsibilities can be found in the disclaimer.
5.1 Sketch-based Fallback Authentication
The ability to sketch is a procedural skill that forms part of autobiographical memory (see
Section 2.6). It has often been used in the domain of biometric authentication due to the
unique features that drawings convey. Popular examples are draw-a-secret [98], passdoodles
[66] and scribble-a-secret [134]. All of them allow users to create free-hand sketches on
a grid or canvas and assume better memorability based on the fact that pictures are better
remembered than words [129]. In this section, we introduce a sketch-based authentication
scheme for fallback authentication. We present its design, implementation and evaluation to
report the key insights from the latter.
In general, sketch-based authentication schemes are very similar: Users create an authenti-
cation template by repeatedly drawing their passwords during enrollment. This template is
then used during authentication to compare it with the authentication attempt. The compari-
son returns a value that describes the similarity between the two and if it exceeds a predefined
threshold, the attempt is considered as successful. Otherwise the attempt is rejected.
The comparison itself can be done with different methods: Some approaches are inspired by
signature verification and use visual matching for comparison (e.g., [4, 134, 171]). Others
rely on implicit features that are collected during drawing and include, for example, the
speed with which the sketch is made or the pressure that is used (e.g., [40, 67, 179]).
5.1.1 Approach
Since the results from previous research on sketch-based authentication were promising
(e.g., [40]), we were keen on exploring its use in the context of fallback authentication on
smartphones. We propose an approach that authenticates users by the way they draw a prede-
fined sketch template on a smartphone touch screen using two of their fingers simultaneously
(see below for further details).
The use of predefined sketch templates (instead of user-chosen ones) was inspired by the
work of Alzubi et al. who provided users with drawing instructions during password selec-
tion (e.g., “draw three connected wheels of different sizes”) [4]. However, we do not use
textual guidelines, but show the actual sketch that users have to draw for authentication.
This was done to minimize potential memorability burdens [169].
Furthermore, drawing with two fingers simultaneously was motivated by the problems that
Goldberg et al. identified [66]. Although many methods for sketch comparison use stroke
order as distinction feature, users often have difficulties to recall the exact order. With the
use of two fingers at the same time, we assume to positively influence stroke order due to
physical restrictions. In addition to this, the use of two fingers allows us to explore additional
features, such as the distance between two fingers, to distinguish between users.
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
Table 5.1: Overview of the nine sketch templates (T1-T9) that were created during brainstorm-
ing sessions.
5.1.2 Design of Predefined Sketches
A brainstorming with four participants (all male) was conducted to collect ideas for different
sketch templates. Participants were recruited through mailing lists, social media or personal
communication. They were between 19 and 23 years old (average: 22 years) and had a
background in media informatics. All of them owned a smartphone and were familiar with
the capabilities and limitations of touch input on mobile devices. The brainstorming lasted
about 30 minutes and participants received 5AC gift vouchers as incentive.
Participants were invited to our lab. After a brief overview of our approach, we asked them
to come up with ideas for sketches that they think can be drawn on smartphone touch screens
using two fingers simultaneously. We collected all ideas on a whiteboard for later discussion.
The participants’ ideas were inspired by a variety of topics: A substantial amount of sugges-
tions was based on different character sets, such as hieroglyphs, Chinese characters or Latin
letters (e.g., Table 5.1, T9). Other ideas took into account finger movements and included
sketches that required both fingers to move (either in the same or opposite direction) as well
as sketches that required the fixation of one finger, while the other had to be moved (e.g.,
Table 5.1, T3 or T5). Symmetry and simplicity were also important factors: participants of-
ten proposed sketches that were composed of simple forms, such as lines, circles or triangles
(e.g., Table 5.1, T8).
Table 5.1 overviews the final sketch templates that we used for evaluation. They were all
based on the suggestions made by participants during the brainstorming.
5.1.3 Prototype
The study prototype was implemented for smartphones using Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sand-
wich) or higher, but was optimized for our study device (i.e., Samsung Galaxy S3). Using
the same device for all participants had the advantage that the collected data could also be
used to simulate attacks for our security analysis. More details about this will be provided
later (see Section 5.1.4).
The overall structure of the study application was simple (Figure 5.1). The opening screen
explained the study task and as soon as participants pressed the OK button, they were suc-
cessively shown the nine sketch templates that appeared in random order. For each template,
participants were asked to draw them on a white canvas ten times in a row. In case they were
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Figure 5.1: Screenshots of the study prototype: Opening screen (left), example of sketch tem-
plate with instructions (center) and example of a sketch drawn by a user (right).
not satisfied with the result, participants had the option to reset their sketch to draw it again.
The same application was used to collect the data for enrollment as well as authentication.
In order to detect the participants’ interaction with the touch screen, we registered different
touch event properties. For example, we identified whether the users’ finger touched the
screen, was lifted from the screen or was moved on the screen. Due to multi-touch support,
this was done with both fingers simultaneously. Furthermore, the first finger to touch the
screen was recognized as primary touch, while the other was considered as secondary touch.
Data collection was done every 25 milliseconds and all relevant information was stored in a
CSV-file on the device. Each entry in the file consisted of the following parameters: event
time, xy-coordinates of primary touch and xy-coordinates of secondary touch. In addition,
we also stored the drawn image for later visual inspection.
5.1.4 Threat Model
Since predefined sketch templates reveal the secrets to be used for authentication, potential
adversaries (e.g., strangers) who are in possession of the victim’s device can try to attack the
fallback scheme by simply drawing the templates (i.e., blind guesses; see Section 4.3.2).
In order to evaluate whether these kinds of adversaries are likely to succeed, we simulated at-
tacks using the authentication attempts from the study. How this was done will be described
later in the next section.
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5.1.5 User Study
The user study consisted of two sessions: The first session was used for enrollment, while
the second session (i.e., four weeks after the first session) simulated fallback authentication.
A detailed description of the study is provided next.
Study Design and Study Procedure
Participants were recruited over bulletin boards, social media and personal communication.
All participants completed the same tasks for the study. The independent variable was the
sketch template (nine levels) to be drawn for enrollment/authentication. The order in which
the templates appeared was randomized to minimize learning effects. The study design was
the same for both sessions.
Session I (Enrollment) Participants were invited to our lab for the first session. At the
beginning of the study, we gave them a brief introduction to the general procedure and ex-
plained the study task. Once they were ready, they started the study application and drew
each of the nine sketch templates ten times in a row. There was a break between each
template to hand participants a brief questionnaire about how easy it was to draw the corre-
sponding sketch. The first session was concluded with another questionnaire that asked for
demographic information and the participant’s three most favorite templates.
Session II (Fallback Authentication) The second session was conducted four weeks after
the first session to simulate fallback authentication. The procedure was the same as for the
first session. The only difference was that the data from the first session was used to create
the authentication template (i.e., enrollment), while the data from the second session was
considered as actual authentication attempts and compared to the data from the first session.
Each session lasted about 60 minutes and participants received 20AC gift vouchers for their
participation (10AC per session). Participants were required to show up for both sessions in
order to receive their compensation.
Participants
General Demographics Altogether, 21 participants (4 female) took part in the experi-
ment. They were between 11 and 58 years old (average: 30 years). Ten participants were
students with a background in media informatics. Eight participants were already employed
and worked as research assistants, physicians, electricians or insurance salesmen. One par-
ticipant was a homemaker, while two others were high school students.
Drawing Skills When asked to rate their drawing skills on touch screen devices (using their
fingers) on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very bad; 5=very good), most of them (15 participants)
stated to have mediocre drawing skills (equals three on the Likert scale). Two participants
were good in drawing on touch screen devices, while four participants stated to have bad or
very bad drawing skills.
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Combination Event Time X1 Y1 X2 Y2 Distance
1 X X
2 X X
3 X
4 X X X X
5 X X X
6 X X X
7 X X X X X
8 X X X X X
9 X X X X
10 X X X X
11 X X X X X X
Parameter Description
Event Time Timestamp of touch event.
X1 X-coordinate of first finger to touch the screen.
Y1 Y-coordinate of first finger to touch the screen.
X2 X-coordinate of second finger to touch the screen.
Y2 Y-coordinate of second finger to touch the screen.
Distance Distance between xy-coordinates of first and second finger.
Table 5.2: Overview of the parameter combinations used for the DTW analyses (top) and the
description of the corresponding parameters (bottom).
Data Analysis
In order to analyze the data from the two sessions, dynamic time warping (DTW) was used.
Although there were other options available (e.g., machine learning algorithms), DTW was
shown to be a good option by previous work (e.g., [40]).
DTW originates from speech recognition, but has found usage in various domains related
to pattern recognition [10]. Its general idea is to compare two time sequences to each other
by calculating a so-called warp distance that represents the effort needed to match one time
sequence to the other. The bigger the effort (i.e., the warp distance), the more different
the sequences are [149]. For our analyses, we used the DTW implementation for R by
Giorgino [65] and computed the warp distances on a grid engine.
For the analyses, we used different combinations of touch screen data to create the time
sequences. The combinations were based on the results by De Luca et al. who identified
event time and xy-coordinates as essential parameters to distinguish between users [40]. We
further included the distance between two fingers during drawing as an additional parame-
ter. Table 5.2 overviews the combinations that we tested in our analyses and explains the
parameters.
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
TP 171 131 183 179 166 161 161 174 175
TN 2158 2831 1999 2053 2634 2662 2028 2600 2535
FP 2042 1369 2201 2147 1566 1538 2172 1600 1665
FN 39 79 27 31 44 49 49 36 35
Sensitivity 81.4% 62.4% 87.1% 85.2% 79.0% 76.7% 76.7% 82.9% 83.3%
Specificity 51.4% 67.4% 47.6% 48.9% 62.7% 63.4% 48.3% 61.9% 60.4%
Accuracy 52.8% 67.1% 49.5% 50.6% 63.5% 64.1% 49.6% 62.9% 61.5%
Table 5.3: Overview of the best accuracy values for each sketch template.
Authentication Template Authentication templates are important as they decide whether
an authentication attempt fails (i.e., the authentication attempt is not similar to the authenti-
cation template) or succeeds (i.e., the authentication attempt is similar to the authentication
template). In order to create an authentication template for each sketch template, the data
from the first session was used. Remember: each sketch template consisted of ten data sets
(since each of them was drawn ten times during enrollment). The creation of the authenti-
cation template for each parameter combination, each user and each sketch template worked
as follows: For each data set the warp distance to the other nine data sets was calculated and
then averaged. The data set with the smallest average distance was then chosen as authenti-
cation template (i.e., it is the data set that is the closest to all other data sets).
In order to define a threshold T (i.e., warp distance) based on which an authentica-
tion attempt is considered as successful, the data sets were again compared to the au-
thentication template, resulting in nine different warp distances. These distances were
then used to calculate T . We tested different formulas (i.e., mean, minimum, maximum,
halfwayMeanMax, Standard deviation) and found that, based on the resulting accuracy val-
ues, the halfwayMeanMax plus standard deviation worked best: T = (Mean+Maximum2 ) +
Standard Deviation. This observation is in line with previous work [40] and thus the
halfwayMeanMax was used as the basis of our result reports in the next session.
Authentication and Attack The data from the second session was used to simulate fall-
back authentication after enrollment. For each parameter combination, each user and each
sketch template, we compared the authentication attempts to the corresponding authentica-
tion template to decide whether the attempt was successful or not. In addition to this, we
tried to attack each participant by using the authentication attempts by all other participants
and compared them to the authentication template of the participant to be attacked.
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Results
Altogether, we collected 1890 (= 9×10×21) data sets during the first session to create the
corresponding authentication templates. The same amount of data was collected during the
second session, but were used as authentication attempts and attacks, respectively.
Accuracy For each sketch template and each parameter combination the number of true
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) and accuracy
values were calculated. Table 5.3 reports the results of the parameter combination that
reached the best accuracy value for the corresponding sketch template.
Overall, the best accuracy was yielded for sketch template T2 when the factors time, x2,
y2 and distance were taken into account. This combination yielded an accuracy of 67.1%
(1369 FP; 79 FN), with a success rate of 32.6% for attacks and a failure rate of 37.6% for
authentication attempts.
In turn, sketch template T7 showed the worst results. Its highest accuracy value was only
49.6% (2172 FP; 49 FN). While the success rate for attacks was 51.7%, the failure rate was
23% for authentication attempts. Interestingly, this was the only sketch template that did not
use the parameter distance to reach its highest accuracy. Instead, it took into account the
parameters time, x1, x2, y1 and y2.
Ease of Drawing After the enrollment of each sketch template, participants were asked
to state how easy it was to draw the corresponding sketch with two fingers simultaneously,
using a 5-point Likert scale (1=very difficult; 5=very easy). The opinions for most sketches
were ambiguous, but for three of them, we observed a clear tendency. For example, sketch
templates T3 and T6 were found to be difficult to draw by the majority of users as they had to
move their fingers in opposite directions. For one of the two templates they even had to rotate
their hand. In turn, sketch template T7 was easy to draw for the majority of participants. It
consisted of two vertical and two horizontal strokes that could be drawn within two parallel
strokes from top to bottom and from left to right.
Favorite Sketch The results of the ratings for ease of drawing were also mirrored in the
sketches that users liked the most and the least, respectively. Sketch template T7 was the
template that the majority of participants liked the most, while sketch template T6 was liked
the least.
User Stories and Comments After the study, some participants reported that they were
dissatisfied with the results of their sketches. They told us that most of the time it was not
possible to draw a seamless sketch that did not have a gap when both of their fingertips met.
Thus, the sketch differed from the provided template, resulting in frustration. To overcome
this problem, some participants used only one finger to draw a line that closed the gap.
Others gave up and drew the complete sketch with only one of their fingers.
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5.1.6 Discussion
The study results clearly show that the proposed approach does not work for fallback au-
thentication due to its bad usability and security properties (e.g., user frustration and the
high number of FP/FN). But beyond that, we found some inspiring insights that should be
taken into account when sketch-based authentication schemes are designed that use prede-
fined sketch templates (but not two fingers simultaneously to draw them).
Usability Matters
Even if we had reached desirable security properties, the presented approach would have
failed due to usability reasons that go beyond memorability issues. The qualitative ratings
by participants were a prime example that user satisfaction is also an essential factor to be
considered for fallback authentication (despite its infrequent use). Most participants found
that sketching with two fingers simultaneously was frustrating and developed undesired be-
haviors (e.g., drawing the sketch with one finger only). This may have severe consequences:
if users do not enroll as intended by the fallback scheme, the system may fail the user when
it is actually needed (i.e., fallback authentication), for example, when they use one finger for
enrollment, but two fingers for fallback authentication.
Distance between Two Fingers
The assumption that the distance between two fingers during sketching is distinct enough to
distinguish between users was proven to be wrong. However, it is worth mentioning that the
distance parameter was still a contributing factor in order to reach better accuracy values for
most of the sketch templates.
Reasons why this was not sufficient to authenticate users and reject adversaries may be due
to the limited complexity of the sketch templates or the form factor of smartphones. Since
smartphone displays are small, the maximal possible distances between two fingers was not
fully exploited by the participants. This could have been different on bigger devices (e.g.,
tablets).
Gap Closure
Participants in our study showed high perfectionism. They wanted their sketches to be as
close to the template as possible. However, this was difficult to accomplish due to the use of
two fingers.
When creating predefined templates for sketch-based authentication, it is important to pro-
vide users with a close-to-real experience, meaning that the template should reflect what is
actually possible. With respect to the study templates, this could have been achieved, by in-
cluding gaps to the sketch templates where both fingers were supposed to meet or by leaving
the templates as is, but automatically connecting the gap during drawing instead.
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Drawing Preferences
Most participants drew their sketches from top to bottom and from left to right. Overall,
users preferred sketch templates that were simple and easy to learn. This is problematic as
simple templates often do not convey enough data to distinguish between users. However,
we assume that this problem is specific for 2-finger sketches and more complex sketches
would not frustrate users when only one finger is used. But in case the problem is prevalent,
one could think of including guiding instructions (e.g., arrows to indicate the direction of
the stroke). In retrospect, ease of drawing (and thus drawing preferences) could have been
positively improved, if our brainstorming had taken into account ergonomic characteristics
of the human hand for the sketch templates.
5.2 Location-based Questions
For the design of fallback schemes, procedural skills were not the optimal solution. There-
fore, we explore an alternative approach to traditional text-based security questions (see
Section 2.3) that takes advantage of episodic memories. In the remainder of this section,
we present the described approach in more detail: This encompasses the design of location-
based questions, their implementation as well as evaluation. We further report the results of
the evaluation to discuss their implications for the design of fallback schemes.
5.2.1 Approach
Our approach is based on a combination of location-based questions with map-based input.
Although these questions are similar to traditional security questions where content is con-
cerned (i.e., they are based on personal facts), they are inherently different as the answers
are provided in the form of locations on a map instead of text. For example, the question
“Where was your first travel by plane?” can be used for both location-based questions and
traditional security questions. However, while the text-based answer for the latter can lead
to lexical ambiguities (e.g., “London, UK” vs. “London, United Kingdom”), we assume
that the use of map locations can overcome these problems as landmarks on the map (e.g.,
buildings or street crossings) can serve as memory cues.
Selecting a location on a map as password has already been proposed by previous work
(e.g., [164, 168, 174]) and the answer input in our approach is inspired by one of them (i.e.,
GeoPass [174]). However, instead of memorizing arbitrary locations as primary passwords,
we combine map-based input with location-based questions for cued-based recall, meaning
that the questions are used to evoke episodic memories that, in turn, are associated with a
particular location. This combination has not been explored before and has the advantage
that no free recall is required. In particular in the context of fallback authentication, this is
important to maintain memorability even when a long time between enrollment and authen-
tication has passed.
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The basic idea of our approach is as follows. During enrollment, users select or define a set
of three questions for which they provide the answers in form of a map location. In case
of password loss, users are, again, presented with the questions that they provided earlier.
For each question, users are given three attempts to answer it. The answer is considered
as correct when its distance to the original location (i.e., the location that users provided
during enrollment) lies within a predefined threshold. In our approach, we use a threshold
of 30 meters, as this was shown to be useful by Thorpe et al. [174]. Whether users are
authenticated successful, depends on the number of questions that they answer correctly.
5.2.2 Question Design
A focus group with five participants was conducted to collect and discuss potential topics
for the design of location-based questions. Participants were recruited over bulletin boards,
mailing lists and personal communication. All of them were male and between 18 and 26
years old (average: 22 years). They were all students in natural sciences (e.g., computer
science, physics and medical engineering).
Participants were accepted on a first come first serve basis, which could have influenced our
question design. Since there is evidence from research that women have more vivid and
precise autobiographical memories than men [87], our location-based questions are likely to
be a lower-bound only.
For the focus group, participants were invited to our lab. The focus group started with a
brief introduction to fallback authentication, the use of security question and an overview
of our approach. After this, participants were encouraged to discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of the presented approach. They were also asked to come up with topic ideas
for the design of location-based questions.
Altogether, we collected a variety of promising topics, such as childhood memories (they lie
far in the past and only few know about them), travel memories (they include all possible
world locations and thus increase the answer space) or first time memories (they are special
and memorable). Participants also mentioned big events (e.g., concerts) or third persons
(e.g., childhood friends).
During the discussion, participants also addressed different question types. For example,
since memories are very individual, participants raised concerns about the use of fixed ques-
tions due to potential applicability issues. The flexibility of open questions was also criti-
cized as they have the risk that users define insecure questions. Overall, participants found
guided questions to have the best trade-off between the two extremes: They set the frame for
the question, but give users space for customization.
For the study, we tested all three question types to compare them to each other. Based on the
insights from the focus group, we defined 22 fixed questions and 10 guidelines for guided
questions (Table 5.4).
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Fixed Questions
Whereto was your first travel by plane? (5)
Where have you been camping for the first time? (1)
Whereto was your longest travel so far? (5)
Where was your first car accident? (1)
Where is your favorite beach? (3)
Where did you park for your driving test? (1)
Where did your best friend from elementary school live? (2)
Where did you injure yourself badly for the first time (e.g., broken leg) (1)
Where was your first time at the sea? (2)
Where did your best kindergarten friend live? (0)
Where did you meet your best friend? (2)
Where did you spend your first vacation? (0)
Where did your first kiss take place? (2)
Whereto did you drive in your first driving lesson? (0)
Where have you been in a dangerous situation? (2)
Where was your first party? (0)
Where does a distant relative of yours live? (1)
Where was your first breakup? (0)
Whereto did you travel for your first school trip? (1)
Where was your most embarrassing moment? (0)
Where was your first job interview? (1)
Where was your saddest moment? (0)
Guided Questions
Please define a location-based question that ...
. . . refers to a travel destination/vacation destination. (7)
. . . refers to a personally experienced sport event. (5)
. . . refers to an event in your childhood. (4)
. . . refers to an event during your time at university/apprenticeship. (4)
. . . refers to one of your party experiences. (3)
. . . refers to something that you did for the first time. (3)
. . . refers to an event during your time in school. (2)
. . . involves another person. (1)
. . . refers to one of your favorite places. (1)
. . . refers to an experience that had a strong impact on your life. (0)
Table 5.4: List of the 22 fixed questions and 10 guidelines used in the study. The values in
brackets depict the number of times a question or guideline was selected by study participants.
The original language was German.
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Figure 5.2: Screenshot of the user interface for the example question “Where did your first
kiss take place?”. Answer provision always started with the world map (left). Users had the
option to zoom in using either the mouse or to enter the required location in a search field
(center). However, the answer had to be selected using the mouse to avoid facilitated guessing
for adversaries (right).
5.2.3 Prototype
The study prototype was a simple web application that used the Google Maps API to retrieve
location-based information (e.g., longitude and latitude). It further logged relevant informa-
tion from user interactions (e.g., timestamps and selected/defined questions). The prototype
had three main modes: enrollment, authentication and attack.
Enrollment
In enrollment mode users were asked to select/define three location-based questions. The
overall procedure varied for the different question types: For fixed questions users were
asked to select three questions from a list of 22 questions. For guided questions they were
asked to select three guidelines from a list of ten guidelines. In addition to this, they were
provided with three text fields so that they could define the corresponding questions. With
respect to open questions, they were also provided with three text fields for question def-
inition. After this was completed, users were consecutively shown the questions they had
just selected/defined to provide the corresponding answers by selecting a location on the
given map. Hereby, a location can be any geographical coordinates that, in turn, consist of
latitude and longitude values. For each question, users could reposition their marker before
submitting it with the corresponding save button.
Authentication and Attack
In authentication mode, fallback authentication was simulated. Users were consecutively
shown the questions that they selected/defined during enrollment. For each question they
were given three attempts to provide the correct answer on the map. Remember: An answer
was considered as correct when its distance to the original location was within a threshold
of 30 meters.
The attack mode was similar to the authentication mode. The only difference was that the
answers were provided by potential adversaries and not the legitimate users.
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Map Initialization, Zoom Level and Location Selection
In all three modes the map was always initialized at zoom level 2 and centered at the positions
0.0 / 0.0 (latitude/longitude) to display the complete world map. This was done to prevent
biasing users during answer selection and to avoid hinting possible solutions to adversaries.
In order to zoom in, users could either use the mouse or the search field that we provided on
the user interface to make it easier to find a specific region on the map. However, the answer
selection had to be done using the mouse to make the answers more individual and harder
to guess. Furthermore, the answer could only be submitted when the zoom level was higher
than 16. Previous work by Thorpe et al. has shown the usefulness of this value [174]. In
case the zoom level was too small, users were informed by a pop-up notification. Figure 5.2
shows an example work flow when providing the answer to a question.
5.2.4 Threat Model
We consider three types of threats for security evaluation: threats by close adversaries,
threats by close adversaries that research possible answers on the Internet and strangers that
also research on the Internet to conduct educated guessing attacks (see Section 4.3.2).
Close adversaries often have advanced knowledge about the user and are more likely to
know the answers to autobiographical questions than other adversary types. The threat is
aggravated when they use this knowledge to research possible answers on the Internet (e.g.,
on social networks).
With respect to strangers, their chances to guess the correct answers is (1n)
x, with x being the
number of questions and n the number of selectable locations on a world map. However, in
reality, n is assumed to be smaller when more targeted attacks are taken into account. For
example, using Internet for research, strangers may narrow down the number of possible
answers to a certain geographic location (e.g., the victim’s home town).
Another threat to be mentioned are brute force attacks for which more sophisticated adver-
saries use automated processes to successively guess one possible answer after another. In
order to encounter this threat, the number of guessing attempts must be limited.
5.2.5 User Study
The user study consisted of a short-term evaluation (three sessions within four weeks) and a
long-term evaluation after six months. More details on the study and the different sessions
are provided next.
Study Design
A between-groups design was used for the study to prevent biasing participants during the
creation of questions, for example, to avoid that they define open or guided questions that
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are similar to the ones that they encounter as fixed questions. The independent variable was
question type with three levels (i.e., fixed, guided and open). The number of correct answers
was used as dependent measure.
Study Procedure
Session I Participants were recruited for the study over bulletin boards, social media and
personal communication. For the first session, participants were invited to our lab. They
were asked to bring another person they were close to who acted as adversary (to attack their
questions). Participants were given examples for close adversaries during recruitment (e.g.,
significant other, best friend). In order to avoid confusion, we will use the terms users and
adversaries to distinguish between the two participant types.
To begin the study, users and adversaries were given a brief introduction to the topic of
fallback authentication, the general idea of our approach and an overview of the study pro-
cedure. After this, adversaries were asked to leave the room, while users completed the
actual task for the study group they were assigned to (i.e., fixed, guided or open). The task
started with the selection/definition of three location-based questions (i.e., enrollment) and
was followed by a short break during which users were shown a short distraction video with
an approximate length of six minutes. This was done to conduct a memorability test shortly
after enrollment. Users had three attempts per question to provide the correct answer. They
were informed about the correctness of their answers. In case they were not able to provide
the correct answer to a question within three attempts, they had to skip to the next question.
Once users completed their tasks, they were asked to leave the room. In turn, adversaries
were invited back in and the same procedure was repeated, but without enrollment. In case
adversaries were not able to guess the correct answer to a question within three attempts,
they were given another three attempts to do some Internet research to find the answer.
Note that we allowed participants to act in both roles during the study in case they wanted to,
meaning that they could take part as users as well as each other’s close adversaries. We paid
particular attention that these participants were assigned to different groups and that they,
one after another, completed the user tasks (i.e., enrollment and memorability test) before
the adversary tasks (i.e., attack). This was important to prevent biasing them during question
selection/definition.
The first session was concluded by a questionnaire that had to be answered by users and
adversaries. It contained questions about their demographics, the study task and their rela-
tionship to each other.
In addition to this, users were handed another form that asked them for personally iden-
tifiable information (i.e., first name, last name, date of birth and place of birth). This in-
formation is interesting for educated guessing attacks by strangers (see Section 4.3.2). We
informed users about the purpose of this data collection and told them that the provision of
this information was optional. However, none of the users refused to provide the needed
information.
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Session II + III The second and third session took place one week and four weeks after
the first meeting, respectively. For both sessions, users were invited to our lab for another
memorability test in which they had three attempts to answer the questions they had enrolled
during the first session.
Long-Term Evaluation Another memorability test was conducted six months after the
third session. This way, we were able to simulate a realistic fallback scenario in which a
long time between enrollment and authentication had passed. In order to encourage users to
participate and to spare them from long traveling times, the test was conducted over Skype.
Educated Guessing Attacks In addition to the attacks by close adversaries, we also con-
sidered educated guessing attacks. Two strangers were provided with a list of the users’
location-based questions and personally identifiable information. They had two weeks to
use this information for researching the answers to the questions on the Internet. For each
question, they were instructed to select three locations they thought could be the answer.
They were also asked to briefly state why they had chosen a specific location.
Incentives Users received 20AC gift vouchers as compensation for their participation when
they completed the first three sessions (otherwise they received nothing at all). Another 5AC
gift voucher was given when they took part in the long-term evaluation. Adversaries also
received 5AC gift vouchers for their participation in the first session. This means that partici-
pants who took part in both roles received 25AC gift vouchers for the first three sessions.
Participants
General Demographics Altogether, 32 participants (15 female) took part in the experi-
ment. While 28 of them acted as users as well as adversaries, there were two participants
who acted as users only and another two who acted as adversaries only. Participants were
between 17 and 55 years old (average: 26 years).
Most participants were students with different backgrounds (e.g., computer science, busi-
ness, etc.). Others were in high school, employed (e.g., finance, administration, etc.) or
retired.
Relationship When asked about their relationship to each other, most user-adversary pairs
were best friends, good friends or partners/spouses. Overall there was good agreement be-
tween users and adversaries on the named relationships, but there were four cases in which
the relationship did not match. For example, while one person treated the other as good/best
friend, the other person considered them as acquainted friend/good friend only.
Participants were also asked to state how well they know each other on a 5-point Likert scale
(1=not at all; 5=very well). Fourteen users-adversary pairs knew each other very well or
well. One pair reported to know each other only a little. For another pair the ratings did not
match. While one of them thought to know the other person well, the latter stated to know
them a little only.
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Strangers Two strangers (one female) who had no relation to the users in our study per-
formed educated guessing attacks. They were 29 years and 33 years old. Both of them
worked as research assistants at our university with a security background.
Results (Short-Term Evaluation)
Question Categories Altogether, 90 location-based questions were selected/defined in
the user study (i.e., 30 fixed questions, 30 guided questions and 30 open questions).
Most users selected travel-related topics for one of their fixed questions (e.g., first flight or
longest flight). This was followed by questions that involved another person (e.g., best friend
or first kiss). Table 5.4 (top) shows how often each fixed question was selected.
Travel was also a popular topic for the guided questions. This was followed by guidelines
about sport activities. Example questions that users defined included athletic first times (e.g.,
“Where did I receive my first sports award?” or “Where did I run my first marathon?”) and
special travel memories (e.g., “Where was your graduation trip?” or “Where did I spend
my most beautiful summer when I was a child?”). Interestingly, there was one question that
referred to the future (e.g., “Where is the place I want to be at least once?”), while all other
questions referred to the past.
For open questions, users covered different topics that, for example, included another per-
son or animal (e.g., “Where was my tomcat born?”). Other questions were about special
events (e.g., “Where did I celebrate the victory against Argentina in 2010?”), first times
(e.g., “Where did your first kiss take place?”), travel (e.g., “In which country did I get
homesick?”), education (e.g., “Where was my final exam?”) or personal preferences (e.g.,
“Where can I eat my favorite food?”).
Amount of Information in a Question During the review of the guided and open ques-
tions, we made an interesting observation: Some questions presume knowledge of more
information than others. For example, in order to provide the answer to the question “Where
is the center of the route to my best childhood friend?” five pieces of information are re-
quired: Who is the childhood friend? Where does the friend live? Where does the user live?
Which route did the user take? Where is the center of this route?
Overall, 77% of the guided and open questions required only one piece of information (i.e.,
the location), 17% required two pieces of information (e.g., “Where did I meet my best
friend?”) and 3% required three pieces of information (e.g., “Where is my sister’s husband
from?”). Another 3% required four or more pieces of information.
Answer Distribution Figure 5.3 uses a world map to visualize the answers that users sub-
mitted during enrollment for their questions. Interestingly, most answers were clustered in
one geographical area: Europe. In particular, most answers were located in Munich, Ger-
many and its surrounding areas (i.e., the city in which the study took place).
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of answers that users provided for their questions during enrollment.
Number of Correct Answers (Users) Users submitted answers to their security questions
in three sessions and during the long-term evaluation (the results of the latter, however, will
be reported in another section).
A two-way ANOVA that examined the effects of question type (i.e., fixed, guided and open)
and user type (i.e., user, close adversary and stranger) showed that users were significantly
better than adversaries in answering their questions for all three sessions (each with p <
0.01). No significant main effects were found for the factor question type. There were also
no interaction effects. Thus, the results in the remainder of this section will report the total
number of correct answers for all question types (and not for each of them separately).
An answer was considered as correct when the selected location was within a distance of
30 meters to the original location. In the first session, users answered 80 out of 90 ques-
tions (89%) correctly (Table 5.5). Most of them answered all their questions correctly and
needed only one attempt most of the time. Although there were users that failed for some
questions, none of them failed in all three questions. The main reason for failing a question
was precision, meaning that users were close to the original location but outside the required
threshold. Only in two cases were users far away from the the original location (> 1000
meters). The reason was that they had forgotten their answers. One of them remarked that
she had selected a question/location that she did not associate with a strong memory.
After one week, users still answered 79 out of 90 questions (88%) correctly (Table 5.5).
Similarly to the previous session, most of them answered all their questions correctly and
most of them needed only one attempt. Interestingly, most users who failed some of their
questions were the same users that already failed for these questions in the previous session.
There was no user that failed in all three questions.
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Session I Session II Session III
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
3 Attempts 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
2 Attempts 0 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 1
1 Attempt 26 25 25 25 24 25 23 24 21
3 Correct Answers 21 20 19
2 Correct Answers 8 9 8
1 Correct Answer 1 1 3
0 Correct Answers 0 0 0
Table 5.5: Overview of the number of attempts that users needed for the three questions (Q1-
Q3) for each session as well as the number of correct answers by users per session.
In the third session (i.e., four weeks after the first one), answers to 76 out of 90 questions
(84%) were recalled (Table 5.5). Most users answered all their questions correctly and were
able to provide the correct answers within one attempt. Most users that had difficulties with
their questions in the previous sessions still encountered these problems. However, two of
them were able to provide the correct answers.
Number of Correct Answers (Close Adversaries) Adversaries were only required to
submit their answers in the first session (as no memorability test was needed for them). They
answered 6 out of 90 questions (7%) correctly. While some adversaries guessed the correct
answers within one attempt, others needed two or three. Within the set of three questions,
none of the adversaries had more than one correct answer.
Adversaries who failed to provide the correct answer after three attempts were given another
three attempts to research it on the Internet. However, only two adversaries succeeded. Each
of them answered one question correctly after research. Questions that adversaries were able
to answer correctly were, for example, the questions “In which street did my grandma live?”
or “In which building was my first lecture?”. The former question was guessed by a spouse,
while the latter was guessed by a university friend.
Number of Correct Answers (Strangers) Most of the time, the two strangers failed in
their educated guesses as, according to their reports, it was very difficult to research the
answers despite the use of social networks and search engines. One of them was able to
research the answer to 1 out of 90 questions (1%). The other had 2 out of 90 questions (2%)
correct. Both of them needed between one and two attempts.
The questions that they answered correctly were “Where was the first time I partied when I
was a student?”, “Where did I meet my best friend?” and “In which building was my first
lecture?”. The correct answers were given due to different assumptions by the two strangers:
For the last question, one stranger assumed the user to be a student at the university he was
working at, and thus selected common buildings for classes. For another question, one of the
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strangers assumed that the user had met the best friend in high school and selected different
high school buildings in the home town of the user.
Answer Distances (Users) In case users answered a question incorrectly, we calculated
the shortest distance of all three attempts to the actual location.
In the first session, users had 10 incorrect answers (11%). Seven of these answers were
located 40-100 meters from the original location. Two answers had a distance of 300-600
meters and one answer had a distance of several kilometers.
After one week, users provided 11 incorrect answers (12%). Four answers were located
40-100 meters from the original location. The distance was 100-400 meters for five answers
and over one kilometer for another two answers.
In the last session, the number of incorrect answers was 14 (16%). Nine answers had a
distance 40-100 meters from the original location, two answers had a distance of 200-600
meters and three answers had a distance of several kilometers.
Answer Distances (Close Adversaries + Strangers) The same calculations were done
for close adversaries and strangers.
Close adversaries gave 84 incorrect answers (93%), most of which were located multiple
kilometers away from the original location (average: 440.4 kilometers). Twelve of their
answers had a distance of 200-900 meters.
Similar observations were made for strangers. They answered 177 out of 180 questions
(i.e., each of them attacked 90 questions) incorrectly (98%). For the majority of questions,
their answers were multiple kilometers away from the original location (average: 1176.7
kilometers). In nine cases the distance was 300-800 meters and in another case the distance
was 50 meters.
Authentication Time Time measurement began when users opened the first HTML page
for enrollment/authentication using the corresponding start button. It ended when they sub-
mitted the last answer to their last question.
Users needed on average four minutes (min=75s; max=420s) for enrollment. Authentica-
tion took them on average 36s (min=12s; max=214s) in the first session, 45s (min=13s;
max=225s) in the second session and 47s (min=13s; max=232s) in the last session.
Perceived Memorability In the first session, users were asked to state whether they think
that they will be able to recall the answers to their questions after longer periods of time.
They affirmed this for 78 out of 90 questions (87%), but negated it for three questions (3%).
A neutral opinion was expressed for the remaining questions.
In the second session, users were asked how well they could recall the actual answers. For
73 out of 90 questions (81%) they did not have any difficulties at all. They needed some
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time to think about the answers for 6 questions (7%) and they had forgotten the answers to
11 questions (12%).
The same question (as asked in the second session) was asked for the third session. No
problems were reported for 71 out of 90 questions (79%). Some time to think about the
answers was needed for 8 questions (9%) and the answers were forgotten for 11 questions
(12%).
Guessability Users were asked to state how easy they think it is for different types of
adversaries (i.e., close adversaries and strangers) to guess or research the answers to their
questions. The ratings were given on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very difficult; 5=very easy).
While users thought that the answers to 34 of their 90 questions (38%) are not guessable
by close adversaries, they assumed this to be possible for 35 of their questions (39%). The
remaining opinions were neutral. They also believed that 48 of the 90 questions (53%) are
not researchable by close adversaries, but assumed this to be possible for 27 of their ques-
tions (30%). They were neutral about the remaining questions. Furthermore, users thought
that the majority of the questions is not guessable (89 questions; 99%) or researchable (85
questions; 94%) by strangers.
In turn, close adversaries were asked for each question whether they knew or guessed the
answers. This was done to compare their assessment to their actual performance: For the
majority of questions, 46 out of 90 (51%), close adversaries stated to have guessed the
answer to the security questions. Only in one case the corresponding security question was
answered correctly. For 38 questions (42%) they had some vague idea about the answer,
but only in one case the corresponding security question was answered correctly. For six
questions they were sure to know the answer and thus provided the correct answers to the
corresponding questions. One of the reasons was, for example, an adversary that was part of
the actual memory (e.g., joint vacation).
We further analyzed whether users and adversaries disagreed with respect to their guess-
ability assessments. A disagreement was counted when users assumed their questions to be
guessable by close adversaries, while the corresponding adversaries stated not to know the
answers (or the other way around). A disagreement was found for nine questions, but only
in one case did the user assume the question to be unguessable, while the corresponding
adversary thought to know the answer to the question.
Accuracy In order to assess the memorability and security of the proposed approach, we
calculated the number of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), false
negatives (FN) as well as the accuracy values.
For the first calculation we considered authentication attempts by users and attacks by close
adversaries only. For all three sessions, the best accuracy values were yielded when users
were required to answer at least two out of three questions correctly (with three attempts per
question). Table 5.6 gives an overview of the best accuracy values for these parameters. In
the first and second session the accuracy values were 98.3% (0 FP, 1 FN), which, however,
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Session I Session II Session III Long-Term
TP 29 29 27 20
TN 30 30 30 24
FP 0 0 0 0
FN 1 1 3 4
Accuracy 98.3% 98.3% 95% 91.7%
Table 5.6: Overview of the accuracy values for the first, second and third session when requiring
users to answer at least two out of three questions correctly (with three attempts per question).
decreased to 95% (0 FP, 3 FN) for the third session due to an increase in the number of
FN. However, no close adversary was able to authenticate. The same results were obtained
when taking into account attacks by strangers only. The results are promising: None of the
close adversaries or strangers were able to authenticate successfully, not even after trying to
research the answers to the questions.
Results (Long-Term Evaluation)
Six months after the third session, another memorability test was conducted. Altogether, 24
out of 30 users from the preceding sessions took part in this long-term evaluation. The other
six users did not respond to our invitation. To better understand the results that are reported
next, it is important to note that all six missing users were able to authenticate successfully
in the third session.
Number of Correct Answers After six months, users recalled 55 out of 72 questions
(76%). While most of them needed one attempt to provide the correct answers, others needed
two or three. There were eleven users who answered all their questions correctly. Nine users
had two correct answers and four users had at least one question correct.
Overall, 17 out of 72 questions (24%) were answered incorrectly. Five answers were 40-100
meters from the original location. Another five answers had a distance of 100-800 meters
and two answers had a distance of multiple kilometers.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance When asked how well they recalled the an-
swers to their questions after six months, most users stated that they did not encounter any
problems at all (49 out of 72 questions; 69%). However, there were some users who needed
some time to recall their answers (10 out of 72 questions; 14%) or who had forgotten the
answers completely (13 questions; 18%).
The statements were in line with their actual performances. Only in two cases, users stated
to have recalled the answer, but provided an incorrect answer instead. They were close to
the original location, but not within the required threshold.
74
5 Fallback Authentication Based on Static Enrollments
Accuracy Similarly to the preceding sessions, we used the accuracy metric for memora-
bility and security analysis. When considering authentication attempts by users and attacks
by adversaries only, the best accuracy value was 91.7% (0 FP, 4 FN) and required users to
answer at least two out of three questions correctly (with two/three attempts for each ques-
tion). The same parameters and accuracy values were identified when attacks by strangers
were taken into account instead.
User Feedback Overall, users liked the presented approach. They found the use of
location-based questions more secure and memorable than traditional security questions and
would consider using them in a real-world deployment. However, users raised concerns
about the fact that they were not aware of the required threshold of 30 meters. Most of
them were confident that, if they had known about its existence, they would have been able
to submit the correct answers. Another interesting observation was made by two users that
reported about changes in the map sections for their security questions. Due to the different
appearance of the map, they needed some time to orient themselves, as previous orientation
points (e.g., buildings) were missing.
5.2.6 Discussion
The accuracy results from the short-term as well as long-term evaluation showed promising
results in terms of security (i.e., none of the adversaries succeeded in their attacks). However,
in terms of memorability, there were some users who failed fallback authentication, leaving
room for the improvement of location-based questions, discussed next.
Question Type
Although we did not find any significant differences between fixed, guided and open ques-
tions, we made interesting observations with respect to the selection/definition for each ques-
tion type.
For example, the use of open questions can lead to the definition of weaker (but not weak)
questions that are similar to the ones found for traditional security questions (e.g., “Where is
my mother born?”). Since this information can be researched from public records, potential
adversaries may benefit from these kinds of questions (although it is still difficult to be close
enough to the original location). The use of fixed questions can overcome these problems
by excluding weak questions, but has the disadvantage that users cannot customize their
questions to include a more personal notion (e.g., increasing the amount of information that
is needed to answer a question) for better memorization and, in some cases, also for better
security. All things considered, the use of guided questions seems to be the best trade-off
between the different question types.
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Topics of Questions
The user-defined questions in our study covered a variety of topics, such as travel, first
times or special activities. Although these topics are similar to the ones found for traditional
security questions, using them for location-based questions worked much better compared
to how they were previously used (e.g., [72, 139]).
Nonetheless, the topics for the guided questions can be improved, for example, by encour-
aging users to define more complex questions that require the provision of multiple pieces of
information (e.g., “Please define a question that involves the center of two locations.”). At
the same time the amount of required information must be chosen carefully to avoid causing
problems for users to come up with a question. In addition to this, it is also advisable to
brainstorm about further topics for guided questions that take into account the thoughts of
participants from different age groups to ensure the applicability of guidelines.
Memorability
Users were confident in their ability to recall the answers to their location-based questions
when a long time between enrollment and fallback authentication has passed. This self-
assessment was in line with their actual performances: Even after six months, the number of
incorrect answers was few.
This shows that location-based questions work well in terms of memorability and have a
promising potential for real-world deployments. We hypothesize that this is not only due to
the great recall rates, but also due to the good self-assessment: Having a positive attitude
towards an authentication system is a prerequisite to increase the motivation and time that
users are willing to spend with the definition of questions for fallback authentication.
Answer Precision
Most of the time, when users gave an incorrect answer, the main reason was not related to
memorability. Instead, errors were made due to the fact that users were not aware of the
predefined threshold of 30 meters. They assumed the system to be more tolerant, resulting
in imprecise selections that were close to the original location, but not within the desired
threshold. Thus, it is important to inform users during enrollment about this threshold to
improve their performance. Furthermore, most errors were made shortly after enrollment
and then repeated in the following sessions. Therefore it is advisable to ask users to verify
their answers during enrollment, for example, by re-entering the location. This way, users
have the chance to adjust their position marker.
Guessability The majority of adversaries (i.e., close adversaries and strangers) had a hard
time attacking the questions. Most of them had to guess the answers and even after research
they were able to answer only few of the questions correctly. This shows that location-based
questions work well in terms of security. Nonetheless, adversaries that share the same expe-
riences that users had (e.g., joint vacation) are a serious threat. To prevent these adversaries
from succeeding, it is important to define multiple questions from different categories.
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Geographical Clusters Visualizing the locations that users provided during enrollment
showed that most answers were centered around their home towns or universities. This is
reasonable as they are likely to have spent a lot of time at these locations and associate many
memories with them. However, this also means that potential adversaries can take advantage
of this knowledge to perform targeted attacks by limiting the number of possible locations.
This is exactly what the strangers from our study did. But even with this strategy, it was
difficult for them to find the exact location.
5.3 Lessons Learned
In this chapter we have explored two types of autobiographical memories for the design of
fallback schemes with static enrollments: drawing skills and episodic memories. While one
memory type did not yield the expected results, the other had very desirable usability and
security properties. The key insights are summarized in the following.
• User Satisfaction. Due to the infrequent occurrence of fallback authentication, we
argued that some usability factors, such as user satisfaction, can, to some extent, be
neglected for the design of fallback schemes (see Section 4.1.2). Although not a con-
tradiction to this assumption, the results from both studies highlighted that user satis-
faction matters after all and should not be forgotten completely. Fallback schemes that
are disliked by users can lead to undesired behaviors, while schemes that meet their
expectations are likely to be adopted (in particular when they require enrollment).
• Behavioral Biometrics. The use of implicit features from 2-finger sketches did not
work to distinguish between users. Future implementations should focus on sketches
that are drawn with one finger only. However, based on the experiences from our study
and the insights from related work, we find that behavioral sketch-based authentication
is a better fit for uses cases other than fallback authentication (e.g., continuous authen-
tication) as they allow more flexibility in their design (e.g., implicit enrollments).
• Location-Based Questions. The use of location-based questions with location-based
answer input is a great combination to overcome the problems of traditional security
questions. Their usability and security properties are outstanding. We expect that,
with some usability improvements, this combination would work great in a real-world
setting.
• Guidance. One area of improvement is related to different notions of guidance. First,
question design should focus on guided questions to encourage users to define complex
questions that are harder to guess than other question types. Second, the overall system
should provide users with more information about how it works (e.g., the use of answer
thresholds) to improve the success rate of inputing correctly remembered answers.
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6
Fallback Authentication
Based on Dynamic Enrollments
Although the use of static enrollments has its advantages (see Chapter 5), it becomes prob-
lematic when a long time has passed between enrollment and fallback authentication. Infor-
mation that once was up-to-date may have become outdated, making it difficult for users to
recall the correct answers.
Dynamic approaches are a promising alternative to this as they do not require users to enroll
in advance. Instead, information relevant for fallback authentication is collected implicitly,
for example, through the user’s interaction with the device.
This chapter explores the potential to exploit different categories of information found on
smartphones for the design of three different prototypes for fallback authentication. This
includes approaches using common smartphone activities (Section 6.1), icon arrangements
on smartphones (Section 6.2) and installed apps (Section 6.3).
We found that app-related information categories are promising for the design of fallback
schemes as they have a good balance between memorability and security. However, we also
learned that the success of app-related information categories for fallback authentication
depends on the design of the authentication task.
Overall, this chapter provides an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of different
information categories for fallback authentication. It also highlights the factors that need
to be taken into account when handling smartphone information for fallback authentication.
In particular, this includes privacy aspects that have been rarely discussed in previous work
about dynamic enrollments (Section 6.4).
Personal contribution statement: The content of this chapter is based on five bachelor theses by
Stephan Thalhammer [173], Philipp Hauptmann [81], John-Louis Gao [62], Carina Saliger [150]
and Manuel Demmler [45]. All theses were supervised by the author. Part of this work was pub-
lished at the Conference on Human-Computer Interaction (CHI 2014 [74], CHI 2015 [75]) and
the Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI
2015 [77]). Several co-authors were involved in these publications: Alexander De Luca, Manuel
Demmler, Emanuel von Zezschwitz and Heinrich Hussmann. A detailed overview of task responsibil-
ities can be found in the disclaimer.
6.1 Smartphone Activities
The use of dynamic enrollments relies heavily on data availability. Luckily, most smart-
phones are equipped with hardware and software sensors that collect all types of data (e.g.,
touch information or storage information). In order to exploit this data for fallback authen-
tication, it is important to find data that is distinct enough to distinguish between users and
that it is frequently updated over time to facilitate recall during fallback authentication.
Smartphone activities, such as calls or the use of apps, seem to be an interesting data source
for the design of dynamic enrollments. Previous work has shown that individuals with differ-
ent personality exhibit different smartphone usage patterns [30]. We hypothesize that these
differences are distinct enough to be used for authentication. Das et al. [37], for example,
used information about everyday smartphone activities for primary authentication. Their re-
sults were promising, but lacked a detailed security analysis that takes into account human
adversaries. A similar idea was proposed by Dandapat et al., who used daily activity logs
from phones, browsers or Facebook in the context of password sharing [36]. With a success
rate of 95%, their results are promising. They also evaluated their approach with human
adversaries, but did not take into account the closeness between the user-adversary pairs.
The research presented in this section is similar to the work by Das et al. and Dandapat et
al. in the sense that we explore different types of smartphone activities [36, 37]. However,
it is different as we use different types of human adversaries for evaluation. We further
evaluate these activities in the context of fallback authentication, which imposes different
requirements than primary authentication or password sharing (see Chapter 4).
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: Our research started with a brain-
storming session to identify smartphone activities that are suitable for the design of security
questions for fallback authentication (Section 6.1.1). This was followed by the implementa-
tion of a prototype for Android devices (Section 6.1.2) to evaluate these questions in terms
of security and memorability (Section 6.1.4). The results were then used to improve the
questions and to conduct a follow-up study to re-evaluate them (Section 6.1.5).
6.1.1 Question Design
The brainstorming session was joined by four smartphone users (one female). Participants
were recruited over bulletin boards, social media and personal communication. They were
between 23 and 25 years old (average: 24 years). All were students with a technical back-
ground. Each received 5AC gift vouchers as incentive for their participation.
During the session, participants were encouraged to name and discuss different smartphone
activities that they thought to be suitable for the creation of security questions for fallback
authentication. Altogether, participants came up with various ideas that can be grouped into
seven categories: SMS (outgoing and incoming), Call (outgoing and incoming), App, Music
and Photos. The categories are in line with the results from previous work (e.g., [36, 37]).
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Category Question + Time Span
SMS (out) Whom did you text [yesterday | last week | last month]?
SMS (in) Who texted you [yesterday | last week | last month]?
Call (out) Whom did you call [yesterday | last week | last month]?
Call (in) Who called you [yesterday | last week | last month]?
App Which app did you use [yesterday | last week | last month]?
Music Which artist did you listen to [yesterday | last week | last month]?
Photos Which photo did you take [yesterday | last week | last month]?
Table 6.1: Overview of the 21 security questions of the first study.
For each of these categories, one question was created. In order to test how far we could
go back in time, each question was combined with three different time spans: yesterday,
last week and last month. Altogether, we ended up with 21(= 7×3) security questions for
evaluation (Table 6.1).
6.1.2 Prototype
The study prototype consisted of two Android applications: one for logging and one for
question generation.
Logging Application
Once installed, the logging application ran in the background of the users’ device to avoid
interrupting them during their everyday tasks. It logged all relevant information for the study
and included information about incoming/outgoing calls (e.g., contact number, duration),
incoming/outgoing text messages (e.g., contact number, length), app usage (e.g., name of
app) and music (e.g., artist).
Since some of this data is highly sensitive, we ensured that our research complied with
federal privacy laws. The logged data never left the users’ device. We further informed users
that they have the possibility to get a list of all information that was logged. We informed
them about this in the installation instructions that we sent them with the study application.
However, we never received a request to see this list.
Questions Application
The second application was responsible for creating the actual questions based on the logged
information. The questions were generated in random order and each had four answer op-
tions, one of which was none of them. While one of the four options was the correct answer,
the remaining ones were incorrect and were also based on the logged data (excluding the
correct answer). All answer options were provided as text (Figure 6.1, left), except for
photo-related questions for which the answers were represented by pictures (Figure 6.1,
right).
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We excluded popular apps, such as Facebook, for app-related questions to make it more
difficult for adversaries to guess the correct answers. For this, we used the results of an
online survey by Statista1 that listed the 20 most used apps in 2012 (the year of the study).
6.1.3 Threat Model
We assume a person close to the user as potential adversary for the security analysis (see
Section 4.3.2). The adversary has advanced knowledge about the victim so that providing
the correct answers is not based on plain luck. The chance for a random adversary to guess
the correct answers is (1n)
x, with n being the number of answer options and x the number of
questions asked.
6.1.4 User Study
In this section, we provide an overview of the study design and study procedure, which is
followed by the presentation of the results.
Study Design
A within-subject design was used for the study. The independent variables were question
category (7 levels) and time span (3 levels), resulting in 21 dynamic security questions to be
tested. As the dependent variable, we measured the number of correct answers.
The study consisted of two phases: a logging phase that lasted for four weeks and a one-
hour lab study. For the latter, participants were required to bring another person to act
as adversary. This person had to be someone they were close to. We gave participants
examples of close persons (e.g., partners or family members) during recruitment, which
happened over bulletin boards, social media and personal communication. In addition to
this, it was a prerequisite to own an Android smartphone in order to participate in the study.
In the remainder of this section we will refer to smartphone owners as users, while the term
adversaries will be used for accompanying persons.
Study Procedure
For the first phase of the study, we contacted users by email to send them the study appli-
cation with accompanying installation instructions as well as important information about
the general procedure of the study. The logging phase lasted for four weeks, after which we
reached out to users again to invite them and their corresponding adversary to our lab for the
second phase.
1 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/239434/umfrage/nutzeranteile-der-top-20-smartphone-apps-in-
deutschland/ (last accessed 29/04/2015)
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Figure 6.1: Example screenshots for two different questions. Each question has four answer
options using either text (left) or pictures (right).
For each user-adversary pair, the lab study started with a brief introduction to the study
procedure, after which the adversary was asked to leave the room. This was done to prevent
the adversary from observing the user during the study task. In the next step, the study
application was installed on the user’s device and was followed by the actual task (i.e.,
answering the 21 questions). Then, the user was asked to fill out a questionnaire that covered
demographic information, but also task-related items. Once the user was done, the adversary
was invited back in and the same procedure was repeated.
Users received 20AC gift vouchers for their participation (10AC for the logging phase and 10AC
for the lab study). In case they did not show up for the lab study, they did not receive any
compensation. Adversaries also received 10AC gift vouchers for their participation.
Participants
General Demographics Altogether, 38 participants enrolled and took part in the user
study: 19 users (7 female) and 19 adversaries (10 female). Users were between 20 and
31 years old (average: 26 years) and adversaries were also between 20 and 31 years old
(average: 26 years).
Most users were students and research assistants with a technical background. When asked
for their highest educational degree, fourteen of them reported a college degree and five of
them reported a high school degree. Similar occupations were stated by adversaries. Twelve
of them had a college degree as their highest degree, while seven had a high school degree
as their highest degree.
Relationship Users brought different types of close persons to act as adversaries: eight
brought their significant other, eight brought a friend and three brought an acquaintance. In
three cases, the named relationships did not match. For example, while some users told us
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the number of correct answers per participant and their corresponding
adversary (in %) for the first study.
to have brought a friend, the corresponding adversary stated to be an acquaintance only (or
the other way around). However, the line between friends and acquaintances is often blurry.
Overall, the named relationships matched well in both directions.
Results
Number of Correct Answers (Overall Performance) Altogether, we collected the an-
swers to 744 questions (372 by users and 372 by adversaries), resulting in an average of 20
questions per user/adversary.
Users answered 274 out of 372 questions (73.7%) correctly. The best user had 94.4% of
correct answers, while the worst user only 50%. The average success rate was 73.9%. In
turn, adversaries answered 191 out of 372 questions (51.3%) correctly. The best adversary
had 76% of questions correct. The worst adversary answered only 11% of them correctly.
The average success rate was 51.3%.
Some users had a success rate of over 90% and were very good in answering their questions
(e.g., users 3, 7 and 8). But at the same time, their adversaries performed well, too. They
had over 70% of correct answers. One of the reasons for this was related to the relationship
between users and adversaries. For example, users 7 and 8 participated as users as well as
each other’s adversaries in the study. They were best friends who communicated on a daily
basis using their smartphones. For some questions (e.g., “Whom did you call yesterday?”)
the adversary herself was the answer to the question. In turn, some users seem to know
very little about themselves (e.g., users 1, 17 and 19). They had less than 60% of their
questions correct. Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the individual performance of users and
their corresponding adversaries.
Number of Correct Answers (per Category) Users were best at answering questions
about outgoing text messages as well as incoming text messages (Table 6.2). They had
93% of correct answers for SMS (out) and 79% for SMS (in). However, the corresponding
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Question Category
SMS (in) SMS (out) Call (in) Call (out) App Music Photos
User 79.0% 93.0% 77.2% 71.9% 71.4% 62.2% 56.9%
Adversary 61.4% 64.9% 47.4% 50.9% 35.7% 48.7% 47.1%
Difference 17.6% 28.1% 29.8% 21% 35.7% 13.5% 9.8%
Table 6.2: Overview of the number of correct answers (in %) by users and adversaries for each
question category as well as the difference between them.
adversaries were good in answering questions from those categories as well. They had a
success rate of 64.9% for SMS (out) and 61.4% for SMS (in), respectively.
The performance of adversaries was worse for the other categories. They had less than 50%
of correct answers for Call (in), App, Music and Photos. However, for the latter two, users
achieved only a success rate of 62.2% and 56.9%, respectively. The best trade-off was found
for the question category App. While users were able to answer 71.4% of the questions
correctly, adversaries achieved only 35.7%.
Number of Correct Answers (per Time Span) Users answered 87.3% of yesterday’s
questions correctly. This was more than for questions about last week (71%) or last month
(62.3%). We did not observe any tendencies with respect to adversaries. They had around
50% of correct answers for the three time spans.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance After the study task, users and adversaries
were asked to estimate the number of correct answers they thought to have given. The ma-
jority of them tended to overestimate their performance. On average, the difference between
the number of estimated answers and the number of correct answers was 3 (min=0; max=8).
In turn, the average difference for adversaries was 4 (min=0; max=17).
Guessability Users were also asked to state how easy they think it is for an adversary to
guess the correct answers to certain questions. While they perceived questions about Music
and App as safe categories, there was no clear opinion for the remaining categories. We also
did not observe any tendencies with respect to the different time spans that users found less
or more secure.
Most users thought that the presented approach is safe against strangers. However, it was
assumed that close persons or even acquaintances are able to answer at least some of the
questions correctly.
User Stories and Comments The qualitative feedback that we received from our users
at the end of the study was positive. Most of them described our approach as entertaining
and fun. One user, for example, was particularly excited to learn about her own smartphone
behavior. However, some participants raised concerns with respect to data privacy. One user-
adversary pair talked to us at the end of the study and said:“We just broke up – just kidding,
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but your study could destroy relationships. You are revealing information that you actually
want to protect.” They were referring to answer options that revealed communication details
or photos. Two other participants had their birthday during the logging phase and thus had
difficulties in answering questions related to communication categories (e.g., “I would have
been better in answering questions about last month, if it wasn’t my birthday. I received so
many text messages”).
6.1.5 Follow-Up Study
Based on the insights from the previous study, the questions design was improved for further
evaluation. The goal was to test the security of the different question categories with respect
to different types of adversaries (i.e., close adversaries and acquainted adversaries). In ad-
dition, we wanted to evaluate other app-related questions as they yielded promising results
in the previous study. We further wanted to see if the privacy concerns for photo-related
questions could be reduced when blurring them before showing.
In summary, the overall study design for the follow-up study remained similar as for the
previous study, but tested slightly different set of question categories: The question category
Music was removed due to the difficulties that users had had in answering them. Despite a
similarly bad performance for photo-related questions, we kept them to test whether blur-
ring photos before showing can reduce privacy concerns. Furthermore, we included another
question category called App Install. The communication-based question categories were
not modified and were kept to re-evaluate them with respect to different types of adversaries.
Last but not least, we removed the time span last month as users were better in answering
questions about yesterday or last week. An overview of all questions is given in Table 6.3.
A brief recap of the study design, study results and their discussion is given next.
Study Design and Study Procedure
The follow-up study was similar to the first study, using a within-subject design with the
independent variables question category (seven levels) and time span (two levels). This re-
sulted in the evaluation of 14 security questions. Again, the study consisted of a logging
phase and a lab study. However, this time users were required to bring two types of adver-
saries: a person that they are close to and a person that they are acquainted with. This allowed
us to evaluate the security of the questions with respect to different types of adversaries.
The study procedure was identical to the first study, but took into account the acquainted
adversary who had to wait outside the study room until the user and the close adversary had,
one after another, completed the study task.
Participants
General Demographics Users and adversaries who took part in the previous study were
not allowed to participate again. Altogether, we recruited 18 users for the follow-up study,
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Category Question + Time Span
SMS (out) Whom did you text [yesterday | last week]?
SMS (in) Who texted you[yesterday | last week]?
Call (out) Whom did you call [yesterday | last week]?
Call (in) Who called you [yesterday | last week]?
App Which app did you use [yesterday | last week]?
App Install Which app did you install/update [yesterday | last week]?
Photos Which photo did you take [yesterday | last week]?
Table 6.3: Overview of the 14 security questions of the follow-up study.
but ended up with 11 users (5 female) only. They were accompanied by 11 close adversaries
(3 female) and 11 acquaintances (2 female). Reasons for the high dropout rate were, for
example, the vacation season (e.g., users did not show up for the lab study) or technical
issues (e.g., question application could not be installed; see Section 6.1.2).
Users were between 19 and 33 years old (average: 24 years). Close adversaries were between
19 and 33 years old (average: 23 years) and acquainted adversaries were between 19 and 58
years old (average: 27 years). When asked about the highest educational degree, two users
reported a college degree, while nine users stated to have a high school. Similar backgrounds
were reported by close adversaries. Six of them had a college degree as highest degree, while
five had a high school degree. With respect to acquainted adversaries, five of them had a
college degree as highest degree and six had a high school degree.
Relationship For the role as close adversary, three users brought their significant other,
five brought a very close friend and one brought her brother. All named relationships be-
tween users and adversaries matched well. In addition to this, users and adversaries were
asked to rate how well they know each other on a 5-point Likert scale (1=not at all; 5=very
well). All users and adversaries stated to know each other well or very well.
Eight participants stated to have brought a college friend, high school friend or colleague to
act as acquainted adversary. Two brought a friend, while another two brought a friend of a
friend. There were no contradictions with respect to the named relationships. When asked to
rate how well they know each other, most users and acquainted adversaries stated that they
did not know each other well.
Results
Number of Correct Answers (Overall Performance) Altogether, we collected the an-
swers to 462 security questions (154 by users, 154 by close adversaries and 154 by ac-
quainted adversaries). Users answered 135 out of 154 questions correctly (87.9%). The best
user achieved 92.9% and the worst user 78.6%. The average success rate was 87.7%.
Close adversaries answered 84 out of 154 questions correctly (54.6%). The best close ad-
versary achieved 85.7%, while the worst had 21.4%. The average success rate was 54.6%.
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Figure 6.3: Overview of the number of correct answers per participant and their close and
acquainted adversaries (in %) for the follow-up study.
In turn, acquainted adversaries provided correct answers to 67 out of 154 questions (43.5%),
with 78.6% being the best and 21.4% the worst percentage of correct answers. The average
success rate was 43.5%.
Figure 6.3 overviews the individual performance of each user and adversary (close and ac-
quainted). Overall, users were good in answering their questions and made only few errors
(1-3). Five users had over 90%, four users had over 85% and two users had over 75% of
their questions correct. However, some users were easier to attack than others. For example,
users 1, 6, 7 or 11 were good in answering their questions, but the performance of their close
adversaries was good as well. In turn, users 3, 4, 9 or 10 were harder to attack. While they
had a high number of correct answers, their close and acquainted adversaries reached only a
low percentage of correct answers.
Number of Correct Answers (per Category) Users were good in answering most of the
communication-related question categories (Table 6.4). For example, they answered all
questions for SMS (in) correctly. However, close and acquainted adversaries were good
in answering these questions as well. They reached 68.2% and 63.6%, respectively.
Adversaries performed worse on other question categories (i.e., Call (out), App, App Install
and Photos) and achieved success rates of around 50%. The best trade-off was found for
the question category App Install. The difference between users and adversaries was 50%
for close and 59% for acquainted adversaries. Although the differences were also promising
for some other question categories (e.g., Photos), they suffered from problems, such as the
revelation of private information. For example, users stated to feel uncomfortable having
photos as answer options (even if they were blurred).
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Questions Category
SMS (in) SMS (out) Call (in) Call (out) App Install Photos
User 100 % 90.9% 81.8% 86.4% 72.7% 90.9% 90.9%
Close Adv. 68.2% 59.1% 68.2% 45.5% 50% 40.9% 50%
Acquainted Adv. 63.6% 36.4% 36.4% 36.4% 54.6% 31.8% 45.5%
Difference 1 31.8% 31.8% 13.6% 40.9% 22.7% 50% 40.9%
Difference 2 36.4% 54.6% 45.5% 50% 18.2% 59.1% 45.7%
Table 6.4: Overview of the number of correct answers (in %) by users and adversaries (close
and acquainted) for each question category as well as the difference between them.
Number of Correct Answers (per Time Span) When answering the questions, users
made very few errors. Interestingly, users made at most one error for questions about yester-
day. This kind of error was always made for questions from the category App.
Altogether, users gave 94.8% of correct answers for questions about yesterday and 80.5% of
correct answers for questions about last week. Close and acquainted adversaries were also
better in answering yesterday’s questions, but the differences to last week’s questions were
minimal. Close adversaries achieved 55.8% for questions about yesterday and 53.3% for
questions about last week. Acquainted adversaries had 44.2% and 42.9%, respectively.
An ANOVA was conducted using the between-groups factor user type (i.e., user, close and
acquainted adversary) and the within-factor time span (i.e., yesterday and last week). There
was no significant main effect for the factor time span, but a significant main effect was
found for user type (F(2,30) = 24.1; p < 0.001). The post-hoc test showed that users were
significantly better in answering their questions than close (p < 0.01; Bonferroni corected)
and acquainted adversaries (p < 0.01; Bonferroni corected). No differences were found
between the two adversary types.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance Users were good in assessing their own per-
formance. The difference between actual performance and estimation was on average one
question (min=0; max=2). The average distance for adversaries was three questions (min=0;
max=8).
Guessability Questions about communication-related activities or the category Photos
were considered as insecure by the majority of users. Only questions about yesterday’s App
were found to be secure, while the opinions for the remaining question categories varied
among users.
Accuracy So far, we have only reported the number of participants who answered indi-
vidual questions correctly, but fallback systems usually consist of a combination of multiple
questions to enhance security. To identify the best combination within n = 14 questions
(as we had 14 questions in the study), we calculated the accuracy values for all possible
combinations (i.e., ∑nk=1
(n
k
)
= 16383).
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One of the best combinations consisted of three questions (i.e., “Which app did you install
yesterday?”, “Whom did you call yesterday?” and “Whom did you text yesterday?”) and
required users to answer all of them correctly in order to authenticate successfully. With this,
we achieved an accuracy of 95% (1 FP, 0 FN) when only attacks by close adversaries were
considered. If only attacks by acquainted adversaries were taken into account, the accuracy
was even 100% (0 FP; 0 FN).
However, with only three questions (and four answer options per question), the chances for
a random adversary to authenticate successfully are (14)
3 = 0.016 = 1.6% and thus much
higher than the chances to guess a four-digit PIN ( 110000 = 0.0001 = 0.01%). Luckily, there
were several other combinations that yielded the same accuracy values, but consisted of more
questions (e.g., “Which app did you install yesterday/last week?”, “Which app did you use
last week?”, “Whom did you call yesterday?”, “Who called you last week?” and “Who
texted you yesterday/last week?”).
6.1.6 Discussion
The evaluation of different smartphone activities for the design of fallback schemes showed
promising results in terms of usability and security. The removal of questions categories
that were hard to answer (i.e., Music) and the inclusion of other question categories (i.e.,
App Install) seemed to have positively influenced the performance of users and their self-
assessment. However, the results also identified the challenges when exploiting personal
smartphone data. The key lessons from both studies are summarized in the following.
Limited Device Usage
Users performed very differently in our study. We had users who were good in answering
their questions, but we also had users who knew very little about themselves. Interestingly,
the latter type of user was also very hard to attack. We assume that these users spend only
little time with their smartphones and, in addition to this, have atypical usage patterns that
are difficult to guess (e.g., the use of special apps). The main problem with these users is
that there might not be enough usage data to generate the security questions for fallback au-
thentication. One could think of creating more security questions within a question category
for which enough data is available, but in the last resort, an alternative for fallback authenti-
cation is needed. This is essential to prevent adversaries from succeeding in their attacks by
always answering with none of them when the smartphones had been idle for some time.
Time Spans
Overall, users found it easier to answer questions about yesterday than last week. This was
also mirrored in their actual performance and is reasonable as recent activities are more
present in one’s memory. Nonetheless, we also found that some questions worked better
when combined with longer time spans. This included, for example, questions from the
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category App. A possible explanation is that apps are often used habitually (e.g., checking
emails) and part of an automated routine for which it is easier to tell if it happened some
time during the week than to answer if it occurred the day before.
Special Events
The occurrence of special events made it difficult for users to answer certain questions. For
example, two participants received too many text messages for their birthday so that they
could not answer the question “Who texted you last month?”. Therefore, unusual events
need to be taken into account, for example, by outlier detection. In case an event happens
more frequently than usual, the corresponding question should be skipped during fallback
authentication. Another possibility could be the inversion of the question. Instead of asking
“Who texted you yesterday?”, one could ask “Who did not text you yesterday?”. However,
we have to keep in mind that the latter approach could cause social tension by pointing out
that some expected event did not happen.
Question Categories
One of the key insights from both studies was that the best option in terms of usability
(i.e., memorability) is not necessarily the best option in terms of security and the other way
around. For example, although users were good in answering communication-related ques-
tions, adversaries did a good job as well. Instead, the best trade-off was found for app-related
questions. Furthermore, most users perceived these types of questions as personal, but not
too private so that they had less concerns when revealing some of their used apps to potential
adversaries. A contrary example was the use of photos or contact names as answer options
that most participants described as privacy intruding.
Similar to the category App, Music was also described as a safe question category. However,
most users had problems in answering them. One of the reasons might be the way music
on mobile devices is consumed. Listening to music is a passive activity that often happens
on the go or while doing other activities. Thus, it is difficult to recall which music one had
listened to at a specific point in time. In addition to this, many users stream their music
from different services (e.g., Spotify) making it more difficult to log the data for question
generation.
Security
The redesign of the questions from the first study increased the number of correct answers
given by users during the follow-up study. It also influenced the performance estimation
positively, meaning that users were confident in the answers they had given. This is important
to offer users a close to real experience during fallback authentication, making the overall
process more enjoyable and less frustrating. However, close and acquainted adversaries had
a good self-assessment as well, indicating that they know well which questions they can or
cannot answer. This is dangerous as adversaries (in particular close ones) could try to spy
on their victim to collect the missing pieces.
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It is also important to use multiple questions for fallback authentication to make it more
difficult for them to guess or observe the correct answers. One of the best combinations
that we found consisted of seven questions with a comparable security level to a 4-digit
PIN. However, the combination is very strict, allowing users to make at most one error.
Furthermore, the combination included communication-related questions that users found
as privacy-intruding. Although this does not mean that these questions should not be used
at all, it seems to be advisable to find more app-related questions to complement the two
categories App and App Install.
6.2 Icon Arrangements
In this section, we explore the potential of icon arrangements as another app-related option
for fallback authentication. Most smartphones have so-called home screens: Dedicated areas
for customization that, for example, allow users to choose their background images or to
arrange home screen items on a predefined grid. Home screen items include app icons,
folders or widgets (i.e., apps that run on home screens).
Since different strategies exist for home screen organization (e.g., arrangement by frequency
or color) [14], we hypothesize that icon arrangements should be distinct enough to be used
for fallback authentication. While adversaries are unlikely to know the exact layout, we
assume that users implicitly learn their icon arrangements through their daily smartphone
interactions and are able to reconstruct their home screen layout for authentication.
This assumption is supported by earlier experiments that identified the storage of spatial
information in long-term memory as a by-product of the interaction with objects [115]. In
the context of desktop computers, similar results were found by Ehret et al. [54]. There is
evidence that this could be also the case on smartphones. In a study by Gustafson et al.,
users were able to name the location of 68% of their apps by heart [71].
In the remainder of this section, we provide details about our approach: We summarize
the results of a brainstorming that inspired the implementation of our study prototype. We
further report the results from two consecutive user studies that were used to evaluate icon
arrangements for fallback authentication and discuss the key findings from these studies.
6.2.1 Approach
A brainstorming with five participants (one female) was conducted to collect ideas for home
screen-related authentication. Participants were recruited over bulletin boards, social net-
works, email or personal communication. They were between 20 and 26 years old (average:
22 years) and had a background in computer science. All of them owned a smartphone and
were familiar with the concept of home screens. Each of them received 5AC gift vouchers as
incentive for their participation.
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Figure 6.4: Example screenshots for Puzzle Tiles, Widget Space and App Selection. The left
screens are original home screens of users. The right screens are the corresponding solutions
for each approach. For the first approach, users had to place different app icons onto the correct
fields of the home screen. For the second approach, users were asked to select the fields that
were occupied by Widgets. For the third approach, users were asked to select the app icons that
are not correctly positioned on their home screens.
The brainstorming started with a brief introduction to fallback authentication and was fol-
lowed by the collection of ideas that participants were encouraged to express openly. The
results included a variety of ideas, such as security questions about the number of used home
screens, the identification of one’s home screens from a set of different layouts or the selec-
tion of one’s background image from a set of images. Since the listed ideas had a very
limited question space or potential privacy risks (i.e., users often have personal photos set as
their background image), we concentrated on other ideas that participants named during the
brainstorming. The corresponding ideas are described next.
Puzzle Tiles The idea for this approach is based on a puzzle metaphor. Each piece of the
puzzle is a home screen item that needs to be positioned correctly on the home screen grid
(Figure 6.4, left). Users are authenticated when they position a certain number of their home
screen items correctly.
Widget Space This approach focuses on widgets only. In order to authenticate, users are
required to mark all fields on a home screen that are occupied by widgets. For example,
for a home screen with widgets at the top left corner (size: 4× 2) and at the bottom right
corner (size: 1×1), users have to mark all fields in the first two rows and the last field at the
bottom right (Figure 6.4, center). If authentication succeeds or fails, depends on the number
of correctly marked or unmarked fields.
App Selection This approach consists of a pre-assembled home screen with 16 icons.
While some of these icons are part of the user’s original home screen, others are not. In
order to authenticate, users have to mark the app icons that are part of their original home
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screen and that are located at the correct position (Figure 6.4, right). Authentication success
depends on the number of correctly identified apps.
6.2.2 Prototype
All three approaches were implemented for smartphones running Android 4.2 (Jelly Bean)
or higher. While all of them were similarly structured by using a 4× 4 home screen grid
(dock excluded), their implemented features varied.
Puzzle Tiles uses an app drawer that contains all home screen items that need to be positioned
for authentication. Each item within the drawer can be dragged to the home screen and
dropped on one of the 16 fields. In case placement is not possible (e.g., widget is too wide
to be placed at the selected position), users receive visual feedback.
For Widget Space, users can mark or unmark each of the 16 fields on the grid by simply
touching them. The state of each field is color coded: unmarked fields are grey, while
marked fields are blue.
For App Selection the home screen fields are pre-filled with 16 different app icons. Some of
these icons are part of the user’s original home screen, while others are retrieved from an app
library that consists of the 20 most downloaded and free apps from the Google Play Store (at
the time of this work). The number of library apps to be included is a random value between
0 and 16. Similar to Widget Space, users can mark and unmark each of the app icons. Again,
the state of each app icon is color coded: apps with a grey background are unmarked, while
apps with a blue background are marked.
In order for the three prototypes to work, information about the home screen items needs
to be extracted. Since this information is managed by the launcher (i.e., the main view of
the device), we parsed the launcher’s MySQL database to retrieve various information (e.g.,
path to app icons, app names, xy-coordinates or the dimension of widgets). It should be
noted that not all of this information is mandatory. For example, in most cases there is no
information about the name of a widget.
6.2.3 Threat Model
Similar to the previous studies, we assume an adversary that is close to the user and in
possession of the user’s device. The adversary tries to circumvent primary authentication by
exploiting the fallback scheme (see Section 4.3.2).
The chances for a random adversary to guess the correct answers varies for each approach.
For Puzzle Tiles they depend on three factors: a) the number of items to be placed, b) their
position on the grid and c) their dimensions. In the worst case, the chances are 1 (i.e., when a
widget with the size 4×4 is placed). In the best case, the items to be placed are all apps and
folders. With n items and x attempts, the chances then are ∑x−1i=0 1/
( 16!
(16−n)! −1
)
. Assuming
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a home screen with n = 2 items and x = 3 attempts, there are 16!/(16−2)! = 240 possible
ways to place them on the grid and thus the chances are 1240 to guess the correct answer
within the first attempt. With each incorrect guess (and additional attempt), the number of
possible solutions is reduced: The chances to guess the correct answer is 1239 for the second
and 1238 for the third attempt. This results in an overall probability of
1
240 +
1
239 +
1
238 = 0.013.
For Widget Space and App Selection, there are a = ∑16i=1
(16
i
)
= 65535 possible solutions.
Therefore, the chances for a random adversary to guess the correct answers is ∑x−1i=0
1
a−i , with
x depicting the number of attempts.
6.2.4 User Study
In this section we describe the study design and procedure to evaluate the three approaches.
We further present the results of this study.
Study Design
A mixed study design was used for evaluation. The independent variables were approach
(three levels) and screen type (two levels). The approaches were evaluated using a between-
groups design to avoid learning effects, for example, to prevent users from learning their
home screen organization from previous tests. In turn, a within-subject design was used
for the different screen types. Furthermore, their order was counterbalanced to minimize
learning effects. Altogether, we tested two screens: the screen that users see first when
unlocking their device (i.e., main screen) and the screen with the most app icons, widgets
and folders (i.e., secondary screen).
Study Procedure
Participants were recruited over bulletin boards, social media, email and personal commu-
nication. Participants who took part in the study were required to own a smartphone and to
bring another person that knows them well to act as adversary. In order to avoid confusion,
we will use the terms user for smartphone owners and adversary for accompanying persons.
The study was conducted in our lab and started with a brief introduction to the general
procedure. After the introduction, adversaries were asked to leave the room, while users
stayed in the room. Users were assigned to one of the three study groups (using a Latin
Square). We further installed the study application and let users complete their study task.
Users ended the study with a questionnaire about demographic information and task-related
questions. After this, adversaries were invited back in and the same procedure was repeated.
The study lasted about 30 minutes. Users and adversaries each received 5AC gift vouchers
for their participation.
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Participants
Altogether, 36 participants took part in the experiment (6 users and 6 adversaries per group).
However, for App Selection the data of one user-adversary pair had to be removed due to
incomplete data from the launcher’s database. All users owned an Android device with a
launcher that uses a 4× 4 home screen layout (dock excluded). This was a prerequisite to
participate in the study.
General Demographics Six users (2 female) and six adversaries (all male) tested Puzzle
Tiles. Users were between 20 and 29 years old (average: 23 years). Adversaries were
between 20 and 26 years old (average: 23 years).
Widget Space was also tested by six users (all male) and six adversaries (2 female). Users
were between 17 and 29 years old (average: 22 years), while adversaries were between 18
and 24 years old (average: 21 years).
Five users (2 female) and five adversaries (1 female) tested App Selection. Users were be-
tween 20 and 25 years old (average: 22 years). In turn, adversaries were between 20 and 34
years old (average: 26 years).
The majority of users and adversaries had a background in natural or engineering sciences
(e.g., computer science or physics). Others came from areas like teaching or psychology.
The distributions were similar over all three groups and also similar between users and ad-
versaries.
Relationship Users and adversaries were in good agreement on their relationships. For
Puzzle Tiles, five pairs were friends and one pair were colleagues. For Widget Space, four
pairs were friends, one pair were colleagues and another pair were roommates. With respect
to App Selection, two pairs were in a romantic relationship, another two were friends and
one pair were colleagues.
Home Screen Organization All users stated to personalize their home screens using dif-
ferent strategies that, for example, are based on usage frequency, app similarity or aesthetic
factors. These reports are in line with previous research (e.g., [14]). Users also reported that
the re-organization of apps happens infrequently. Most of the times this is done when new
apps are installed (e.g., about once a month or, in some cases, even once a week).
Device Sharing When asked whether they had used the victim’s device before, 13 out of
17 adversaries affirmed this and reported that sharing was most of the time limited to a few
minutes. This information is interesting to see whether adversaries had had the chance to
learn about the user’s icon arrangements before the study started.
96
6 Fallback Authentication Based on Dynamic Enrollments
Results
Number of Home Screen Items The number of home screen items varied from user to
user. For the main screen, they had on average 7 items (min=3; max=13). For the secondary
screen, the average number was also 7 (min=1; max=13).
Number of Correct Answers (Puzzle Tiles) A correct answer was counted when an app,
widget or folder was correctly positioned on the grid. Table 6.5 (columns 1-2) reports the
percentage of correct answers). Users gave 82.1% (min=28.6%; max=100%) of correct
answers for the main screen and 65.2% (min=33.3%; max=100%) for the secondary screen.
In turn, adversaries gave 43.6% (min=0; max=100) and 15.2% (min=30.7%; max=100%) of
correct answers, respectively.
For the main screen, there was one user-adversary pair that both had 100% of correct an-
swers. They had to place five items, one of which was a big widget (size: 4× 3). Both of
them positioned the widget at the top left corner and used the other fields for the remaining
apps and folders. Another user showed particularly bad performance and explained that al-
though it was easy to recall the shape in which the apps, widgets and folders were placed, it
was very difficult to reconstruct their exact order.
Similar observations were made for the secondary screen. There was one user-adversary pair
that had 100% of correct answers. They had to place a widget that filled the complete screen
so that only one placement was possible (i.e., the field at the top left corner). Another two
users showed a bad performance, mostly due to the number of items they had to place (i.e.,
12 apps and folders).
Number of Correct Answers (Widget Space) On average 7 out of 16 (min=4; max=10)
fields of the main screen were used for widgets. For the secondary screen, the average
number of fields was 10 out of 16 (min=4; max=16).
A correct answer was counted when an occupied field was marked or when an empty field
was left unmarked. Table 6.5 (columns 3-4) shows the percentage of correct answers.
For the main screen users had 99% (min=93.8%; max=100%) of correct answers. The
number was 88.5%(min=50; max=100) for the secondary screen. In turn, adversaries had
66.7% (min=37.5%; max=100%) of correct answers for the main screen and 27% (min=25;
max=100) for the secondary screen.
For the main screen, there was one user-adversary pair that both had 100% of correct an-
swers. The corresponding adversary selected only the first two rows of the grid which is a
typical position for widgets (e.g., clock).
For the secondary screen, one user had a very low number of correct answers. The reason
was a dynamic widget that adapted its size. This, however, was not mirrored in the widget’s
internal representation (i.e., the launcher only stores the maximal possible size). Although
the user provided an answer that corresponded to the widget’s actual appearance, the answer
did not match with the internal data and was considered as incorrect answer.
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Puzzle Tiles Widget Space App Selection
Main Sec. Main Sec. Main Sec.Screen Screen Screen
Users 82.1% 65.2% 99% 88.5% 95% 91.3%
Adversaries 43.6% 15.2% 66.7% 61.5% 78.8% 78.8%
Difference 38.5% 50.0% 32.3% 27% 16.2% 12.5%
Table 6.5: Overview of the number of correct answers (in %) for each approach and the two
screen types.
Number of Correct Answers (App Selection) A correct answer was counted when users
marked apps that were correctly positioned or when they left library apps/incorrectly posi-
tioned apps unmarked.
Users had 95% (min=87.5%; max=100%) of correct answers for the main screen and 91.3%
(min=75%; max=100%) of correct answers for the secondary screen. In turn, the number of
correct answers of adversaries was 78.8% for the main screen (min=50%; max=93.8%) and
also 78.8% for the secondary screen (min=62.5%; max=93.8%;).
For the main screen, most users performed better than their adversaries. In one case, both of
them had the same number of correct answers. The reason for this was that almost all apps
on the grid were library apps. Since the corresponding adversary made only few selections,
most of the library apps were left unmarked, resulting in a high number of correct answers.
Similar observations were made for the secondary screen. In two cases, users and adversaries
had the same number of correct answers. One of these adversaries was the same adversary
that made only few selections for the main screen. The same strategy was used for the
secondary screen and resulted in a high number of correct answers.
When having a closer look at the incorrect answers of users, it was interesting to observe
that users never gave an incorrect answer for library apps, suggesting that they are good in
distinguishing between the apps that they do and do not own.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance Users were asked to to state, on a 5-point
Likert scale (1=not confident at all; 5= very confident), how confident they were about the
answers they had submitted. An overview of the ratings is shown in Figure 6.5 (top).
For Puzzle Tiles the ratings varied for the main screen. Some users were confident about
their answers, while others were not. Most of them had a good assessment about their actual
performance. Similar observations were made for the secondary screen.
With respect to Widget Space, the majority of users were confident about their submitted
answers for the main screen. This is in line with their actual performance. In turn, the con-
fidence ratings varied for the secondary screen. In most of the cases these ratings complied
with their self assessment.
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Figure 6.5: Confidence ratings by users and adversaries about their submitted answers for the
three approaches and the different screen types.
The confidence ratings varied for App Selection. In particular unconfident users underesti-
mated their performance. Similar observations were made for the secondary screen.
Perceived Guessability Adversaries were also asked to state on a 5-point Likert scale
(1=not confident at all; 5= very confident) how confident they were about their submitted
answers (Figure 6.5, bottom).
For Puzzle Tiles, the majority of adversaries was not confident. This applied to the main
screen and the secondary screen. Most adversaries had a good self-assessment of their per-
formance for the secondary screen, but tended to underestimate it for the main screen.
For Widget Space, the confidence ratings varied for the main screen. Furthermore, the as-
sessment of adversaries was not in line with their actual performance. For the secondary
screen, the majority of adversaries was not confident in the provided answers and tended to
underestimate their performance.
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The majority of adversaries was not confident in their answers for App Selection. This was
the case for the main screen as well as the secondary screen. In both cases, adversaries
tended to underestimate their performance.
6.2.5 Follow-Up Study
The preceding evaluation allowed us to get initial insights into the potential problems of each
approach and their suitability for fallback authentication. Although Widget Space showed
promising results, it also revealed some disadvantages. For example, there was a discrep-
ancy between the internal representation of dynamic widgets and their actual appearance.
Furthermore, there were typical widget placement patterns that, when learned by adversaries,
facilitated guessing and thus are serious security threats. Due to the discovered problems that
are difficult to address by further improvements (i.e., it is not possible to change the internal
representation), Widget Space was excluded from further evaluation. Instead, the main focus
of the follow-up study was to improve the other two approaches. and to evaluate them more
thoroughly in terms of memorability and security.
The goal of the follow-up study was to increase the differences in performance between
users and adversaries to achieve better security. Therefore, we added app icons from the
app library to the app drawer of Puzzle Tiles to obfuscate the actual home screen items.
This way, another burden is added for adversaries as they do not only have to place apps on
the home screen, but also have to identify which apps belong on the corresponding home
screen. Since the previous results suggested that users are good in distinguishing between
the apps that they have and that they do not have, we assume that these changes will not have
a negative impact on the performance of users, but instead, will make it more difficult for
adversaries to guess the correct answers (see Section 6.2.4).
In the previous study, most errors for App Selection were made with respect to home screen
apps. Thus, we inverted the authentication task. Instead of marking apps that are part of
their home screens, users now have to mark the ones that are not part of it.
In the remainder of this section we report the design and evaluation of the follow-up study.
Study Design and Study Procedure
The same study design was used as for the previous study. However, instead of the screen
with the most apps, the screens left and right to the main screen were used for evaluation.
These screens are used more frequently [73] and thus likely to overcome the problems from
the previous study (e.g., when users had to place items on less frequently used screens). The
study procedure remained the same as for the previous study.
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Participants
Altogether, 24 users and 24 adversaries took part in the study. All of them owned an Android
device with a 4×4 home screen layout (dock excluded). Participants were recruited, using
bulletin boards, social media and personal communication.
General Demographics Twelve users (6 female) and 12 adversaries (5 female) tested
Puzzle Tiles. Users were between 20 and 29 years old (average: 24 years), while adversaries
were between 20 and 31 years old (average: 25 years). Users came from different back-
grounds, ranging from media, design, communication to economics and computer science.
The background of adversaries included the domains health care, teaching, finance, business
or computer science.
App Selection was also evaluated with 12 users (5 female) and 12 adversaries (7 female).
Users were between 22 and 31 years old (average: 26 years), while adversaries were be-
tween 20 and 27 years old (average: 24 years). Users had various backgrounds, such as
law, business, teaching, engineering or computer science. Adversaries had backgrounds that
included teaching, law, psychology, business or computer science.
Relationship For Puzzle Tiles, six users brought their significant other. Another six
brought a friend. There were no contradictions in the named relationships. When rating
the closeness of their relationship on a 5-point Likert scale (1=not close at all; 5=very close),
there was a good agreement between the user-adversary pairs. The majority of them stated
to be close or even very close to each other.
With respect to App Selection, six users brought their significant other, four brought a family
member and two brought a friend. Overall, there was a good agreement between the user-
adversary pairs on the closeness of their relationship. The majority described it as close or
very close.
Home Screen Organization When asked if they organize their home screens, 19 out of
24 users answered affirmatively. On a 5-point Likert scale (1=very seldom; 5=very often),
17 users stated to do this often or very often, while two users stated to do this seldom or very
seldom. Users also reported that they apply different strategies for home screen organization,
such as the arrangement by frequency, importance or category.
Device Sharing Altogether, 16 out of 24 adversaries stated to have used their victim’s de-
vice before. Interestingly, sharing was not necessarily limited to a short time span. Accord-
ing to the self-report by adversaries, sharing ranged from 5-1000 minutes (average: 107.4
minutes). Thousand minutes was reported by one adversary who explained that he has ac-
cess to his girlfriend’s phone all the time to help her setting up the device. Other reasons for
using the victim’s device were playing games, looking up information (e.g., time), making
calls or taking/viewing photos.
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Results
Number of Home Screen Items On average, users had 7 (min=2; max=16) home screen
items (i.e., icons, widgets or folders) on their main screen. For the left and right screens the
average number was 6 (min=0; max=16).
Number of Correct Answers (Puzzle Tiles) A correct answer was counted when home
screen items were correctly positioned; or when apps from the library were left in the app
drawer. An overview of the number of correct answers is given in Table 6.6.
For the main screen, users had 68.2% of correct answers, while adversaries had 57.3% cor-
rect answers. For the left screen, users identified 69.3% correctly. The number of correct
answers by adversaries was 54.7%. With respect to the right screen, users gave 74% of
correct answers. In turn, adversaries answered 56.3% correctly.
Number of Correct Answers (App Selection) An answer was considered as correct,
when apps from the library were marked; or when apps from the original home screen of the
users were left unmarked. Table 6.6 overviews the number of correct answers.
For the main screen, users had 97.4% of correct answers. In turn, adversaries had 82.3%
of correct answers. For the left screen, the number of correct answers by users was 89.6%.
Adversaries answered 72.9% correctly. With respect to the right screen, 91.7% of correct
answers were given by users. The percentage of correct answers for adversaries was 67.2%.
Number of Correct Answers (Comparison) A two-way ANOVA was conducted to ex-
amine the effect of approach type (i.e., Puzzle Tiles and App Selection) and participant type
(i.e., user and adversary) on the overall number of correct answers. Users were significantly
better in their performance than adversaries (F(1,44) = 15.6; p < 0.01). We also found
that the performance was significantly better for App Selection than for Puzzle Tiles. No
interaction effects were found for approach type and participant type.
For Puzzle Tiles, we ran a mixed ANOVA with the between-factor participant type (i.e.,
user and adversary) and the within factors app type (i.e., home screen item and library app)
and screen type (main, left and right). We found interaction effects between all three fac-
tors (F(2,44) = 6.79; p < 0.01) and thus performed simple main effect analyses. Since
this required 14 pairwise comparisons, the significance level was set to 0.05/14 = 0.004.
There was no significant effect of screen type on the performance of users and adver-
saries. However, there was a significant effect of app type on the performance of users
(F(1,22) = 118.8; p < 0.004). They were significantly better than adversaries for home
screen apps (F(1,22) = 12.95; p < 0.004). No significant differences were found for li-
brary apps.
Another mixed ANOVA was done for App Selection. Users were significantly better than
their corresponding adversaries (F(1,22) = 10.19; p < 0.01). We also found that users
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Main Screen
Puzzle Tiles App Selection
HS LA Total HS LA Total
User 41.8% 95.7% 68.2% 97% 96.2% 97.4%
Adversary 9.18% 90.4% 57.3% 76.7% 83.3 % 82.3%
Difference 32.62% 5.3% 10.9% 20.3% 12.9% 15.1%
Left Screen
Puzzle Tiles App Selection
HS LA Total HS LA Total
User 36.1% 89.2% 69.3% 58.8% 96.2% 89.6%
Adversary 5.6% 90.8% 54.7% 53.8% 77.8% 72.9%
Difference 30.5% 1.6% 14.6% 5% 18.4% 16.7%
Right Screen
Puzzle Tiles App Selection
HS LA Total HS LA Total
User 36.4% 93.7% 74% 84.4% 92.6% 91.7%
Adversary 7.6% 81.7% 56.3% 41.7% 73.1% 67.2%
Difference 28.8% 12% 17.7% 42.7% 19.5% 24.5%
Table 6.6: Overview of the percentage of correct answers by users and adversaries for the
two approaches and the different screen types. The table distinguishes between the overall
performance as well as the performance for home screen items (HS) and library apps (LA),
respectively.
and adversaries were significantly better in identifying library apps than home screen apps.
However, no interaction effects were found.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance Users were asked to state, on a 5-point Likert
scale (1=not confident at all; 5=very confident), how confident they were about the provided
answers. In addition to this, they also had to estimate the number of correct answers they
thought to have given. Figure 6.6 (top) gives an overview of the confidence ratings by users.
For Puzzle Tiles, the ratings varied for the different screen types. While the majority was
confident in their answers for the main screen, most users were less confident for the left
and right screens. While users tended to overestimate their performance for the main screen
(main screen: 8; left screen: 4; right screen: 1), the majority underestimated it for the left and
right screens (main screen: 4; left screen: 6; right screen: 9). Only few users made an exact
assessment (main screen: 0; left screen: 2; right screen: 2). The average distance between
actual performance and estimation was 20.9% (min=1.3%; max=56.3%) for the main screen,
25.3% (min=0%; max=67.5%) for the left screen and 20.6% (min=0%; max=67.5%) for the
right screen.
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Figure 6.6: Confidence ratings by users and adversaries about their submitted answers for the
two approaches and the three screen types.
For App Selection, the majority of users was confident in the answers they had submitted.
This applies for all three screen types. Most users underestimated their performance (main
screen: 7; left screen: 6; right screen: 10), but there were also users that overestimated it
(main screen: 2; left screen: 2; right screen: 5) or that made an exact assessment (main
screen: 3; left screen: 1; right screen: 1). The average distance between actual performance
and estimation was 9.5% (min=0%; max=37.5%) for the main screen, 12.9% (min=0%;
max=45%) for the left screen and 10.5% (min=0%; max=50%) for the right screen.
Perceived Guessability Adversaries were also asked to make confidence ratings and to
make estimations about their performance. Figure 6.6 (bottom) overviews their ratings.
For Puzzle Tiles, the majority of adversaries was not confident in the answers they had sub-
mitted. This observations can be made for all three screen types. The majority of adversaries
underestimated their performance (main screen: 9; left screen: 9; right screen: 10) and only
few overestimated it (main screen: 3; left screen: 3; right screen: 2). The average dis-
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Puzzle Tiles App Selection
Main Left Right Main Left Right
Threshold 10 11 15 16 11 12 15 16 15 16
TP 9 7 4 3 8 11 8 8 8 7
TN 7 9 11 12 9 7 10 10 10 12
FP 5 3 1 0 3 5 2 2 2 0
FN 3 5 8 9 4 1 4 4 4 5
Accuracy 66.7% 62.5% 70.8% 75% 75% 79.2%
Table 6.7: The best accuracy values for the two approaches and the different screen types. The
table overviews the number of required answers (i.e., threshold) as well as the number of TP,
TN, FP, FN and the corresponding accuracy values.
tance between actual performance and estimation was 34.2% (min=7.5%; max=73.8%) for
the main screen, 44.4% (min=2.5%; max=93.8%) for the left screen and 43.1% (min=6.3%;
max=82.5%) for the right screen.
The majority of adversaries was not confident about the answers they submitted for App
Selection. This observation was made for all screen types. Most adversaries tended to un-
derestimate their performance (main screen: 11; left screen: 11; right screen: 10) and only
few of them overestimated it (main screen: 1; left screen: 1; right screen: 2). The average
distance between actual performance and estimation was 39.4% (min=6.3%; max=75%) for
the main screen, 40.6% (min=11.3%; max=77.5%) for the left screen and 38.9% (min=3.8%;
max=75%) for the right screen.
Accuracy So far, we have reported the number of correct answers by users and adver-
saries, respectively. However, we did not interpret them with respect to an actual authentica-
tion system. Similar to the previous studies, accuracy calculations were used to identify the
number of required answers in order to authenticate successfully. Since the maximum pos-
sible number of correct answers is 16, we used this value as an upper threshold to calculate
the accuracy values, true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false
negatives (FN) when 0 to 16 correct answers were required.
For Puzzle Tiles, the highest accuracy values ranged between 66.7% and 70.8% and required
users to have between 11 and 16 correct answers. The highest accuracy values for App
Selection ranged between 75% and 79.2% and required between 15 and 16 correct answers.
The number of FP and FN for the corresponding accuracy values are listed in Table 6.7.
6.2.6 Discussion
The accuracy results for Puzzle Tiles and App Selection are unacceptable for an authentica-
tion scheme, meaning that both approaches, as is, are not suitable for fallback authentication.
Nonetheless, the results are valuable to teach us the key aspects that should be considered
whenever icon arrangements on smartphones are exploited as a data source.
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Data Availability
The number of home screen items varied from user to user. While some of them had only
few items on the tested home screens, others had many. Users with few items often placed
them on the main screen, leaving the left and right screens empty. This means that not all
screens can be used for authentication when these users are locked out. However, testing
only one screen is likely to be insufficient to reach an acceptable level of security. Thus, it
is advisable to use icon arrangements only for users that have enough data. In case there is
not, users must be provided with an alternative for which enough data is available.
Our evaluation focused on screens that were shown to be used the most frequent [73]. Users
may have more apps on other screens. However, the first study revealed that these screens
are sometimes used as trash spaces for unused apps. This makes recalling their exact ar-
rangements challenging. In order to increase data availability, one could think of detaching
home screen apps from their actual location. For example, instead of asking where an app is
positioned, the task could be simplified by asking whether the given app exists on one of the
home screens.
User-Adversary Performance
Users were significantly better than their adversaries. Nonetheless, the performance distance
between them was too small to reach a satisfying security level (i.e., to distinguish between
users and adversaries during authentication). Interestingly, the confidence ratings showed
that, most of the time, adversaries did not know, but guessed the correct answers.
This suggests that the answer space of icon arrangements is not large enough, making it
easier for adversaries to make correct guesses. One of the key reasons for this is certainly
the position and size of widgets that limit the answer options. We tried to overcome this
problem by obfuscating the presence of widgets with the use of library apps. However,
based on the results, we recommend to filter widgets from the arrangement task in order to
increase the performance gap between users and adversaries.
Another reason for the removal of widgets is the existence of dynamic widgets that adapt
their size to the content they hold. Since the internal representation only includes the max-
imum possible size, dynamic widgets are a potential source of error when the submitted
answers are evaluated. In the first place, it would be desirable to include the current size
of widgets in the launcher’s database. However, there is no common standard to enforce
launcher developers to include this information. It is recommendable, to filter widgets from
the authentication task and to focus on app icons and folders instead.
When comparing the results from the first study and the follow-up study, the performance
of users, in some cases, seem to be worse for the latter. For example, for Puzzle Tiles users
gave 82.1% of correct answers for the main screen, while the percentage was only 68.2%
in the follow-up study. One reason could have been that there were less tech-savvy users in
the follow-up study who did not arrange their home screen items on their own (see Section
6.2.6).
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Home Screen Items and Library Apps
Users were good in identifying the apps that they have and do not have on their home screens.
However, with respect to the arrangement of apps, most users reported that, although they
had a vague idea of the app positions, they had difficulties to recall the exact location. This
means that the factor position should be neglected, simplifying the idea of app arrangements
to their mere presence.
We further found for App Selection that adversaries were better in identifying library apps
than home screen items. This suggests that the used app library needs to be optimized to
make it more difficult for adversaries to distinguish between the two app types.
User-Adversary Relationships
After the study, some user-adversary pairs gave us further feedback about the study task. In
some cases, the adversary explained to have set up the phone for the corresponding user and
thus was familiar with the user’s icon arrangements. In turn, the corresponding user reported
difficulties in recalling the arrangement as it was not done by herself.
Although, these kinds of adversaries are likely to know the correct answers, it can be as-
sumed that they are not a serious threat (as they already have access to the phone to set up
things). On the contrary, they are probably the user’s first contact person in case of lockout
to help them to regain access. Nonetheless, the use of icon arrangements for fallback authen-
tication is cumbersome for these users (as they have to rely on a third person). Therefore,
other types of fallback schemes would be a better fit for them.
6.3 Installed Apps
Although the use of icon arrangements for fallback authentication showed many issues, the
problems were a good indicator for the needed improvements for our next design. The main
goal was another app-related approach that a) is independent of app positions, b) has a better
data availability, and c) increases the performance gap between users and adversaries.
Based on these requirements, we came up with an approach based on installed apps. The
basic idea is to ask users whether an app is installed on their device. This has the advantage
that the position factor can be neglected. Furthermore, we are not limited to the users’ home
screen items, but can extend the data source to all installed apps to address the problem of
data availability. The question whether this approach improves the gap between users and
adversaries is the main objective of the study.
In the remainder of this section, we provide further details about the described approach.
We provide a description of the study prototype, the study design and study evaluation. The
results are reported and discussed at the end of this section.
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6.3.1 Approach
In our approach, users are consecutively shown app icons and their names. The apps can
either be installed on the user’s device or taken from an app library. The library apps are
needed to act as distraction items. For each shown app, users have to decide whether it is
or is not installed on their devices. In case they identify a certain number of apps correctly,
they are authenticated. Otherwise, their authentication attempt is denied.
The main assumption is that users are able to distinguish between the apps that they have and
do not have (as also shown in the previous study). This assumption is further supported by
work from Sun et al. who tested a similar app-related approach with a success rate of around
95% [167]. Although the chances are high that adversaries identify certain apps correctly,
we assume that it will be difficult for them to have a sufficient number of correct answers for
successful authentication.
6.3.2 Prototype
The prototype for the user study was implemented for Android smartphones with Jelly Bean
(version 4.1) or higher. The three main components of the app are described in the following.
Device Apps
In the first step, the study application scanned the storage of the user’s device for all installed
packages to generate a list of installed apps. In the second step, we removed all apps from
the list that were marked with a system flag. This included pre-installed apps and system-
related functionalities (e.g., download manager or installed certificates). Pre-installed apps
were removed because they are, as their name implies, installed without the knowledge
of the user and thus could have negatively influenced the identification of (not) installed
apps. System-related functionalities were excluded to avoid overwhelming users during
authentication as there are usually hundreds of system apps installed on a device.
Library Apps
The list of device apps was complemented with apps that are not installed on the device (i.e.,
library apps). Since we wanted to create a diverse library to prevent apps from being too
similar (and maybe easier to guess), the apps were selected from different Google Play Store
categories (as of May 2014). Altogether, the library consisted of 49 apps. This included 15
paid and 15 unpaid apps from the list of top apps as well as a random selection of 19 less
popular apps from different app categories (e.g., sports or education).
Question Application
For the actual study task, users were asked about all device apps and a random number r
of library apps, with r ranging from 0 to the maximum number of apps in the library (after
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Figure 6.7: Screenshot of the study application. On the left: an example question for an app
with the two answer options yes and no. On the right: overview of the performance of a user.
removing apps that are actually installed on the device). The decision to quiz all installed
apps was done for evaluation purposes, for example, to see how many installed apps users
recognize as such. In a real-world setting, one would use only a subset of those apps for
authentication.
For each app in the quiz, we asked users whether it was installed on their device. The
question was accompanied by the corresponding app icon as well as app name. To answer
the questions, users could choose between yes or no (Figure 6.7, left). Although the chances
to guess the correct answer from two options is 0.5, we have to keep in mind that this
probability decreases with each additional question.
Users did not receive immediate feedback about the correctness of their answers. However,
we showed them an overview of their performance once they had finished the study task
(i.e., after they had answered all questions; Figure 6.7, right). This was done to encourage
discussions about the apps, for example, to reveal different answering strategies. In a real-
world setting, such an overview must not be shown to prevent adversaries from learning the
correct answers for future attacks.
6.3.3 Threat Model
Similar to the preceding threat models in this chapter, we assume an adversary close to the
user and with advanced knowledge about the user (see Section 4.3.2).
The chance for a random adversary (when equal answer distribution is assumed) to guess
the correct answers is (12)
x, with x depicting the number of apps asked about. However, the
chance to guess the correct answers is likely to depend on the popularity of the apps that
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the adversary is asked about. In this case, the chances should include a weighting factor:
∏xi=0
wi
2 . For example, the weight could be calculated using the percentage u of Android
users who have a certain app installed. If more than 50% of users have app i installed, then
the weighting factor should be wi = 1+( u100) (i.e., adversaries are more likely to answer
yes). In turn, if less than 50% of users have app i installed, the weighting factor should
be wi = 1+(100−u100 ) (i.e., adversaries are more likely to answer no). In all other cases, the
weighting factor should be 1.
6.3.4 User Study
Study Design
The user study consisted of one task (i.e., identifying apps). This task had to be completed by
all participants and we used the percentage of correct answers as a measure for performance.
Participants were recruited over bulletin boards, social networks and personal communica-
tion. Similar to the previous designs in this chapter, we had two types of participants: users
and adversaries. We will continue using this wording to distinguish between them. In order
to take part in the study, users were required to own a smartphone. They were also asked to
bring another person they are close to who then acted as adversary. During recruitment, we
gave them examples for close persons (e.g., significant others or best friends). Although par-
ticipants were informed about the general topic of the study (i.e., fallback authentication),
we did not disclose any additional information about our app-related approach. This was
done to prevent users and adversaries from looking up their apps in advance.
Study Procedure
Participants were invited to our lab for the study. After giving them a brief introduction
about fallback authentication, adversaries had to leave the room and wait outside. Then, we
asked for permission to install the study application on the users’ device. Once installation
was done, the study began and users had to complete the study task (i.e., marking apps as
installed or not installed). This was concluded with a demographic questionnaire and a brief
post-task interview. During the interview, we went through the list of apps that users were
asked about and encouraged them to discuss their answer strategies and problems.
The same procedure was repeated for adversaries. Altogether, the study lasted for about an
hour and users and adversaries received 10AC gift vouchers each for their participation.
Participants
General Demographics Altogether, 15 users (5 female) and 15 adversaries (12 female)
took part in the lab study. While users were between 20 and 34 years old (average: 24 years),
adversaries were between 21 and 49 years old (average: 26 years).
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Device Library Total
Users 95.4% 95% 95.2%
Adversaries 60.5% 82% 68.9 %
Table 6.8: Overview of the number of correctly identified apps for users and adversaries (in %).
Most users were students with a technical background (e.g., computer science, engineering,
etc.). Five participants were employed in different domains (e.g., sales, agriculture, etc.)
and one participant was a high school student. Similar demographics were found for the
adversaries. Nine of them were students, mostly with technical backgrounds (e.g., computer
science, physics, etc.). Five of them were employed (e.g., sales, administration, etc.) and
one adversary was a homemaker.
Relationship The relationships between users and adversaries were diverse. Seven of
them brought their significant other, seven brought their close friend and one brought a
family member. When asked to rate the closeness of their relationship on a 5-point Likert
scale (1=not close at all; 5=very close), most users described it as very close or close. Only
in one case was the relationship considered neutral. Most of the time, these ratings were
in line with the ratings by the corresponding adversaries. However, there were three cases
in which the perceived closeness was not mutual. For example, while one user found the
relationship as very close, the corresponding adversary described it as neutral only. We did
not disclose these discrepancies to our participants.
Device Sharing The majority of users (11 out of 15) stated that they had shared their
device with the corresponding adversary before. This was done, for example, to show photos
or to make calls. However, they also noted that device sharing rarely happened (between 1
and 4 times) and was most of the time limited to short time spans (between 2 and 30 minutes).
This information is interesting to see if adversaries had had the chance to spy on the user’s
apps before they participated in the study.
Results
Number of Installed Apps The number of installed apps on a device varied from user to
user. There were users with very few apps (< 20), but there were also users that possessed a
lot of them (> 70). On average, users had 43 apps (min=14; max=91) installed on their de-
vices. Interestingly, users tended to underestimate the number of apps they had. On average,
the difference between estimation and actual number of apps was 25 (min=2; max=82).
With respect to their installation behavior, users stated that they install on average two apps
per month (min=1; max=5). Most of them preferred free apps and only four of them stated
to be willing to pay between 1AC and 5AC. In turn, the frequency in which these apps were
uninstalled varied from user to user. Deleting apps was done occasionally by six users, often
by three users, seldom by four users and never by two users.
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Number of Correct Answers On average, users had to identify about 72 apps (min=40;
max=104), while the average number was 70 apps (min=37; max=109) for adversaries. Ta-
ble 6.8 overviews the percentage of correct answers that were given by users and adversaries,
respectively. Altogether, users were better in identifying apps (95.2% correct answers) than
adversaries (68.9% correct answers).
While the performance of users was about the same for device apps and library apps, respec-
tively, the results suggest that adversaries were better in identifying device apps than library
apps. Therefore, a mixed ANOVA with the between-groups factor user type (i.e., user and
adversary) and the within-factor app type (i.e., device app and library app) was conducted.
We found that users were significantly better in identifying apps than their corresponding
adversaries (F(1,28) = 66.4, p < 0.01). However, no main effects were found with respect
to app type. There were also no interaction effects.
Authentication Time Time measurement started when the first question of the quiz ap-
peared and ended with the submission of the answer to the last question. On average, users
needed 172.5s (min=96.1s; max=280.6s) to complete the study task, while adversaries took
about 444s (min=242.6s; max=769.3s).
Since the number of questions to be answered was not the same for all users, we also mea-
sured the time that was needed to answer each individual question. On average, users needed
2.4s (min=1.8s; max=3.3s) to mark an app as (not) installed. In turn, adversaries needed on
average 6.5s (min=5s; max=8.6s).
A mixed ANOVA with the between-groups factor user type (i.e., user and adversary) and the
within-factor app type (i.e., device app and library app) was conducted. Hereby, the average
time per user was used for the analysis. The results showed that users were significantly
faster than their corresponding adversaries in identifying apps (F(1,28) = 154.9; p < 0.01).
No main effects were found for the factor app type. There were no interaction effects.
Self-Assessment and Actual Performance Before revealing their actual performance,
we asked users and adversaries to estimate the percentage of correct answers they thought
to have given. The average estimation by users was 89.1% (min=75%; max=100%) and was
56.6% (min=10%, max=99%) for adversaries. The adversary who thought to have identified
99% of apps correctly, had only 68.5% of correct answers in the actual performance. The
average difference between estimated and actual performance was 7% (min=0; max=25%)
for users and 25% (min=0.4%; max=71.7%) for adversaries.
Device Familiarity and Performance In order to see if the familiarity of adversaries with
the user’s device influenced their performance, we asked them to provide familiarity ratings
using a 5-point Likert scale (1=not familiar at all; 5=very familiar). Six adversaries were
completely unfamiliar with the user’s device. Five adversaries were (very) familiar with the
device. The remaining ones had a neutral opinion about their familiarity.
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Figure 6.8: Overview of the assumed guessability of installed apps by users for different types
of adversaries (i.e., close persons, acquaintances and strangers).
A Spearman’s rank-order test was conducted to analyze the correlation between familiarity
and performance. However, we did not find any statistically significant correlations.
PerceivedGuessability In the study questionnaire, users were asked to rate how easy they
think it is for different types of adversaries (i.e., close persons, acquaintances and strangers)
to identify their apps correctly. The ratings were given on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very
difficult; 5=very easy). While the majority of users believed that it is difficult for strangers
(13 users) and acquaintances (10 users) to guess the correct answers, the opinions were
ambiguous for close adversaries. Six users thought that it is difficult for close persons to
identify the apps correctly, while five users stated the opposite opinion. An overview of the
given ratings for all three types of adversaries is given in Figure 6.8.
Guessing Strategies During the post-task interviews, we asked adversaries about their
guessing strategies, one of which was related to the popularity of apps. Social apps (e.g.,
Facebook) or communication apps (e.g., WhatsApp) were often assumed to be widely-used
and lead to the decision to mark them as installed.
Other strategies took the user’s characteristics into account. This included the user’s geo-
graphic location, personal preferences or financial situation. For example, one adversary told
us that she marked all apps as installed that fit into her boyfriend’s special taste in games.
Other adversaries assumed their victim to be too cheap to pay for apps and thus identified all
apps that were labeled with premium, plus or full version as not installed on the device.
Preceding selections were also an influencing factor in decision making. When adversaries
had marked an app from a specific category as installed, they were hesitant to do so again in
case a similar app was shown (e.g., multiple weather apps).
User Problems Similar to the interviews with adversaries, we encouraged users to tell us
about their problems during decision making. Most users had difficulties in distinguishing
between similar apps. For example, there are numerous versions of the puzzle game 2048.
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It was difficult for users to decide if the version they were asked about was the one they had
installed on their device. They also reported difficulties when they had to decide whether an
infrequently used app was still installed on their device or not.
Accuracy With respect to the overall performance, users were always better than their cor-
responding adversaries in identifying apps. Furthermore, the worst user was better than the
best adversary (89% versus 81.7%). If we had asked users about all their apps for authenti-
cation using a threshold of 82%, all users would have been authenticated successfully, while
all adversaries would have been rejected. This naive observation is promising. Therefore,
we move forward to a more formal evaluation using the accuracy metric (see Section 4.3.3).
In theory, it would be necessary to consider all possible combinations of the apps that users
and adversaries were asked about (subsets included). With 15 users and 15 adversaries, the
number of possible combinations is:
15
∑
i=1
[
(
ui_max
∑
k=1
(ui_max
k
)
)+(
ai_max
∑
j=1
(ai_max
j
)
)
]
,
with ui_max and ai_max representing the maximum number of apps in the quiz for the ith user
and adversary, respectively.
However, due to computation limitations, we had to follow another approach in practice.
That is, for each user/adversary, we randomly selected x apps from the list of apps, with x
ranging from 15 to 45. The upper border was based on the average number of apps that users
had installed on their devices and was chosen to maintain a certain level of data availability
and comparability of the results (e.g., not all users had enough apps to be asked about more
than 45 apps).
This procedure was repeated a thousand times, resulting in 15000 (= 15× 1000) authen-
tication attempts by users and 15000 (= 15× 1000) attacks by adversaries with different
combinations of x apps. Please note that for x = 40, we only had 14000 attacks. For x = 45,
only 14000 authentication attempts and attacks were taken into account. The reason was that
some users/adversaries were asked about fewer apps during the study.
Based on this data, the number of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives
(FN), false negatives (FN) and accuracy values were calculated. The calculation took into
account the number of asked apps in the quiz and the number of allowed errors e, with e rang-
ing from 0 to 10. Table 6.9 overviews the results of the analysis. The best accuracy values
were yielded when 40/45 apps were used. Further details are provided in the following.
Asking users to identify 40 apps and allowing at most 5 errors, resulted in an accuracy of
94.9%, (747 FP; 722 FN). Users succeed 95.2% of the time. In turn, the success rate of
adversaries is 5.2%. Similar observations were made when using 45 apps and 6 allowed
errors as parameters for the quiz. The accuracy was 95.2% (824 FP; 529 FN). The success
rate was 96.2% for users and 5.8.% for adversaries.
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Number of Asked Apps
A
llo
w
ed
E
rr
or
s
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0 77.1 73.9 71.4 69.5 67.8 65.6 63.3
1 87.8 85.5 83.1 79.9 77.2 74.5 71.3
2 88.1 90.7 90.2 88.1 85.7 82.4 79.5
3 82.0 89.4 92.5 92.6 91.5 89.2 86.8
4 73.1 84.4 90.4 93.5 93.9 93.5 91.8
5 64.7 77.0 85.8 91.1 94.0 94.9 94.5
6 58.6 69.8 79.7 87.1 91.6 94.1 95.2
7 54.7 63.2 73.3 81.9 87.8 91.7 94.3
8 52.4 58.2 67.0 75.9 83.3 88.9 91.9
9 51.1 55 61.7 70.2 78.3 84.8 88.7
10 50.4 52.8 57.9 65.2 72.6 80.4 85.2
Table 6.9: Overview of accuracy values (in %) with respect to the number of apps asked in the
quiz and the number of errors allowed. The best accuracy values are highlighted in grey.
6.3.5 Discussion
Using installed apps for fallback authentication achieved promising results. In compari-
son to the icon arrangements study, we were able to increase the performance gap between
users and adversaries and influenced the accuracy values positively. With 95% the results
are comparable to our first study about smartphone activities. However, this time, we had a
false positive rate of 5%, meaning that some adversaries were able to authenticate success-
fully. Therefore, we identified several areas for improvement that are supposed to reduce the
number of false positives for future implementations.
Data Availability
The use of installed apps as data source increased the data availability in comparison to the
icon arrangements study. Nonetheless, similar observations were made with respect to the
different user types: While some smartphone owners used few apps, others had many apps
installed. In particular for the former type of user, there may not be enough data to create a
sufficient number of questions. This problem is mitigated by the inclusion of library apps.
In our implementation the number of library apps was defined by a random number between
zero and the app library’s size. For future implementations, it is advisable to increase the
lower bound, for example, by using the difference between the required number of questions
and the number of installed apps available on the device.
Similarity of Apps
When users were asked about different versions of the same app (e.g., free and premium),
they had difficulties in distinguishing between them. This kind of confusion should be
avoided, for example, by merging different app versions. Instead of using the terms Weather
Free or Weather Premium, users should be asked about the Weather app only.
115
The similarity of apps was also exploited by adversaries as guessing strategy. They tended
to mark an app as not installed in case they had already been asked about a similar app prior
to this. Such behavior can be used to improve the quiz design. For example, library apps that
are similar to the installed apps of the user should be asked about first. This way, adversaries
are likely to mark installed apps as not installed. However, this modification must be done
in such a way that the randomness of the quiz is not hurt.
Popularity of Apps
In other guessing strategies, adversaries assumed that popular apps (e.g., Facebook) were
installed on the victim’s device and marked them accordingly. This approach is reasonable
and has different implications. Popular apps should be either removed or weighted, meaning
that less popular apps contribute more to the overall authentication score. The fact that
adversaries are more likely to mark popular apps as installed can also be used to mislead
them. In case a popular app is not on the victim’s device, it should be included in the
question set. This way, adversaries are encouraged to provide an incorrect answer.
Time Limit
Users in our study were significantly faster in answering the questions than adversaries.
While they needed on average 2.4s per question, adversaries needed more than twice as
long. It took them on average 6.5s. This could be used to add a time limit for each question
or to look at the overall time when deciding whether authentication should be considered
successful. This has the advantage that there is not enough time for adversaries to apply
their answering strategies. For example, it will be difficult to research answers on social
networks (e.g., to see whether information was shared using a certain app).
Library Apps
Based on the results from the icon arrangements study, we created a more diverse app li-
brary that was based on various lists from the Google Play Store. Since these lists change
frequently (app icons are updated, apps are removed or new apps are released), it is impor-
tant for a real-world deployment to work with a dynamic library that is updated on a regular
basis. For example, a library update could be done when users update their operating system.
Such an update is necessary to prevent adversaries from recognizing library apps.
6.4 Lessons Learned
In this chapter, we explored the potential of different information categories on smartphones
for fallback authentication with dynamic enrollments. In three main projects, various ex-
amples were implemented and evaluated. This helped us to identify promising information
categories and, beyond that, taught us the challenges when handling and evaluating personal
smartphone data. The following list summarizes the key lessons.
116
6 Fallback Authentication Based on Dynamic Enrollments
• Trade-Off between Usability and Security. The best solution in terms of memora-
bility is not necessarily the best choice in terms of security. For example, although
questions about communication activities had good recall rates, these questions were
also easy to guess for close adversaries. In turn, the best trade-off was found for
app-related questions. The decision which factor should be prioritized depends on
the requirements of the system to be implemented. In most cases, a balance between
them is desirable. Since fallback authentication happens infrequently, memorability
is an important factor. But at the same time, fallback schemes need to be at least as
secure as other common authentication schemes on smartphones (e.g., PIN) to prevent
unauthorized access.
• Privacy. Since the use of smartphone data for fallback authentication reveals infor-
mation to potential adversaries, privacy is another important factor to be considered.
For example, the use of photos was not well received by our study participants due
to the sensitivity of this data type. The information used must be distinct enough to
authenticate users/reject adversaries successfully, but at the same time, must not be
too private to be shared with others.
• Confidence Ratings. The extent to which users and adversaries are confident about
their submitted solutions is a good indicator for the memorability and guessability of
different information categories. This can be useful to explore the potential of different
information categories at an early stage before the actual implementation, for example,
with semi-structured interviews.
• Data Availability. Dynamic enrollments rely heavily on the availability of data to
provide users with the needed fallback schemes. However, there are situations in
which not enough data is present to generate the authentication task. For example,
there were smartphone owners in our studies who install and use very few apps only.
In those cases, it is important to have a fallback for the fallback scheme. In general,
it is advisable to have at least one authentication scheme in the fallback chain that is
based on static enrollment as an alternative option.
• Passive and Active Consumption. Some information categories work better than
others. In particular, information that is consumed passively (e.g., music, app posi-
tions) showed bad recall rates. Instead, information categories that require the active
involvement of users should be favored for dynamic enrollments due to memorability
reasons.
• Information Category: App. Fallback authentication based on smartphone apps
showed the best trade-off between the three factors memorability, security and pri-
vacy. Thus, this information category is a promising data source for dynamic enroll-
ments in the context of fallback authentication. However, as shown by the evaluation
of different examples, not all implementations worked equally well. The success of
this information category depends on the way it is is used for the design of fallback
schemes.
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• Distractor Items. Although users do not mind to reveal app-related information to
others, the use of distractor items is advisable to obfuscate the apps that exist on a
device and to sustain the user’s privacy. The composition of distractor items must be
done carefully, taking into account that apps change frequently (e.g., icons) and need
to be updated on a regular basis.
• Guessing Strategies. Since most users have to guess the answers to app-related ques-
tions, they apply different guessing strategies (e.g., popularity of apps). Finding out
about these strategies is important to use the insights for the design of the fallback
scheme (e.g., by filtering apps or weighing apps).
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Assembling the Pieces
The main objective of this thesis was to get a better understanding of fallback authentication
as well as a thorough exploration of different types of autobiographical memories for the
design of fallback schemes. We did not strive for the perfect solution to be used in practice,
but, instead, we were interested in the potential and challenges of using different types of
autobiographical memories that go beyond personal facts.
We found that lockout experiences on smartphones are rare and that most users are satisfied
with current fallback solutions. Nonetheless, we also identified special circumstances in
which recovery from lockouts is inconvenient and difficult (e.g., when users are on the go).
These circumstances yield for alternative fallback schemes that are independent, immediate
and engaging to complement (but not replace) currently available solutions.
For the design of alternatives, our choice fell on the use of autobiographical memories for
several reasons: First, the retrieval of autobiographical memories is independent from third
parties as it relies on information about the self. Second, the retrieval is immediate as the
required information is stored in the users’ head, and third, it is engaging as users have to
actively provide this information and, in addition, can get new insights about themselves.
Although not all approaches with autobiographical memories worked as we had expected,
each example implementation taught us important lessons about their requirements (Section
7.1), design (Section 7.2) and evaluation (Section 7.3) in the context of lockout situations.
While the discussions in the preceding chapters focused on specific prototypes, this chapter
brings each single piece together to create the big picture of this thesis and to discuss their
applicability for other application domains (Sections 7.4 and 7.5).
7.1 Motivation for Fallback Authentication
In order to learn about the frequencies, problems and countermeasures of mobile fallback
experiences, we conducted an online survey and complementary interviews to get a better
overview on this matter (Chapter 3). It was not surprising that lockouts on smartphones are
rare, but the countermeasures that some people take when special circumstances apply were
intriguing (e.g., disposal of phone) and thus asked for alternative solutions. Since only a
small target audience is affected by these problems, it is justifiable to question the necessity
of alternative fallback schemes and research in this area. However, our opinion on this issue
is clear based on several reasons.
First, as usability and security researchers, we always strive for the better and are not only
responsible to address the problems of the general population, but we are also responsible
to help those that are not part of it. And although lockout situations are rare, they can come
with extreme inconvenience so that better solutions are needed.
Second, a remarkable number of researchers design systems well applicable for fallback au-
thentication, but are not aware of it and propose their systems for primary authentication
instead (e.g., [36, 37, 174]). Although these systems are often interesting, they are less con-
vincing due to the typical constraints of primary schemes, such as long authentication times.
The framework in this thesis enables researchers to categorize their ideas based on different
properties and to learn which circumstances they are designing for. This allows to define
convincing uses cases that highlight their relevance to push further research in that area.
7.2 Designing for Fallback Authentication
Our framework for fallback authentication provided a clear definition of fallback authen-
tication and depicted its characteristics to overview the options for the design of fallback
schemes. We implemented five different prototypes that varied in the type of scheme they
used, the type of memory they exploited as well as the type of enrollment and authentication
they required. From each of these implementations we uncovered different design implica-
tions that should be considered in the context of fallback authentication. The key insights
are summarized next.
7.2.1 Type of Authentication Scheme
Authentication schemes can be based on something you know, something you are and some-
thing you have [187]. Since the last does not meet the requirement of immediacy, our ex-
ample implementations focused on things the user knows (i.e., location-based memories and
recent smartphone activities) and on things the user is (i.e., sketching skills).
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Project Adversary Time Successful Failed AccuracyType Attacks Auth.
St
at
ic
2-Finger Sketch Strangers 4 weeks 32.6 37.6 67.1
Close Persons
5 min 0 3.3 98.3
1 week 0 3.3 98.3
4 weeks 0 10 95
Location-Based 6 months 0 16.7 91.7
Questions
Strangers
5 min 0 3.3 98.3
1 week 0 3.3 98.3
4 weeks 0 10 95
6 months 0 16.7 91.7
D
yn
am
ic
Smartphone Close Persons n/a 9.1 0 95
Activities Acquaintances n/a 0 0 100
Icon Arrangements
Close Persons n/a 25 / 41.7 41.7 / 25 66.7(Puzzle Tiles,
Main Screen)
Icon Arrangements
Close Persons n/a 16.7 33.3 75(App Selection,
Main Screen)
Installed Apps Close Persons n/a 5.9 3.8 95.2
Table 7.1: Comparison of the successful attacks by adversaries, failed authentications by legit
users and the overall accuracy values for the different projects in this thesis.
The results for our biometric approach were disappointing: Drawing sketches with two fin-
gers simultaneously was hard to learn and lead to user dissatisfaction that, in turn, caused
undesired behaviors. Also in terms of security, our approach was not convincing as there
was a high number of false positives and false negatives (Table 7.1). Overall, the results did
not encourage the use of biometric schemes (as we implemented them) for fallback authen-
tication. All things considered, knowledge-based schemes showed the best potential for the
design of fallback schemes in terms of memorability and security and should be favored over
other design options.
7.2.2 Autobiographical Memories
The knowledge-based fallback schemes in this thesis exploited different autobiographical
memories that included episodic memories from the very past (i.e., location-based questions)
and episodic memories from recent smartphone activities. While some of these memory
types showed bad usability and security properties, others worked very well (Table 7.1).
Location-based questions, for example, yielded very high recall rates and had, at the same
time, very low guessing rates. The good memorability properties were due to the strong
location-depended context of these questions, but also due to the way the answers provi-
sion was implemented: Selecting a location on a map (instead of text-based input) allowed
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users to recall locations with the help of surrounding landmarks. In turn, these questions
were hard to guess due to their personal nature, but even when the answer was known, it
was difficult to make precise selections on the map that were close enough to the actual
solution. With respect to the different types of smartphone activities, users found it easier
to answer questions about recent activities (e.g., yesterday or last week) that were actively
created by them. Overall, the best trade-off between memorability and security was found
for app-related questions. But how well certain questions could be answered also depended
on the way the authentication task was implemented. For example, while it was difficult for
users to recall the exact position of their apps, they showed a better performance when the
authentication task was simplified to yes-no options.
All things considered, one can say that the suitability of autobiographical memories for
fallback authentication depends on two factors: The characteristics of the corresponding
memories and the way these memories are exploited in the implementation of the challenge-
response design.
Overall, the reasons for the success or failure of different memory types as enablers of fall-
back authentication can be summarized as follows: Some of them were not distinct enough
(and thus easy to guess), lacked in active involvement of the user (and thus hard to recall)
or were too privacy sensitive (and thus should not be used). In turn, other memory types
were personally relevant (and thus memorable), had a strong spatio-temporal context (and
thus also memorable) or were personal, but not too private (and thus should be used). As
a conclusion, it is advisable to take advantage of episodic memories from the declarative
knowledge that fulfill the following requirements: First, they are actively created by the user
and not only the byproduct of other activities. Second, they possess a spatial or temporal
context. Third, they are personal, but not too private to be shared.
7.2.3 Type of Enrollment
In the scope of this thesis, we analyzed two enrollment types: static enrollments that require
users to actively provide authentication-related information before fallback authentication
takes place; and dynamic enrollments that collect this information implicitly in the back-
ground during the user’s interaction with the device.
With respect to static enrollments, we found that learnability is an important factor to con-
sider for their design in order to achieve user satisfaction. For example, our approach with
2-finger sketches did not work out due to its bad learnability properties that lead to user dis-
satisfaction. But also the promising location-based questions left room for improvement: If
users had learned earlier about the required precision of their answers, this knowledge would
have positively influenced the recall rates of the system.
These kinds of problems do not exist for dynamic enrollments, but this does not spare them
from other issues that must be taken into account (i.e., privacy and data availability). Since
dynamic enrollments are based on implicit information, they are using content on the user’s
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device without their explicit consent. There is always the risk of revealing information that
users would prefer to see protected. We encountered this problem, for example, when we
used photos for question generation. Therefore, privacy-sensitive information should not
be used for the design of fallback schemes, but since different users may consider different
types of information as sensitive, it is advisable to inform them about the availability of
dynamic fallback schemes and the data sources that these schemes use. This way, users can
opt out data sources that they do not want to be used.
Another issue that we observed was related to data availability. There were users that did
not generate enough data for certain type of questions (e.g., users that have only few apps).
Therefore, it is important that dynamic fallback schemes do not rely on one data source
only, but take into account multiple data sources for question generation to ensure better
data availability. However, in the last resort, when all data sources are insufficient, a fallback
option for the fallback is needed.
The discussed problems show that both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages
(see Chapters 5 and 6), but instead of considering them as competing approaches, it is advis-
able to view them as complementary solutions that help balance each other’s shortcomings.
Overall, we recommend the following fallback chain: A primary scheme that is used on a
daily basis to access the device, a dynamic fallback scheme that is used when the primary
scheme fails, and a static fallback scheme that is used when the dynamic scheme is not fea-
sible (e.g., when not enough data is available). This way, users have different options to
choose from in case lockouts happen and can use the scheme that is best for their current
context (e.g., home versus vacation). At the same time, the limited number of options in the
fallback chain keeps the number of potential points for attacks small to maintain a reasonable
level of security.
7.2.4 Type of Challenge, Type of Response
As previously described, the memorability and security of autobiographical memories is also
influenced by the way the corresponding authentication task is implemented. The different
options for implementation are numerous and there is no general suggestion for the perfect
solution, but our observations allow to point out important aspects that should be taken into
account during the challenge-response design.
Challenge Design While it is clear that dynamic enrollments can only rely on fixed chal-
lenges as no user involvement is possible, static enrollments can work with fixed, controlled
or open challenges. We tested all three challenge types and found ambiguous results for fixed
challenges. For example, many users had difficulties in figuring out how to draw complex
sketches with two fingers simultaneously and could not reproduce them during enrollment or
fallback authentication four weeks later. With respect to location-based questions, the fixed
challenges were less problematic, but there were some users that selected questions that were
related to less important episodes in their lives and thus forgot the answers to these questions
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within six months. Overall, we observed that guided questions were the best option to en-
courage the definition of more secure questions through personal customization (e.g., by the
inclusion of multiple pieces of information). Therefore, we recommend to use simple ques-
tions that keep the mental effort low, but that at the same time ask users (either implicitly
or explicitly) for more than one piece of information to make it more difficult for potential
adversaries to guess the correct answers (e.g., “Where is my sister’s husband from?”).
It is also advisable to divide the authentication task into small challenges that are consecu-
tively shown to the user to reduce the mental effort, enabling users to focus on one thing at a
time. This also has the advantage that the number of challenges required is more flexible and
not everything is revealed at once [75]. For example, showing all items to be positioned for
the icon-arrangements approach revealed to potential adversaries how many sub-tasks they
have to solve and enabled them to infer relationships between the given items.
Response Design Similar to the design of challenges, responses can be fixed, controlled
and open. For dynamic enrollments we mainly focused on fixed answers and advise to use
them for cued-based recall as users are enrolled implicitly and may have problems to re-
produce the exact answers otherwise. However, the use of fixed answers requires a certain
amount of questions to be asked during fallback authentication to prevent random adver-
saries from succeeding by guessing. This number varies from approach to approach and
depends on the number of answer options provided and the desired security level. For ex-
ample, while a combination of seven questions about different smartphone activities with
four answer options per question was sufficient to reach a comparable security level to PIN
authentication, asking about installed apps required at least 40 questions to reach a similar
security level.
We also tested guided/open answers for static enrollments, but the results were ambiguous:
While they worked well for one approach (location-based questions), they did not for the
other (2-finger sketches). The insights do not allow us to make a clear recommendation, but
we want to encourage researchers not to shy away from the use of guided/open answers when
novel techniques for answer input are explored. For example, we were able to obtain very
promising results for our combination of location-based questions and map-based input.
7.3 Evaluating Fallback Authentication
The different design options for fallback authentication schemes and the potential of different
types of autobiographical memories were evaluated with the help of different usability and
security criteria (see Section 4.3). A summary of the key criteria is given next.
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7.3.1 Usability Evaluation
Since we focused on knowledge-based schemes, memorability was one of the key usability
factors to ensure the effectiveness of the corresponding fallback scheme. However, we also
learned that the importance of user satisfaction should not be underestimated despite the
infrequent use of fallback authentication.
Memorability Due to the natural process of forgetting it was not surprising to observe
that the ability to recall authentication-related information decreased over time. But, it was
interesting to learn about the reasons why this decrease happened. For example, with the
help of repeated memorability tests at different points in time, we were able to find that
errors for location-based questions were made due to ignorance of how the system works
than due to forgetting the actual answers. From this observation, we conclude that repeated
memorability tests can be beneficial for the evaluation of static enrollments to reveal usability
issues on the one hand and to simulate a realistic fallback scenario on the other. There is no
strict time schedule for memorability tests, but, based on our experience, three measurements
seem advisable to reflect different fallback situations.
For example, a memorability test shortly after enrollment can help to quickly discover us-
ability and memorability issues to improve the evaluated prototypes or to reject the approach
completely. Another test after one to four weeks is useful to see if this information can be
recalled after a certain time has passed and to analyze what kinds of errors users make (e.g.,
whether they make similar errors as for the first memorability test). It reflects situations in
which users have just registered for a service/device and thus may get locked out due to the
lack of training. While these short-term evaluations are a quick way to conclude whether a
certain idea is worth pursuing, long-term evaluations (e.g., after six months or longer) are es-
sential to simulate realistic fallback scenarios that allow better conclusions about the actual
memorability of a system.
With respect to dynamic enrollments, long-term evaluations are not needed as they work
with recent information. For example, we conducted only one memorability test after four
weeks of logging for questions about smartphone activities. However, it would have also
been interesting to see, if the availability of data for these activities would have changed, if
we had conducted another test a few months after the first memorability test.
User Satisfaction We argued that user satisfaction plays only a minor role in the design
of fallback schemes due to their infrequent use (see Chapter 4). While this is true to some
extent, our results suggest that a certain level of user satisfaction must be met with respect
to the learnability of new schemes. For example, although users understood the general idea
of 2-finger sketches, they found it hard to learn how to actually draw them with two fingers
simultaneously and thus developed undesired behaviors and were unsatisfied with the system
as a whole. This means that fallback schemes that are hard to learn can prevent users from
setting them up in the first place or can compromise their security due to undesired behaviors
by the user.
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7.3.2 Security Evaluation
For the security evaluations, we took into account different types of threats. We started with
a baseline comparison with PIN authentication with respect to the theoretical security level
of the corresponding fallback scheme. This was done to ensure that the fallback chain is not
weakened when another component is added. In addition to this, the baseline allowed us to
define important authentication parameters, such as the number of required answers or the
number of allowed attempts.
We also took into account different types of human adversaries, but focused on attacks by
close persons. Since these adversaries are more familiar with the victim than acquaintances
or strangers, they are also more likely to know the answers to personal questions. Their threat
potential is emphasized by our study results: Most adversaries that succeeded in their attacks
were part of the actual memory and thus knew the answers (e.g., a joint vacation), were the
answers themselves (e.g., communication partner ) or were the creator of the answers (e.g.,
icon arrangements).
This shows that close adversaries are a good means to test the security of autobiographical
memories. But since not all close adversaries have the same threat potential, it is beneficial
for security evaluation to have a more refined view on this matter. Instead of categorizing ad-
versaries by their closeness to the user only, one should also take into account the trust level
that users have in them. This has the advantage to create a more realistic threat estimation.
For example, trusted adversaries often have access to the user’s device already and are not
likely to attack the user. In turn, less trusted (but still close) adversaries are more likely to do
so. Overall, we suggest the use of close and trusted adversaries to evaluate autobiographical
memories from a worst-case perspective, but we also advise to complement this analysis
with close and less trusted adversaries to get a more realistic security estimation.
7.3.3 Other Evaluation Criteria
In addition to the previously described criteria, we found additional factors in the course
of our studies that have to be taken into account for the design of fallback schemes. This
concerns, above all, the design of dynamic enrollments.
Privacy The main problem of dynamic enrollments is their use of potentially sensitive
information (e.g., communication details or photos) and the disclosure of this information
during fallback authentication without the explicit consent of the user. Therefore, users
should be in control to decide whether a certain authentication scheme is activated or not
(e.g., during setup), but, beyond that, the choice of data sources for the design of dynamic
enrollments must be done carefully: the information used should be personal enough to
distinguish between users, but at the same time not too private to be shared with others. We
found that app-related information possesses these properties and thus is an interesting data
source to be considered.
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Data Availability Another problem of dynamic enrollments is related to data availability.
We found in our studies that there are very different types of users: Some of them showed
a high smartphone usage behavior, while others were the exact opposite. There were sit-
uations for the latter in which we could not create the authentication task due to the lack
of data. Dynamic enrollments should take this into account and adapt the fallback scheme
accordingly, for example, by using data sources for which enough data is available.
In addition to this, data availability can also become a problem when certain trends arise. For
example, while music was mostly stored on one’s device in the past, it is now often consumed
through streaming services. Although APIs exist to retrieve information from these services,
their use would not comply with the requirements for alternative fallback schemes (e.g.,
independency from Internet access). This means that dynamic fallback schemes must be
updated to ensure that they work during lockout situations.
7.3.4 Order of Importance
Although the discussed criteria are all relevant for the design of fallback schemes, it is dif-
ficult to meet all of them at the same time. Therefore, compromises and prioritization need
to be made. Since privacy is a deciding factor whether a fallback scheme is accepted or not,
it should get the highest priority. This is followed by security and memorability factors that
often have to be considered together to find a satisfying trade-off between the two. Last,
fallback schemes should be easy to learn to achieve user satisfaction during the fallback
experience.
7.3.5 Analyzing Fallback Authentication
For the analysis of our data, we used the accuracy metric to find the best trade-off between
usability and security. It was a quick way to identify promising autobiographical memories
on the one hand, and to to reject autobiographical memories with less potential on the other.
It further allowed us to define the best parameters (i.e., number of required questions and
number of allowed attempts) for real-world deployments based on the best trade-off between
memorability and security.
While accuracy is commonly used for the analysis of biometric authentication schemes (Sec-
tion 4.3.3), it is less established for knowledge-based schemes. The latter mainly focus on
success/failure rates of users and potential adversaries. These rates are indisputably impor-
tant. However, since they are also part of the accuracy formula, little effort is required to
complement these reports with the corresponding accuracy values. We advise to do this to
enable better comparability.
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7.4 Application Areas
While the focus of this thesis was fallback authentication on smartphones, it is an interesting
question whether the results are also useful for other application areas. For example, tablets
have become popular over the past few years. They have similar properties as smartphones,
but, at the same time, are different due to the way they are used. Research from 2012 about
tablets found that these devices are often used in home environments and shared with other
family members [126]. Thus, in theory, the approaches in this work can also be applied to
tablets, but, in practice, this cannot be done without limitations for several reasons:
First, once devices are shared, dynamic enrollments become difficult as usage data is no
longer generated by one person only which, in turn, is likely to affect memorability as well
as security (e.g., the revelation of data from another person). Second, the predominant use of
tablets in home environments makes the need for alternative fallback schemes less important
as there are quicker ways to regain access to the device (e.g., connecting to the computer).
However, there are, similar to smartphones, use cases in which alternative schemes are also
beneficial on tablets (e.g., when lockouts happen on vacations). When dynamic fallback
schemes are used in these situations, one has to pay particular attention that certain activities
are not highlighted for other users. For example, although users of shared devices already
have access to communication histories, they may not explicitly search for this information
on the device. But when they encounter this information during fallback authentication,
they may stumble on information they did not expect. Therefore, we advise not to use these
kinds of information to prevent social tensions. Again, we see a great potential for app-
related approaches, but whether users are able to tell whether certain apps are installed or
not installed on shared devices needs yet to be tested.
7.5 Lessons Learned
In this chapter, we recapitulated the key results from this thesis and discussed their implica-
tions for the motivation, design, evaluation and analysis of fallback schemes on smartphones
that exploit autobiographical memories. The insights from our exploration are helpful guide-
lines for usable security and privacy research into alternative authentication schemes. The
key aspects that need to be taken into account are summarized in the following.
• Authentication Chain. Consider authentication as a chain of successively issued au-
thentication schemes for which the following components are suggested: a primary
scheme for regular authentication (e.g., PIN), a dynamic fallback scheme in case the
primary scheme fails, and a static fallback scheme in case the dynamic scheme fails
(e.g., [77, 143]; see Sections 3 and 4).
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• Use Case. Know for which part of the chain you are designing to identify impor-
tant requirements and to define convincing use cases. This sounds simple, but is of-
ten neglected, although it is crucial for the development of appropriate authentication
schemes (see Section 4).
• Fallback Scheme Type. Use knowledge-based approaches for the design of fallback
schemes as they are a better fit to accommodate the requirements for fallback authen-
tication (i.e., independency, immediacy and engagement). Token-based schemes can
also be used, but are better suitable as a last-resort option (see Sections 2 and 3).
• Autobiographical Memories. Design knowledge-based fallback schemes that focus
on personal (but not private) episodes from the declarative memory. These memories
must be actively created by the user to establish a strong spatial or temporal context
that supports better memorization (e.g., [36, 74, 76, 77, 83]; see Sections 5 and 6).
• Privacy Evaluation. Use privacy as the key factor to decide whether a certain type
of memory should be used for the design of an authentication scheme. If users are
uncomfortable with sharing this memory with others, it should be neglected in favor
of less private memories (e.g., [75]; see Section 6).
• Task Design. Reduce the mental effort needed for the retrieval of autobiographical
memories by dividing the authentication task into smaller sub-tasks. Favor fixed an-
swers for the design of dynamic enrollments, but do not hesitate to explore the poten-
tial of open answers for static enrollments to replace text-based input. In both cases,
pay attention that a sufficient number of tasks are required and a sufficient number of
attempts are allowed to achieve a certain level of usability and security (e.g., [77,156];
see Section 6).
• Usability Evaluation. Evaluate user satisfaction at an early stage as it is an important
factor for the acceptance of an authentication scheme (and thus allows a quick rejection
of ideas when this requirement is not met). However, memorability is they key factor
for the evaluation of knowledge-based schemes. For this, simulate a realistic fallback
setting and test the ability to recall different types of memories at different points in
time (e.g., [76, 100]; see Section 5).
• Security Evaluation. Evaluate the security of autobiographical memories with two
adversary types: close adversaries that are trusted by the user and that have advanced
knowledge about them (i.e., worst-case scenario) as well as adversaries that are close,
but not necessarily trusted (e.g., [75–77, 103, 128]; see Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6).
• Data Analysis. Use the accuracy metric to compare different approaches to each
other. Report the accuracy values, the success rates of attacks and the failure rates of
authentication attempts. This allows to quickly identify promising approaches and to
find the best trade-off between usability and security (e.g., [75, 121]; see Section 4).
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Looking Back, Moving Forward
Remember the girl that locked her SIM card after a flight to Denmark? That girl was me, the
author of this thesis. I was on my first travel as a research assistant and very excited about
this trip, the conference and my talk. I got a little annoyed by the lockout incident as I was
not able to share my experience with friends and family. At that time, SMS communication
was still common and not possible without a working SIM card. I really felt lost as the
alternative code to unlock it was at home, miles away, in one of my drawers. There is no need
to worry, I quickly got over my annoyance and enjoyed the conference. But in retrospect, it
feels like destiny that I spent almost four years of my research activities on mobile fallback
authentication to support users in similar situations. I enjoyed every bit of this research and
hope you did as well by reading this thesis. It was a long journey and thus deserves a final
summary (Section 8.1) and a brief peak into the future (Sections 8.2 and 8.3).
8.1 Contribution Summary
Fallback authentication has always been the second choice. Not only in the way it is used,
but also in the way it is treated by the research community: The design of new authentica-
tion schemes clearly sets its priorities on primary authentication. Only in cases where the
schemes fail, fallback authentication is considered as another possibility. This has happened
in the desktop environment (e.g., [190]) and also in the mobile environment (e.g., [37]). The
goal of this thesis was to change this situation. In particular, we wanted to create a better
understanding of fallback authentication to help it step out of its shadows. This is important
to help researchers and practitioners to decide for which context of use they are designing
before new authentication schemes are actually proposed, implemented and evaluated. The
insights in this work contributed to this goal in several ways:
First, they motivated the need for mobile fallback authentication by understanding the prob-
lems of current solutions and the needs that users have during lockouts. Second, this under-
standing enabled us to create a fallback authentication framework that helps researchers to
classify their ideas (i.e., to decide if they are designing for fallback authentication or primary
authentication). Third, through the analysis of different types of autobiographical memories,
we identified promising and less promising data sources that should or should not be used
for the design of fallback schemes. Our example implementations provided a glimpse into
the design space of fallback schemes and further demonstrated how these schemes should
be evaluated in order to get helpful results in the context of fallback authentication.
8.1.1 Understanding Fallback Authentication
Within this thesis, we provided an overview of current solutions for fallback authentication
that are used in desktop environments as well as mobile environments (see Chapters 1 and
2). It quickly became apparent that solutions for the latter were not well documented and
little understanding on their usage was available. We are the first to provide insights on this
matter by evaluating how often lockouts happen and how often they fail the user. It was
not surprising that lockout occurrences are rare, but the problems that we identified through
personal anecdotes by smartphone owners were interesting and motivated our work to design
alternative fallback schemes that are independent, immediate and engaging (Chapter 3).
8.1.2 Definition of Fallback Authentication
During our research, we encountered different terminology that described the act to authen-
ticate with an alternative scheme when the primary scheme fails (see Chapter 1). None of
these descriptions went beyond a brief explanation. We therefore contributed to a better def-
inition of fallback authentication (see Chapter 4) and modified it based on our study results.
It can be summarized as follows:
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Definition.
Fallback authentication is part of an authentication chain that consists of 1 . . .n authentication
schemes, with n∈N. Each authentication scheme in the chain involves a three-stage process:
enrollment, authentication and replacement. An authentication scheme is called fallback
scheme if it is preceded by another authentication scheme in the chain. Otherwise it is
referred to as the primary scheme. Fallback schemes should further fulfill the following
requirements to distinguish them from primary authentication schemes:
Effectiveness and Accuracy
Primary schemes must be effective and accurate in distinguishing between users and adver-
saries. This also applies for fallback schemes. Thus, fallback schemes must be at least as
secure as the authentication scheme that precedes them to ensure a certain level of security.
Efficiency
Primary schemes must be efficient due to their frequent use, while fallback schemes can, but
do not have to be due to their infrequent use. Thus, fallback schemes are less time-sensitive
than the schemes that precede them, but more time-sensitive than the ones that follow them.
This is done to reflect their frequency of use and to define their order of issue: Fallback
schemes should be sorted by their required authentication times in ascending order.
Memorability
Primary schemes must be memorable to enable recall during authentication. This also ap-
plies for fallback schemes, but is aggravated due to the lack of training. Thus, fallback
schemes must be memorable even without training. They must not rely on information that
is learned by heart (e.g., through repetition), but should take advantage of recent memories
or memories that are less likely to be forgotten over time (e.g., episodic memories).
Learnability and Satisfaction
Primary schemes must be learnable and satisfying to prevent dropouts and the deactivation
of security measures, while fallback schemes must be learnable and satisfying to be usable
during lockout situations: Users should immediately know how to authenticate when they
encounter the scheme for the first time. Thus, fallback schemes must be easy to learn due to
their infrequent use to satisfy users.
Motivation
Primary schemes exist to motivate users to protect their data, while fallback schemes exist
to mitigate potential problems of primary schemes. Thus, fallback schemes must not lead to
the loss of data to maintain the goals of primary schemes that they substitute. The enrollment
effort for fallback schemes must be kept to a minimum to motivate users to set them up.
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8.1.3 Autobiographical Memories
Based on the insights from the preceding contributions, we exploited autobiographical mem-
ories for the design of fallback schemes as they fulfilled well the requirements for mobile
fallback authentication: They are independent (e.g., from other persons) as they solely rely
on the user, they are immediate as they are stored in the user’s brain (which is hopefully
always with the user), and they are engaging as some of these memories (e.g., episodic
memories) are remembered vividly to relive the past [175].
Our contribution is that we extended the design space of autobiographical memories by tak-
ing into account memory types that go beyond personal facts, such as episodic memories
or procedural skills (see Chapter 2). Their evaluation in five example projects enabled us
to identify their potential and challenges in terms of memorability and security in the con-
text of fallback authentication (see Chapters 5 and 6). Episodic memories with a strong
location-dependent context showed the best results in terms of memorability and security:
While almost all legitimate users were able to authenticate, none of the close adversaries
or strangers were able to attack these memories successfully. App-related activities also
showed good usability and security properties when a certain amount of these memory types
was available. But in addition to this, we also identified less suitable memory types, such as
memories about photos, music or drawings. These memory types failed for different reasons
that were related to memorability, privacy or user satisfaction. We showed that autobiograph-
ical memories that were actively created by the user and that had a strong spatio-temporal
context with a personal, but not private notion, were the most promising memory types.
8.1.4 Design of Fallback Schemes
The evaluation of different autobiographical memories was done through the example im-
plementation of fallback schemes. This means that the memorability and security of the
memories are also affected by the way they were implemented. For example, our location-
based questions worked very well due to the required input on a map, while similar questions
from related research that used text-based answers had much worse recall rates due to re-
peatability issues (e.g., [139]).
Therefore, this thesis also contributes to the design space of fallback schemes. We sum-
marized different authentication-related classifications from related work (e.g., [101, 187])
and derived the design space for fallback authentication based on them. Hereby, our focus
was on the design and implementation of static and dynamic enrollments in combination
with different types of autobiographical memories (see Chapters 5 and 6). This enabled us
to highlight and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different design options based
on which we were able to make suggestions about how they can be applied in the fallback
chain. For example, instead of considering static and dynamic enrollments as competing
schemes, it is advisable to include them both into the fallback chain to mitigate each other’s
shortcomings and to act as each other’s fallback solution.
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8.1.5 Evaluation of Fallback Schemes
A major part of this thesis was the evaluation of autobiographical memories and the example
fallback schemes using a consistent research methodology throughout all projects. Our main
intention was to demonstrate how memorability and security can be evaluated in the context
of fallback authentication with respect to autobiographical memories. We further strived for
the identification of other important criteria that must be considered for evaluation.
The example fallback schemes with static enrollments showed that it is important to use
repeated memorability tests to have a realistic simulation for fallback authentication. While
early tests allowed the quick rejection of ideas (e.g., 2-finger sketches), long-term evaluations
provided better insights into the stability/change of recall rates over time (e.g., location-based
questions). The use of multiple tests was of no concern for dynamic enrollments, but their
evaluation showed that the suitability of different types of autobiographical memories was
not only a trade-off between usability and security, but also a trade-off with privacy.
Within our five projects, we used the accuracy metric to find the best balance between mem-
orability and security. This approach was not new, but still uncommon for knowledge-based
schemes. We provided reasons for and against the use of this metric and demonstrated its
use throughout all of our projects.
8.2 Limitations and Future Work
Although there was some previous knowledge from related work that we could build upon,
fallback authentication, in particular on mobile devices, was still an unexplored domain that
left us with many options that had to be weighted up against each other in order to make
the right decisions with respect to the selection of autobiographical memories, the design
of the fallback schemes as well as their evaluation. Our choices were carefully made by
taking into account previous work; where no preceding work was available, we followed an
iterative design approach to reject bad ideas early and to pursue more promising directions.
Nonetheless, this does not save our work from certain limitations that we would like to use
to light the way for future research in the domain of fallback authentication.
8.2.1 In-Depth Insights on Mobile Fallback Authentication
While we believe that our online survey reflects well how rarely fallback authentication
happens, we also believe that the individual reports did not unveil all potential problems of
lockout experiences due to the small sample size. Since our work was the first to address the
topic of mobile fallback authentication, we were striving for a broad overview on this matter
to set the basis for in-depth evaluations in the future. Still, the problems that were unveiled,
provided a good motivation for the alternative schemes proposed in this thesis.
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8.2.2 Different User Types
With respect to these schemes, one might argue that they are only helpful for a small target
group. It is true that our implementations were targeted at a very specific audience, but the
availability of alternatives can also be beneficial for those who did not report major problems
with current solutions, but who expressed annoyance with them. Nonetheless, there are
limitations to the generalizability of the results on different levels:
For example, the study results in chapter 6 revealed that smartphone owners have very differ-
ent usage patterns. In particular, owners that seldom use their smartphone may not generate
enough data for implicit enrollments. It would be interesting to analyze this in more detail
by testing how well the proposed approaches work between different groups that exhibit
different smarpthone usage patterns.
In addition to this, our study samples were very young so that we cannot rule out a possible
influence of age on the recall rates. However, this is, to some extent, mitigated by our
choice to take advantage of very recent memories or by allowing users to define their own
questions. For example, younger and older persons may have different associations to certain
guidelines for location-based questions (see Chapter 5), but the possibility of customization
enables different types of users to define relevant questions for them to ensure applicability.
8.2.3 Development Platform
The research presented in this thesis mainly focused on fallback authentication on smart-
phones. We had discussed potential application areas outside this context (see Chapter 7),
but there is also the question how well the results can be transferred to other mobile plat-
forms. Although smartphones with different operating systems have their distinct features,
most of them allow users to do similar activities, such as making calls, using apps, install
apps or personalize their devices. This means that the presented ideas in this work can also
work for non-Android devices, but have to be adapted to manufacturer-specific features. For
example, iPhone users do not have the possibility to place Widgets on their home screens,
while Windows Phone 7 users have so-called Live Tiles for home screen organization.
8.2.4 Beyond Episodic Memories
Within this thesis, we showed that autobiographical memories are more than just personal
facts and thus had a closer look at the potential of episodic memories that referred to the
very past (Chapter 5) or to recent activities (Chapter 6). However, during the evaluation of
location-based questions, we made an interesting observation that questions for fallback au-
thentication can also refer to the future. This is an interesting direction for research. To some
extent, this has been done for plans in the near future when, for example, dynamic questions
are generated from calender entries (e.g., [6]). But the study of plans for the distant future
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has yet to be done. On the one hand, these kinds of plans have the advantage that they are
potentially relevant and important for the user, but on the other hand, they have the disad-
vantage that plans are also prone to change so that questions about them may be outdated
when fallback authentication takes place. But besides future plans, autobiographical mem-
ory further contains other types of memories about the past that go beyond personal facts
as wells episodic memories. This includes, for example, the non-declarative memory that is
also responsible for conditioning and priming. For the latter, Denning et al. have shown that
priming has a potential for the design of fallback schemes, so that this direction for research
is also interesting [46].
8.2.5 Real-World Deployment
In the context of this work, we have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of different
types of episodic memories. Location-based questions showed very promising results in
terms of memorability and security so that we trust in their potential to replace traditional
security questions when some changes are made (i.e., the verification of the answer during
enrollment). For this, we hope that location-based questions will be deployed by some
service providers to test their feasibility in the real world.
With respect to dynamic enrollments, we were able to show that app-related questions have
the best potential for the design of fallback schemes. However, the number of false posi-
tives and false negatives prevents us from recommending the fallback schemes, as is, for a
real-world deployment for the time being. Instead of evaluating the different data sources
individually, we suggest to combine them to build and evaluate them with real-world param-
eters. This means that users are not asked about one data source for fallback authentication,
but about all of them: Instead of answering many questions within a question category, users
answer few questions from many categories that, for example, do not only include questions
about their app usage, but also about the apps that they install or have installed on their
smartphones for fallback authentication.
8.3 Closing Remarks
Having been the second choice, neglected, underestimated or even ignored by the research
community, fallback authentication had a cruel fate. We wanted to raise awareness for its
existence and, hopefully, we succeeded. It was a long journey with setbacks, but mostly with
interesting insights that guided us along the way and that kept our strive. For us, this journey
ends here, but it will hopefully be continued by other members of the research community.
We believe that authentication in general, will always be an important topic due to the
increasing amount of explicit and implicit information that we store and create with our
technical devices and that, in turn, require some kind of protection to prevent unauthorized
access. And as long as authentication exists, fallback authentication will be a part of it. It
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is up to the researchers and practitioners of the usable security and privacy community to
decide how this co-existence will turn out for fallback authentication. Remember: Always
know for which authentication context you are designing for and set your design focus on
fallback authentication where suitable.
138
A
Appendices
A.1 Overview of Fallback Schemes in 2014
URL ER EA SQ AA TC P CS O Comments
1 Google.com X X X X
2 Facebook.com X X X X X personal data (i.e. ID)
3 Yahoo.com X X X X
4 Amazon.com X X
5 Wikipedia.org X
6 Twitter.com X X X
7 Live.com X X X
8 Linkedin.com X
9 Ebay.com X X
10 Adcash.com X
11 Instagram.com X X facebook account
12 Reddit.com X
13 Ask.com X X
14 Tumblr.com X X
15 Pinterest.com X
16 Wordpress.com X X command line tools
17 Paypal.com X X
18 Imgur.com X
19 Aliexpress.com X
20 Xvideos.com X
21 Alibaba.com X
22 Apple.com X X X trusted device
23 Imdb.com X X
24 go.com X
25 onclickads.net X
26 Netflix.com X X
27 Xhamster.com X
28 Stackoverflow.com X
29 kickass.so X
30 Craigslist.org X
31 Googleadservice.com X X X
32 Adobe.com X X
33 Pornhub.com X
34 Espn.go.com X
35 bbc.co.uk X
36 Odnoklassniki.ru X X
37 cnn.com X
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38 dailymotion.com X
39 flipkart.com X
40 walmart.com X
41 dropbox.com X
42 huffingtonpost.com X
43 wiki.com X
Table A.1: Overview of fallback schemes of 43 of the 100 top Alexa websites in December
2014. ER = Email-based reset based; EA=Email-based reset with alternate email; SQ = security
questions; AA = account activity; TC = trusted contacts; P = phone-based reset; CS = customer
service; O = other.
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